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ABSTRACT
An empirical analysis was carried out to study urban
land value in China, where the state owns all the land, and
an implicit or explicit bidding among land users was barred.
To support this study, a survey involved over 1,000 Chinese
enterprises in two cities were taken, and their financial
and fiscal data were collected. An analytical framework was
developed to examine issues related to resource allocation,
including: (i) scarcity of land resource; (ii) the
administrative land allocation system and the "bureaucratic
mentality" that governs the behavior of the system; and
(iii) the changing economic environment and its impacts on
enterprises.
Based on the data and the conceptual framework that
were developed, two hypotheses were tested. The first
hypothesis was that the enterprise behavior is random. They
in general have no incentives, nor pressures, nor means, to
make reasonable use of scarce resources. The second
hypothesis was that land-use pattern at city level is random
that prevents enterprises conducting reasonable factor
substitution to raise land productivity, even if they
desired to.
A model to evaluate the marginal product of land and
the shadow land contribution to the economy was developed,
based on a modified transcendental logarithmic production
function. The elasticity of factor substitution and
centrality of land shadow value in the two cities were
analyzed, using the estimated marginal product of land as a
base for the land rent. A comparison was conducted between
the land rent schedule produced from competition and that as
merely a result of bureaucratic land allocation. Based on
the estimated marginal product of land, a government land
rent charge system was proposed. Various issues relating to
designing a land charge system were studied.
The general conclusions of this study are:
* Land has a tangible value to the economy, whether a
society wants to recognize it or not. Deliberately
suppressing land from the price system only results
in a growing government bureaucracy, deteriorating
allocation efficiency, and worsening social equity.
Quantitatively, land represents, on average, 3% of
the total value-added of the enterprises in the two
cities, which is relatively low compared to
international data. This is a consequence of the
noncompetitive land allocation in China. Economic
efficiency of the city of Yantai is much higher than
that of Jinan.
* Enterprises in the study do not behave randomly once
they are given incentives and limited autonomy. They
are able to relate worker's compensation to labor
productivity, and there is evidence that suggests
relationships between the marginal product of labor
and the wage rate, and between capital consumption
and the capital opportunity cost (loosely defined).
e Land use and land consumption in the two cities are
not random. There are locational tendencies for
sector and type of enterprise to concentrate.
However, inefficiency in employing land resource is
also severe, reflected by disproportionally high
industrial land consumption and weak factor
substitution in regard to location.
* Government performance in certain economic aspects
needs improvement. In particular, the basic wage
rates controlled by the government bears little
relationship with labor productivity. Shadow
locational value of land is not considered into the
tax system. The weak factor substitution in regard
to location is also a partial consequence that many
enterprises were not assigned to proper locations by
planners.
The findings that have major policy implications are:
e The proposed land rent system, which is based on a
weighted average of status quo land shadow values,
may not lead to best and highest use of land. This
measure should only be expedient, and, as the
situation permits, a new charge system based on the
records of bona fide and arm's length deeds should be
developed to replace the weighted average system.
e The proposed land rent system also has an adverse
effect that would discourage users in improving land
use. This disencentive, however, can be effectively
offset by establishing local rent administrations,
which requires that the charge is set at a local
level, rather than at national or provincial levels.
* The government can choose to collect fully or
partially the potential social land rental value.
The closer the charge level is set to the full
potential rental value, the more likely that 50% of
enterprises will have a shadow rent deficit. The
trade-off between the loss of the social rental value
and the rising number of rent-deficit enterprises can
be monitored.
* Although it is not known how much land resource has
been lost due to the noncompetitive land allocation,
it is known that targeting a small group of most
inefficient land users will raise the general land
productivity significantly. In Yantai, eliminating
5% worst land users would raise the social rental
value by 9%; in Jinan, they represent a 4% increase.
Profiles of "bad," "average," and "good" land users
are identifiable.
* The government should not expect that the land charge
system will drastically increase its revenue. The
study has shown- that worker's pay has been
excessively low compared to the wealth created by
them. To continue squeezing the enterprise for
revenue will further diminish workers' incentive to
perform reasonably.
This study indicates that the result from China's
economic reform has been encouraging, and in many aspects
the reforms in the two cities seem to have moved on a right
track. What it needs to be reminded is, however, that sound
economic policies alone were not enough to bring economic
prosperity to its people
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
An analytical framework to study urban land shadow
prices in China is developed in this dissertation, in order
to gain an understanding of land value formation in an
economy where there is no formal land market and markets
for capital, labor, and commodities are controlled--at
least partially--by the government. To this end, issues
about the current Chinese institutional setting, its land
allocation system, as well as the economic reform are
discussed. Theories about the urban land market and
spatial structure, and about production of the firm are
reviewed. Mechanisms that govern the location of Chinese
enterprises are investigated. Finally, economic models for
estimating urban land shadow prices are developed and
tested, using survey data obtained from the field.
The central task of this dissertation is to estimate
the shadow price of urban land. To accomplish this
mission, we test two hypotheses and build one set of
models. The first hypothesis deals with the question of
micro-rationality, that is, do Chinese enterprises, since
the economic reform started in the early 1980s, have
incentives as well as pressures to take advantage of the
implicit value of the unpriced land input? Has the
economic reform helped, in any way, to induce enterprises
to behave rationally? The second hypothesis deals with the
question of whether there is a partial and limited macro-
rationality in regard to patterns of land use and
consumption at the city level, or in short, whether a weak
factor substitution in regard to location exists.
Based on the results of these two hypothesis tests,
we then estimate the marginal product of land by using the
notions developed in the production function analysis. A
factor-share (or variable-elasticity) model is developed to
aid the work in separating the land-factor contribution
from the total economic product created by the enterprise.
In this introductory chapter, we take up some basic
and peripfiery issues to set the context and basis of the
study. We first discuss the background and context under
which the research work of this dissertation was carried
out. Then we overview China's land resource situation.
Finally, we describe the organization of the dissertation.
Context of the Research
The comprehensive economic reform in China started
in the early 1980s (See, for instance, the World Bank,
1985; Perry, 1985; Goodman, 1986; Barnett, 1986; Tidrick
and Chen, 1987; Harding, 1987; and Reynolds, 1987). The
objective of this reform was to alleviate the misallocation
of resources by promoting market forces. Consequently, the
establishment of markets became a prerequisite for the
reform. Chinese authorities have helped to create markets
for selected commodities by gradually loosening its price
controls and granting enterprises more freedom in making
production decisions. Various options of creating
financial and labor markets were tried in various cities.
One salient complication of the reform was that
there were severe price distortions in the economy. Urban
land in China is undoubtedly among the most mispriced
commodity, because it is a "free good" in the sense that
once the state, who is the sole landlord, assigns a land to
an user, the user can keep it as long as it wishes without
paying any reoccurring charge (Byrd and Tidrick, 1987; Bahl
and Zhang, 1989).
Land is a basic factor of production. When this
factor is mispriced, resources in general cannot be
efficiently allocated because land is sending wrong price
signals to the system. Social equity is hampered because
the government gives unintended de facto subsidies to the
enterprises that have better land. In the current Chinese
situation, further financial reform is hindered because
land cannot be recognized as collateral by economic
entities.
Some actions to correct mispriced urban land have
been taken. The National People's Congress (NPC) on June
26, 1986 passed the "Land Administration Ordinance,"
asserting that the current practice that assigns land
freely to economic entities is to be discontinued (People's
Daily, 6/27/86, p.1). In March 1988, the NPC revised the
Chinese Constitution in the spirit of stimulating a market
economy. Article 10 of the Constitution, prior to this
revision, had the following passages on land ownership and
rights (1983 PRC Year-book, 1984):
Land in the cities is owned by the state.
Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by
collectives except for those portions which belong
to the state in accordance with the law; houses
sites and private plots of cropland and hilly land
are also owned by collectives.
The state may in the public interest take over land
for its use in accordance with the law.
It further stipulated that:
No institution or individual may appropriate, buy,
sell, or lease land, or unlawfully transfer land in
other ways.
The NPC has revised this last paragraph. The 1988 revision
of the Constitution appears as:
No institution or individual may appropriate, buy,
sell, or unlawfully transfer land in other ways.
The right for land use may be transferred in
accordance with the Law (People's Daily, 3/7/88,
p.1).
Thus, the new constitution, which legalizes the right to
transfer land, has removed a major legal obstacle to
forming an urban land market. There are still, however,
problems preventing land trading. One issue concerns what
grounds that the state will use in order to grant rights to
the current land occupants to dispose of land, especially
for the purpose of pursuing financial gains through land
trading.
In China, because urban land is entirely owned by
the state, and it was initially assigned to users through
an administrative procedure free of charge, if the state
grants rights to dispose of land to whoever currently
occupies the land, there will be at least three
unacceptable political consequences. First, a sizable
revenue resource that could otherwise be used for public
purposes will be permanently lost, and the public ownership
of land--which still stirs ideological emotions in the
empowered--would be compromised. Second, the
accountability of state-owned enterprises (SOE) is further
sacrificed because they are not expected to safeguard the
property that was not acquired by means of adequate
compensation. Third and finally, inequality that results
from capitalization of land will not be tolerated by
society because neither seller nor the buyer can socially
justify the benefit or the cost incurred in land trading.1/
To solve this dilemma, one group of reformers has
proposed creating a state real estate agency to monopolize
land trading (also summarized in Liu, et al., 1987). The
intention of this approach is that as the state allows land
transfer to take place, it would assume control of the
profit generated. This proposal has a fundamental problem.
1/ Excellent comments on why the state should not give away its
assets are made by Kornai (1990). Although he remarks are on
Hungry, they are relevant to China's problem.
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In essence, if the government is allowed to participate
actively in day-by-day land transfer activities, economic
distortions would inevitably be introduced and the
efficiency of allocating the land resource will be
encumbered. This proposal also conflicts with the original
intention of the reform which is to move the government out
of daily economic decision-making.
Another group of reformers proposed a rather
different solution to the dilemma (Summarized in Liu, et
al., 1987). They proposed that the state, as the owner of
the land, should impose a lease fee (or rent) on the
current land occupants. Then, the current land occupants,
or the "first-tier" of tenants, would become lease holders.
These lease holders would be allowed by the state (the
owner) to trade their use rights with other perspective
land users (or the "second-tier" tenants), if they wish.
The reason the state sanctions the "first-tier" lease
holders to capitalize their land-use rights is based on the
grounds that these rights have been purchased from the
state. In this way, the real price of doing business can
be reflected in the economy; a land market can be formed
with minimum state intervention and without compromising
the public ownership of land. This proposal, due to its
political feasibility, has apparently been accepted by the
Chinese authorities. In fact, more than two-thirds of the
Chinese cities have experienced some sort of land charge
schemes already (Bahl and Zhang, 1989).
The next problem the Chinese authorities must deal
with is what land rent is to be charged to the occupants.
China has no land market. The financial cost of land does
not enter into the accounts of enterprises or individual
households.2/ State-sponsored land transfers are few in
number and the monetary compensations are often strictly
controlled by bureaucratic rules that could hardly yield
insight into the real value of the land. Open bidding
might be the ideal way to establish the value of land, but
the institutional constraints, such as the lack of a legal
framework and financial markets, may not guarantee a
meaningful outcome.
Under an invitation from the Chinese reformers in
the government, a research project was formulated, and an
international research team was sent to China to work with
Chinese investigators and local officials by an
international development institution. A number of studies
that explore the possibility of establishing a land market
2/ Except for newly established enterprises that must pay (in
cash and other kinds of payment) for relocating the people
whose houses are demolished, or for acquiring farmland from
farmers who collectively owned the land. Detailed discussions
will be provided in Chapter Two.
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in China have been produced as a result.3/ The study
presented in this dissertation is part of a broader
research project. In this dissertation we intend to
explore theoretical and technical solutions that may help
assess the status quo shadow price of urban land in China.
The conceptual framework of this dissertation lies
within the arena of neoclassical economics applied to
developing economies. Land is a scarce resource. Land
markets are often among the most distorted in developing
and developed market economies (see, for instance, Ingram,
1982; Murray, 1988; Dowall, 1989 and forthcoming). Soaring
housing prices, which counteract public efforts to improve
social welfare for low-income people, are often due to the
rising land prices. By investigating the basic formation
of land value in an economy, this dissertation seeks to
shed light on a situation where the true land value,
measured by its contribution to the economy, is disguised
by the distorted price system.
This study also has practical value in assisting
governments in developing countries to formulate an
3/ These include, among others, Liu, et al.: "General Report on
Land Use Charges in Chinese Cities" (Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences Report, available in Chinese); Jia Lurang, "On the
Land Use Charge and Opening of a Land Market" (a CASS
unpublished mimeo); Steen Jorgensen: "Property Rights and
Land Taxation in Capitalist and Socialist Societies" (a World
Bank unpublished mimeo); Margaret Grosh: "Tax Structure and
Land Use in Yantai" (a World Bank unpublished mimeo); and Roy
Bahl and Jun Zhang: "Taxing Urban Land Use in China" (World
Bank Discussion Paper, Report INU 39).
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effective land policy. In many countries, rapid population
growth and urbanization have raised greatly the demand for
land. The gap between land supply and land demand, both
for urban and rural purposes, seems to be enlarging
(Woodruff, 1971; Rivkin, 1976; Sinha, 1980; Wishwakarma,
1980; Ness, 1984). Despite this, in many developing
countries, price mechanisms that take into full account the
relative scarcity and costs of resources are not in place
(see, for instance, Koo, 1982; Helmsing, 1986). In forming
their policies, the governments in developing economies
need, first, to foster the growth of market forces by,
among other things, alleviating price distortions. Second,
they must provide transitional solutions to bridge the gap
between weak incipient market forces and fully functioning
markets. These two options will be intensively
investigated in this dissertation.
Land Resources in China
China's land territory ranks the third largest in
the world, only after the Soviet Union and Canada, and it
is slightly larger than that of the United States.
Paradoxically, China is also a country short of useable
land. Of its territory - 9.6 million square kilometers
(3.53 million square miles), the arable land accounts only
for less than 15%, or 1.36 million square kilometers.
Meadow and pasture land accounts for another 4.67 million
square kilometers. About 37% of the land is either dessert
or mountains, with little economic value, using today's
technology (1983 PRC Year-book).
The scarcity of land resources in China is acute
when the size of the population is taken into
consideration. China's per capita arable land is about
0.13 hectare (ha), which is 1/17 of that of Canada, 1/8 of
the United States, and 1/7 of the Soviet Union. The
comparable international average is 0.37 ha per person.
China's meadow and pasture land is 0.47 ha per person,
compared to 1.4 ha of the world average. Thus, on the per
capita basis the average land endowment of the world is as
much as three times that of China (Kirkby, 1985, p.181).
Worse still, the majority of China's cities are
located in developed agricultural zones. Urban land use
competes with farming and, as a result, the per capita farm
land dropped from 0.18 ha in 1949 to 0.10 ha in 1979.
Moreover, a large amount of farmland has been polluted by
industrial and urban growth (Zhang, 1986, p.35).
Table 1-1 provides some statistics for China's urban
land and population in 1986. These cover 295 "designated
Table 1-1
CHINA: STATISTICS ON URBAN LAND AND POPULATION
City Size (Population in million)
<0.2 0.2 -.5 0.5 - 1 >= 1 TOTAL
# of Cities: 54 117 73 51 295
------- City Proper Population (000) -------
Mean 137 331 699 1827 645
Std Dev. 45 80 147 1258 779
---------- Built-up Area (sq. km) ----------
Mean 11.2 18.5 29.0 86.8 32.1
Std Dev. 5.9 13.1 22.6 78.0 44.3
--- Built-up Area Density* (person/sq.km) --
Mean 7268 12963 23765 24699 16755
Std Dev. 3841 9101 23611 30008 19400
---- Built-up:City Proper Land Ratio (%) ---
Mean 5.8 4.8 5.5 8.3 5.8
Std Dev. 6.3 5.0 7.9 10.0 7.1
SOURCE: China Urban Yearbook 1984.
NOTE: * Assuming 50% of the city proper population living
in the built-up areas.
#= Number.
000 = Thousand.
Std Dev = Standard Deviation.
cities, "4/ of which 51 were over 1 million in population.
The average size of the city proper was 645,000 residents
and the average built-up area was 32 square kilometers.
These latter two figures would mean more if converted into
density terms. However, it is not adequate to calculate
the urban population density by dividing city-proper
4/ A settlement can be designated as a city if it has more than
100,000 permanent residents, or it has permanent residents are
less than 100,000 but it is an important industrial base, a
large commercial center, or an important town in remote areas
or on the border. A provincial city can only be designated by
the central authority, and a prefecture-level city can be
designated by the provincial government.
population by the city-proper land area because Chinese
cities are defined in such a way that large farm lands are
included. The ratio of built-up area, where urban
infrastructure is provided and could be roughly classified
as urban, to the total city proper is only about 6% on
average, as shown in the last row of Table 1-1. We assume
that 50% of the city proper people live in the built-up
areas, which is a very conservative estimation. Then we
calculate the built-up area population density. The
figures show that the larger the size of city, the higher
the density. On average, the population density in built-
up areas is 16,755 persons per square meter.
The crowding in Chinese streets is perhaps the most
striking impression of every foreigner visiting China. To
put this subjective experience into an international
perspective, we gathered some international data (from
Marlin, Ness and Collins, 1986), and constructed Table 1-2.
In this table a number of international cities well-known
for being crowded are compared with Chinese cities. The
data show that there are 36 Chinese cities that are more
crowded than Tokyo, 50 outdo New York City, 82 exceed San
Francisco, 106 outclass Hong Kong, and 142 surpass
Singapore. The shortage of China's urban land alone
justifies a close look at the land-use efficiency issue.
Table 1-2
URBAN DENSITY: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Number of
International Population Chinese Cities
City Density With Higher Density
Tokyo 29,874 36
New York City 23,310 50
San Francisco 15,370 82
Hong Kong 12,757 106
Singapore 10,223 142
SOURCE: International cities: Marlin, Ness, and Collins.
Chinese cities: Compiled from China Urban
Yearbook 1984.
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into seven chapters.
In Chapter Two, we discuss institutional issues and set out
the theoretical framework under which hypotheses will be
tested. Chapter Three is intended to describe how the
field surveys were conducted and how the data were
organized. Chapter Four will be used to consider the
micro-hypothesis, i.e., whether there is evidence that the
enterprises, which are under a highly refrained regulatory
climate, behave rationally in some aspects. In Chapter
Five we will evaluate the macro-hypothesis, i.e., whether
there is evidence that some selected enterprises, under a
bureaucratic land-delivery system, have found a way to
incorporate the implicit value of the unpriced land factor
into the product. In Chapter Six we introduce a factor-
share model for assessing the theoretical land status quo
contribution to the financial position of an enterprise and
the marginal product of land. Estimation and comparison of
elasticity of substitution between land and non-land
factors are included in this chapter. We also examine in
details some policy implications of our findings from this
study. Finally, some concluding remarks are found in
Chapter Seven.
Chapter II
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND THEORETICAL ISSUES
This chapter is intended to achieve two objectives:
First, we describe the institutional context of the study
topics and establish a pretext for hypothesis tests
required in later chapters. Specifically, two aspects of
institutional issues are discussed: One is related to land
allocation; the other deals with the behavior of
enterprises. Second, we discuss some crucial theoretical
aspects of the land market, set up a paradigm on how the
land market "should" work in a competitive economy and how
different it would function in the setting of the Chinese
economy, both before and during the economic reform.
In light of the nonexistence of a land market, we
will utilize the production function to estimate the land
shadow price, i.e., to evaluate the de facto land
contribution to the economic product and to use this
relative contribution to approximate the implicit value of
the unpriced land. This approach requires, first, at the
micro level, some selected enterprises that, on their own,
are motivated to use resources, including land, rationally,
so that they have a tendency to incorporate the implicit
value of the unpriced land into their economic product. At
the city level, these motivated enterprises would have been
allowed to capitalize the free land input into their
economic product.
Enterprise location and land consumption in China is
an outcome of a nonmarket process. Under this
land-delivery system, how is the land factor employed and
manipulated by economic entities and the planners in the
production process? Is there a possibility that on
isolated occasions the value of the unpriced land is
partially incorporated into the economic output? How would
we separate the contribution of land from the rest economic
product? How different would our estimated results be
compared to a situation where a land market exists? These
are the questions on the research agenda of this chapter.
In order to shed light on these questions, we first
take on the issues surrounding urban land tenure and
allocation. Second, we consider the issues of enterprise
competition, especially the factors that affect the micro
behavior of enterprises. Third, we examine some relevant
urban land market theories that indicate how land market
equilibrium would be achieved in a competitive economy.
Fourth, we provide a theoretical treatment on how
equilibrium in land allocation in the Chinese economy would
be reached and compare the results with the market "norms"
established in the earlier section. Finally, we examine
the policy implications of establishing a land change
system in China.
Urban Land Tenure and Allocation
The issues of urban land tenure and allocation are
complex. We will discuss them under four subsections:
evolution of public land ownership, property rights, land
use and the assignment system, and the "bureaucratic
mentality."
Evolution of the Public Land Ownership 1/
Before the establishment of the People's Republic of
China (PRC) in 1949, urban land was owned by five types of
people or entities, namely, foreigners, "bureaucratic
capitalists,"2/ "national capitalists, "3/ private urban
residents, and the Kuomintung government. According to the
information cited in Cai Qiang (1986), about 90% of urban
land was privately held, and one-fifth of the private land
was owned by foreigners. There were a large number of real
1/ This section is based on a number of interviews carried out in
Beijing, Shanghai, Jinan, and Yantai, and an unpublished mimeo
prepared by Mr. Cai, Qiang (1986).
2/ "Bureaucratic capitalists," represented by four rich families,
namely, Kiang, Song, Kung, and Chen, were alleged to have
owned about 70% of the national wealth in China before the
1949 revolution, according to the PRC government. They were
also alleged to have been deeply involved in politics and
corruption, and therefore they were the main focus of the 1949
communist revolution.
3/ This group of capitalists were the owners of lesser fortunes,
and they were considered not to have been deeply involved in
politics, and therefore they were not held responsible for
China's corruption and poverty. In the 1949 revolution, the
"national capitalists" were treated as the subject of reform.
estate developers.
In those days, land was nothing but an ordinary
commodity, a fixed asset that could be leased, sold,
inherited, or appropriated as capital paid for shares, as
financial securities, or as gift. Land transfer and use
were entirely controlled by the market. The "bureaucratic
capitalists" were alleged to have made a fortune out of
speculating on land.
The 1949 Chinese revolution, or "the Liberation" as
it is called in China, changed the whole situation. The
Liberation to a great extent was a land revolution, in the
countryside and cities alike.4/ The ideology of the
revolutionary pioneers, such as Marx and Engels, had a
strong influence on the land policy set forth by the newly
founded People's Republic of China. Marx and others have
repeatedly denounced profiting from land dealings, on the
basis that land is not a product of labor, therefore it
does not contain value. Hence any individual gain from
land is unearned and profiting from land is an
exploitation. It follows that when the "proletariat" power
is established, it should immediately nationalize land.
The Soviets followed their ancestors' instructions strictly
and promptly. The regime declared the state-ownership of
4/ Perhaps the rural land revolution is better documented for
western readers. See, for instance, Fanshen, by Hinton
(1966); The Red Star over China, by Snow (1938).
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land the very night the Bolshevik occupied the Kremlin in
the October Revolution in 1917.
The Chinese communists, headed by Mao Tse-tung,
adopted a policy that was somehow different from the
USSR's. The state did not nationalize land immediately
after the old regime was overthrown. It gained the full
ownership of urban land over time through four methods,
namely, (i) land confiscation; (ii) redemption or
buying-off; (iii) acquisition; and (iv)
"constitutionalization."
(i) The land confiscation policy was directed to
handling the property, including land, owned by foreigners,
"war-criminals," "traitors," "bureaucratic capitalists,"
"counter-revolutionary elements," and the Kuomintung
government. The action of confiscation was taken
immediately following military occupation in 1949, on a
city by city basis.
(ii) The land redemption or buying-off policy was
designed to deal with the land and other property owned by
national capitalists. Having learned from Russian's
post-Revolution economic catastrophe caused by the general
resentment to nationalizing all property, Mao concluded
that China's national capitalism warranted only reform, and
should not be treated as the target of revolution.
Accordingly, the state adopted a redemption policy in
regard to capital held by national capitalists. In the
process of incorporating their land and other properties
into public-private joint ventures, the state agreed to pay
them a 5% annual interest based on the appraised value of
property. Most of these capitalists were hired by the
joint-ventures as salary-earning managers.5/ The real
estate companies also were merged into public-private joint
ventures. Capitalists were allowed to draw out up to 40%
of the surplus from the rental income, on the ground that
they had paid in their property as shares of the venture.
The completion of the "Campaign to Reform National
Capitalism" in 1956 in effect achieved state ownership of
urban land. This redemption policy was abruptly
interrupted by the "cultural revolution" led by the
Communist Party.
(iii) Land acquisition, i.e., outright purchase of land
from farming brigades and people's communes, has generated
the largest portion of state-owned land, although exact
nationwide statistics are not available. Due to a rapid
population growth in absolute terms, cities have also
experienced a rapid expansion. The rates of growth of
several Chinese cities are in Table 2-1. It shows that the
land expansion of cities in the past 30 years ranges from
5/ Perhaps the best reference to the PRC history of that period
is to be found in a novel, Life and Death in Shanghai, by Nien
Cheng.
1.4-fold of Wusun to
Table 2-1
5-fold of Wuhan. Most EXPANSION OF SELECTED CITIES IN CHINA
1949 - 1985
new land to support (Square Kilometer)
the expansion came IncreasedCity1949 1985 By factor of
from acquisition of Jinan 23.2 95.0 4.1
rural land. Wusun 69.5 98.0
Wuhan 34.7 175.0 5.0
Before we Shanghai* 49.8 149.1 3.0
examine how land NOTE: Shanghai data were 1944 and 1982.
acquisition has been SOURCE: Field surveys, 1987.
handled in China, it
is relevant to say a few words on land ownership in the
rural areas, which has also gone through dramatic changes
since the People's Republic was founded. Before 1949, land
ownership in the countryside was extremely skewed. The
Chinese revolution in rural areas was geared to achieve the
aims of the motto "down with landlords and divide their
land." Thus, as soon as the new regime took over, the poor
peasants were organized to divide land among themselves.
The outcome was a rather magnificent rural land reform.
Private ownership of land in China's rural areas was
short-lived, nevertheless. Only three years later during
the "collectivation" movement, their lands were pooled.
The peasants were persuaded first to form small rural
cooperatives with a dozen households, then to join a
collective farm with hundreds of households and, finally,
to merge into a people's commune that had tens of thousands
of households. The commune land was owned by members
collectively, except for a few family plots that were held
privately (Cai, 1986).
When the rural land is converted to urban use, the
ownership is changed from collective to state-owned.
Proper compensation to peasants is required by law. There
are central laws and regulations governing compensation for
rural land. Normally, the following four components are
included in compensation:6/
1. land acquisition,
2. unharvested crops,
3. improvements, and
4..relocation of peasants.
The central government specifies only the general
items to be considered in determining compensation. The
actual amounts have to be determined by the local
government largely because the availability and
productivity of farmland varies from city to city.
The formula adopted by Changzhou, a city with
300,000 population in Jiangsu Province is used here as an
example to illustrate how the compensation is calculated.
Land for acquisition purpose is often put into two
categories: vegetable fields and grain land. The basic
acquisition fee for vegetable land is Y 400 and for grain
land, Y 240.
6/ Some materials in the following few paragraphs are adapted
from Bahl and Zhang (1989, pp.10-13).
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Table 2-2 summarizes the items and costs involved in
acquiring either vegetable or grain land. One notable
observation from Table 2-2 is that the most expensive item
listed is not the land cost itself (Y2,000/mu for vegetable
land and Yl,200/mu for grain land); the largest expenses
of acquiring a piece of land is the land-occupation tax
imposed by the local government (Y6,000/mu for vegetable
land and Y5,500/mu for grain land) and the cost of labor
retraining (Y4,000/mu for vegetable land and Y2,400/mu for
grain land), and in case of vegetable land, the expense of
new vegetable land development (Yl0,000/mu). In addition,
the city must provide a quota to allow commune members to
obtain "urban residence status" with a job assignment since
they lost their means of production--land. Moreover,
compensation must be paid for improvements, e.g.,
buildings, wells, irrigation facilities, roads, etc. The
amounts are often calculated as the total labor cost plus
capital investment.
Over and above this, various demands may be made by
peasants because the law says vaguely that whoever takes
over the land has the obligation to help reestablish the
production level of the brigade. Sometimes peasants ask
for a truck, building materials, diesel fuel, etc., to be
purchased at state prices. At times the compensation
package may be extended to include "technical assistance"
in helping a farming brigade create a rural enterprise.
Table 2-2
COST STRUCTURE OF RURAL LAND ACQUISITION*(yuan/mu)
Item
No. Item Price
A. Vegetable Land:
A-1: Land acquisition fee (Y 400 x 5 years) 2,000
A-2: Labor training and re-employment 4,000
A-3: If per capita land is less than 0.2 mu 1,200
A-4: Compensation for unharvested crops 180
A-5: New vegetable land development 10,000
A-6: Irrigation facility fee 400
A-7: Land occupation tax 6,000
23,780
(Y 36/sq. meter)
B. Grain Land:
B-1: Land acquisition fee (Y 400 x 5 years) 1,200
B-2: Labor training and re-employment 2,400
B-3: If per capita land is less than 0.2 mu 1,200
B-4: Compensation for unharvested crops 120
B-5: Compensation for price difference of
grain vs. oil and coal 350
B-6: Irrigation facility fee 400
B-7: Land occupation tax 5,500
11,170
(Y 17/sq. meter)
EXHIBIT - Conversion Unit:
1 mu = 666.6 sq. meter, or
1 sq. meter = 0.0015 mu.
Y 1 = US$ 0.25, or
US$ 1 - Y 3.76 (approximately, as of 04/04/89)
NOTE: * Excluding Compensation for Improvements.
SOURCE: Bahl and Zhang, 1989. Taxing Urban Land in China,
pp.11-12.
When a clock factory in Yantai City expanded onto
agricultural land, it agreed to the previous land owners'
request for a workshop that manufactures casings for
clocks. A supplier contract was signed with a special
clause obligating them to buy a certain number of casings
for a designated number of years.
(iv) A fourth method for achieving state-ownership of
land is "constitutionalization", i.e., to use the
constitution to declare that all urban land belongs to the
state. This took place in 1982 when the PRC constitution
was revised for the second time. Previously, the state had
gained control of the majority of the urban land through
compensation and redemption in the early 1950s (no
statistics), and later, by acquisition, as described above.
China, however, had never formally nationalized urban land
until 1982. There were still lands owned either privately
or collectively in cities. These included (a) house sites
of private housing built before the revolution,7/ (b)
privately owned land paid in as shares when urban
cooperatives were formed in the early years of the People's
Republic of China, and (c) land owned by small real estate
companies that was not big enough to be reformed. These
lands were never paid for nor confiscated by the state.
They were just "declared" to belong to the state in the
1982 constitution. One reason that nationalization of all
land through "constitutionalization" did not cause any
political turmoil in the country is because that transfer
of land had already been prohibited by law and local
regulations.
7/ According to the 1985 National Urban Housing Census, 9% of the
national stock was built before Liberation, and 16% of houses
were privately owned (People's Daily, 12/3/86, p.1).
25
In the 1982 version of Constitution, Article 10 was
to deal with land ownership. In regard to urban land, it
declared:
Land in the cities is owned by the state.
For rural land, the following passage applies:
Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by
collectives except for those portions which belong
to the state in accordance with the law; house
sites and private plots of cropland and hilly land
area are also owned by collectives (1983 PRC
Year-book).
Thus, it was the passage of the 1982 constitution by the
National People's Congress that officially terminated the
private ownership of land, in city and rural areas alike.
Property Rights
Before 1982, there was no specific law or ordinance
in China that explicitly said private ownership of land in
urban areas was acceptable or to be denied. After
examining a number of official documents issued by the
authorities, nevertheless, we gain an impression that the
private ownership of land was recognized by the state.
This is seen, for instance, from "The Contract Tax
Regulation (Temporary)" promulgated by the Administration
(the former State Council) on April 3, 1950. One of the
articles reads:
Deeds relating to appropriating, selling,
mortgaging, transferring, or trading land and
housing between and among government departments and
private individuals shall be subject to the contract
tax (Selected Official Documents on State Real
Estate Policies 1948-1981).
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On September 5, 1951, the Administration issued another
document, "Guidelines on Settling Railroad Real Estate
Dispute," requiring that when a non-railroad-owned
enterprise intends to make use of the land owned by the
central and local railroad authorities, "a contract between
the railroad authority and the perspective user is
required. The latter should pay a rent to the railroad
authority in accordance with the contract."
A rent was imposed on public land until five years
after the regime took power. The rent was abolished
formally following a No.15 Administration Statement, issued
on February 24, 1954. The Statement reads:
Land occupied by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), if
its occupation is approved by the government,
regardless of whether it was assigned to, or it was
actually purchased by the enterprise, shall be
recognized as public property. A land rent or fee
collected from SOEs is undue. Land occupied by
government departments, the military, or educational
institutions, if approved by the government, shall
also be set free of any charge (ibid).
Subsequently, another Administration Statement made on
March 8 of the same year stipulates:
From now on should public land be needed by
state-owned enterprises, government agencies,
educational and other institutions, and the
public-private joint ventures, the local government
shall assign land to them and no rent shall be
charged (ibid).
Above documents establish that the land assignment system
was completed in the mid-1950.
Land trading was allowed with some government
intervention in the early years of the People's Republic of
China. Restrictions on land transfer, however, were
introduced soon after the new government was formed. An
early internal official document (dated 11/25/1950) from
the Central government states that:
In order to meet the need for economic construction,
land speculation should be eliminated completely.
Urban land selling should be controlled tightly,
land price should be properly fixed, and land
registration should be continued (ibid).
The completion of the "Campaign to Reform National
Capitalism" in 1956 generally put a formal end to land
trading in cities. As far as we can tell, however, it was
not until 1982 that a national law was formally created
that banned the trading of land. The 1982 Constitution
asserts that:
No organization or individual may appropriate, buy,
sell, or lease land, or unlawfully transfer land in
other ways (1983 PRC Year-book).
All the later government-policy statements conformed to the
position taken by the 1982 Constitution. The 1984
"Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on Carrying out
Economic Structural Reform," for instance, proclaims that
"land is not a commodity"; therefore, trading of land is
not under consideration in this economic reform. The 1986
"Land Administration Ordinance" restates that no land
trading shall be allowed.
With regard to use of residential property, there
seems to be a strong set of property rights. First,
tenants by law cannot be evicted. Second, when an
individual is given an apartment, he/she can transfer it,
and it can even be passed on as inheritance. Thirdly, if
the government decides to demolish the housing, it has an
obligation to provide the individual with a similar size
apartment preferably in the same location, otherwise a
monetary compensation will be arranged.
The type of use of industrial and commercial land is
specified on the land use permit. Enterprises cannot
transfer the use rights, so that they seem to be nearly a
perfect case of a stewardship right that is assigned and
held conditionally. Any unused land reverts back to the
state. Only until April 1988 the passage of the
Constitution amendment made it possible to transfer land
"in accordance with the law." Although the conditions
under which such transfers can take place are not at all
clear, it, in fact, does not appear that the regulations
are strictly observed. It was reported that probably in
every major Chinese city, "illegal" leasing of land exists.
Enterprises that are assigned too much land rent out space
to small private firms. Thus, in China, property rights in
land can be characterized by a formal denial of private
ownership, limitations on the transfer of user rights, and
by restrictions on its use in urban areas (Bahl and Zhang,
1989, pp.3-5).
The issue of property rights bears particular
relevance to the efficient allocation of resources (for a
literature review, see Furuboton and Pejovich, 1972).
Pejovich (1971, pp.14 1-55), in particular, links the
economic growth and behavior of economic agents under
various forms of ownership of capital goods, by
concentrating on the problem of short-run adjustments in
the rate of real income voluntarily diverted to gross
investment. His analysis indicates that a reduction of
private property rights tends to change the community's
pattern of behavior in favor of a greater preference for
current consumption. Thus, a socialist state must rely on
administrative measures to increase its rate of economic
growth. This is certainly a fair description of the
problem in the Chinese economy.
If the Chinese authorities want to have an improved
land allocation system, they must provide flexibility to
land users, one kind or another, in the transfer of land.
If the enterprises are left with no means to adjust their
input-mix to reflect the relative costs and scarcity of
resources, there will be no need to estimate the shadow
price of land, because no desirable allocative effects can
be expected without permission of land transfer, even if
one can make the cost of land explicit. In this regard,
the recent 1988 revision of the constitution (which was the
third revision of the constitution) that allows the
transfer of land use rights can be seen as a platform
serving as one of the prerequisites that will allow
desirable economic mechanisms to develop.
Land Use and the Assignment System
Until the 1988 Constitution amendment, land transfer
was outlawed. Only the transfers directly administered by
the government were allowed. In accordance with the state
land policy and regulations, an administrative land
assignment system was created, under which the government
took full responsibility for assigning urban land to
occupants (Byrd and Tidrick, 1987; Bahl and Zhang, 1989).
Land assignment is largely a local responsibility.
Policies and guidelines set out by the Central and
provincial government will have certain influences on the
outcome. The provincial government is required to approve
any acquisition of more than 10 mu (0.67 hectare) rural
land. The principal government agency responsible for
enterprise location in cities is the local (city) Urban
Planning Bureau. Apparently the planners are given strict
guidelines prepared by the state to deal with enterprise
location and relocation. It appears that the state
guidelines are rather extensive, consisting of a great
number of instructions on what type of industry should be
located where and under what circumstances. Figures 2-1
and 2-2 are directly translated from a government training
menu that teaches how cadres in charge of the light
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industry should handle location factors (Tongji University
and others, 1980, p.84 and p.85). It indicates that
bureaucrats sometimes do have a sense of confidence on what
they are doing, even though their approach often seems to
be nothing more than a superficial understanding of a
grossly simplified world.
The roles other public agencies at the local level
played in the land-allocation process are also substantial.
Regardless of their levels of sophistication in
understanding the state guidelines and applying them to the
local situation, the planners thereby must play a "wiseman"
role, assuming they know what is the best for the
enterprise under consideration and what is the best for the
society as a whole. The Economic and Planning Commission,
for instance, will check on whether the amount of land the
enterprise wishes to obtain is reasonable from the
technical point of view, e.g., the requirement of the
production process and storage space for input and output.
Line-agencies and bureaus will be asked to provide
reasoning from their standpoints on whether the proposed
location is technically justified. In case there is more
than 0.7 ha of farm land to be acquired, the provincial
government will be brought in to issue the final
acceptance.
When a new enterprise is established or when an
enterprise is expanding at a new location, it may have a
limited say on selecting its location. It must indicate,
as well as justify, where it prefers to be located and the
size of land that is needed. Managers and technicians of
the enterprise are required to make frequent site visits
before and during the land acquisition.
The following nine-step procedure was documented
from field interviews of this research project. Although
this procedure is generally applied to the cases involving
conversion of rural land to urban use, it nevertheless
reveals the spirit of how the land allocation in cities is
handled by the authorities in the past 30-odd years:8/
Step 1: The enterprise sends a memo to the Urban
Planning Bureau requesting a location. The Urban
Planning Bureau makes a decision.
Step 2: If a favorable decision is made, the report
is sent to the local Planning Commission for
determination of the scale of the land allocation.
Step 3: The Urban Planning Bureau works with the
enterprise to determine the exact location, to
design the land use plan, and to plan for the
necessary facilities (roads, utilities, etc.).
Step 4: The enterprise submits a detailed final
plan to the Urban Planning Bureau.
Step 5: The Urban Planning Bureau holds a
conference involving the Economic Commission,
subcity government, the Vegetable Office, the Urban
Renewal Office, and other concerned agencies. Any
objections are noted and appropriate action is
taken.
Step 6: If steps 1-5 have been passed, the Urban
Planning Bureau will draw the boundaries of the land
to be taken.
8/ The description of the nine-step procedure is adopted from
Bahl and Zhang (1989, p.6).
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Step 7: The Urban Renewal Office (or Land
Acquisition Office) will negotiate with the sellers
on behalf of the buyer on the price of the land.
Step 8: The Urban Planning Bureau will issue a land
acquisition permit and will authorize the
construction of extra facilities, such as roads.
Step 9: The Urban Planning Bureau will issue a land
occupation permit for the total amount of land to be
assigned. The difference between the last two steps
is that often the enterprise will be required to
take an additional amount of land to allow for
necessary rights-of-way, etc.
In Changzhou city, Jiangsu Province, we were told
that the whole process previously took months but now it
takes much longer. Steps 2, 5, and 7 are especially
time-consuming. Moreover, while municipal governments can
give approval for less than 10 mu (.67 ha), approval of the
Provincial government is required for larger tracts.
Hence, another step (or a series of steps) is involved.
Relocation of enterprises is initiated either by the
Urban Planning Bureau or the enterprise. Most relocations
involve the movement of smokestack industries or relocation
of enterprises to make way for a new public facility. When
involuntary relocation takes place, it is normally the
responsibility of the municipality to arrange for a new
location. The municipal government will pay for all the
cost of moving, including purchasing the new location,
construction of the new site, new plants, and new workers'
dormitories.
Relocation initiated for pursuing higher economic
returns is rare. There are, however, some voluntary
relocations that were observed in our field work. If an
enterprise wants to move, it can draw on three sets of
resources to finance the move: retained earnings, bank
loans, and compensation obtained from selling
superstructures. The enterprise will not be compensated
for its location value, because the land is owned by the
state and was granted free of cost to the enterprise in the
first place. On the buying end, the compensation paid for
new land on the urban fringe (agricultural land) is rather
high, as we pointed out in the earlier sections. In
addition to paying for the use rights of the new property,
the relocating enterprise must rehouse all displaced
inhabitants of the area and give present users enough
compensation to continue production elsewhere. The
relocating enterprise may also face an infrastructure fee,
based on the amount of new land to be developed. Finally,
there may be some direct negotiation with the displaced
farmers that leads to additional side payments. The result
is a financial shortfall to which relatively few
enterprises can accommodate. This becomes a powerful
incentive to "stay put" (Bahl and Zhang, 1989, pp.7-8).
Several observations can be made about this land-use
and assignment system. First, the current land-use pattern,
the location of enterprises, and the amount of land
consumed by the enterprise are all a product of
administrative and bureaucratic processes. Planners must
assume they know what is best for society as well as for
the individual land user--which is unlikely to be the case.
Second, the enterprise pays a price to acquire land
initially, but this price is just a few-year's worth of the
crops planted on the land, and/or the value of
superstructures. Therefore, the price of land varies
depending entirely on what is planted, or what has been
built on it. Because it does not depend on the location of
the land, the price the enterprise pays for acquiring land
is independent of the implicit market value. Considering
the fact that the enterprise does not have to pay any
recurrent charges, the initial price paid for land is
little when it is amortized over a long time-span. This
means that the marginal financial cost of land incurred by
Chinese enterprises is essentially zero.
On the other hand, the directly experienced marginal
cost of the land, which crucially affects enterprise
production decisions and the social opportunity cost which
should also affect production decisions, is not zero. We
have to bear in mind that it is taxing for the enterprise
to go through the tedious and lengthy bureaucratic process
to obtain an additional piece of land, not to mention the
chance of being turned down is very high because the
enterprise must win approval at all nine steps of the
procedures. The enterprise under this inflexible
land-assignment system will often settle for what it has
already been assigned. Bargaining power and skills of the
enterprise personnel would under the circumstance have
undue influence on the marginal land cost of the
enterprise.
This cumbersome nonmarket approach to land
assignment has severe drawbacks. First, the land
assignment does not reflect the social opportunity cost,
i.e., the relative productivity and scarcity of land
resources in the economy as a whole. This is because the
cost of land to a particular enterprise depends only upon
the marginal land conditions that enterprise faces, which
is disassociated from the size and location of the land.
Thus, if the enterprise has greater bargaining power and/or
skills, it may acquire more marginal land than otherwise so
that it faces a low marginal land cost, and vice versa.
Even if two enterprises face identical marginal land
conditions, the location values of the marginal land will
not be captured by this system. The two enterprises, as a
result, then face different marginal costs. In brief, the
kind of costs incurred by the enterprises do not reflect
its scarcity, productivity, and the relative costs of land.
Second, the land-assignment system aggravates the
price distortions in the economy. Because each enterprise
faces a different marginal land cost, a rational
enterprise, one that tries to use a proper input mix of
land versus other factors, will, if it is lucky, take
advantage of not paying the full cost of the land and
location. If it is unlucky, it will have to compensate for
the high "cost" of the land and location. This inequity
will directly affect at least three aspects of the
financial performance of a enterprise, ceteris paribus:
(i) the costs of products; (ii) workers' wage bonus and
welfare;9/ and (iii) the enterprises' capital
accumulation. For the economy as a whole, the price
distortions, in effect, put enterprises in different
footings, so that they cannot effectively compete with each
other. The land-endowed enterprises can produce goods and
services at lower costs than otherwise, ceteris paribus,
hence the returns to these enterprises will be higher than
otherwise. This effect is equivalent to incurring a lower
price for inputs and/or getting a higher price for outputs.
Land-deficit enterprises will have to acquire other factors
to compensate for their land inferior status, thus, the
returns to these enterprises will be lower to that extent.
Third, the land-assignment system is inflexible in
responding to the needs of the economy. For example, the
enterprise that could justify paying an additional cost for
an extra amount of land or for a relocation may not succeed
9/ In china basic wages are still tightly controlled by the
State.
because, first, it is blocked by the tedious bureaucratic
procedures, or second, it can find no appropriate land in
the pool because of land-hoarding by other economic agents.
Because the land-assignment system cannot match
demand to supply, some other forces have to be operating.
Various forms of "illegal" land transfer do in fact take
place (Liu, et al, 1988). As a result, the state has not
collected, as it should have, the "profits" due from its
property. The unauthorized exchange also produces an
unjust outcome: some participants have to pay an extra
price to obtain the land they need, while others receive
profits that do not belong to them, and the financial
inequality between enterprises is further exaggerated.
The "Bureaucratic Mentality"
It may be argued that excessive land abuse and
dysfunctional location of enterprises might be prevented,
on a limited scale and in isolated cases, by the lengthy
bureaucratic process. Being a centrally planned economy
does not mean that there is no resource scarcity problem.
Just as for every other form of economy, the resource
scarcity is an acute problem that must be faced, but the
centralized system chooses to deal with it in a different,
so-called "planned," way. The land-shortage problem in
China is particular acute, as we pointed out in Chapter
One. There is no doubt that the system is under great
pressure to utilize this resource in a rational manner.
For one reason, it has no luxury to abuse it. For another,
we may argue that it is, after all, in the interest of the
state to have its economy producing and its enterprises
being successful.
One way to understand what is behind and governs the
resource allocation in China is perhaps to examine a
phenomenon that we will call the "bureaucratic mentality"
in the rest of this study.10/ Because it is bureaucratic,
the system is not geared toward recognizing and rewarding
the people who do a good job. It does, however, punish
those who do a bad job or who deliver a job undesired. To
a certain extent, anyone going along with a bad decision
risks paying a price. He or she may be demoted or blocked
from future promotion, or lose favor with the leadership.
For some really unlucky cadres, they may even end up in
jail. It is fair to say that a system such as the one in
China has never hesitated to punish, for whatever reasons,
its out-of-favor cadres, ranging from the Party Secretary
General to a manager at the grassroots level.
Moreover, the tight control of the job market by the
government makes a public official think twice about
participating in a bad or even questionable decision. If
10/ Kornai (1989) has also provided extensive discussions on the
subject. His argument is basically along the line of "soft
budget constraint," which is different but relevant and
related to the approach we are taking in this study.
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something does not work out, he or she does not have the
luxury to say "I quit" and to find a job elsewhere.
Instead, he or she has to expect to pay for that mistake
for a long time into the future.
As a result, the system will foster a "bureaucratic
mentality" syndrome. Avoiding risk is the best strategy
for cadres to escape punishment. If a decision has to be
made, the person-in-charge would make sure that the state
guidelines, such as the ones presented in Figures 2-1 and
2-2, are properly followed with a comfortable safety margin
so that if something goes wrong, the maximum deniability is
to be found. This is one reason that contributes to a
wide-spread phenomenon in China that every government
branch or agency seems to have a "position" or "opinion" on
something, but when the client asks for an action, no one
is in charge. Every agency refers the client to another.
Needless-to-say, cadres with the "bureaucratic
mentality" will create an immense problem in the
land-allocation process. For instance, it was documented
that a foreign joint-venture in Nanjing requested a
contract with local Chinese firms. One year and 64 signets
and stamps later, the joint-venture was told that there
were still several key government agencies that wanted to
take more time to consider their proposal. Facing this
situation, the firm decided to give up (Zhang, 1986).
Looking on the bright side, however, we can say that
the chances of blocking a faulty location plan is high,
because everyone in the system is inclined to say "no," and
no one is in a mode to say "yes." A "yes" requires a lot
of persuasion and courage.
Having said that "bureaucratic mentality" perhaps
helped block obvious faulty location plans, we do not
advocate that the bureaucratic system can allocate
resources in an efficient fashion. As pointed out by a
China watcher, Alain Bertaud (1986), land development in
China seems to be orderly, but the process is inefficient
because it is extremely time-consuming. Moreover, the
mechanisms in the system for correcting a mistake are weak
because to correct the mistake, another long procedure that
invokes a new series of decisionmaking will be required.
Because someone has had trouble with it before, all the
persons involved this time in each step would naturally
want to take extra precautions which will take still a
longer time than "normal" to push things forward.
Eventually, the steam to correct the mistake runs out. As
a result, when a mistake is made, the system is contented
with the fact that the ones responsible for it have been
punished, or there is no one that can be blamed in the
first place for the mistake. This is why, for example, a
huge military artillery shelling ground can be found in the
center of a city with one-million population. This is also
why storage and warehousing occupies large portions of the
most central locations in numerous cities; why large
tracks of vacant land can be seen in many cities in spite
of land resource shortage (Grosh, 1988). This is why large
numbers of low-rise residential buildings can "afford" to
take the best land in the cities.
In a land-delivery system as described above, can
economic agents incorporate implicit land value into its
economic product? This is one of the hypotheses we intend
to test against empirical survey data. To do so, we impose
some stratification rules on our samples. We do not select
the economic entities whose land use represents the failure
of the bureaucratic land allocation system (no need to test
those samples, because the result is already known).
Therefore, we exclude warehouses, military land, vacant
land, and freight-train stations that occupy prime city
locations. We will not select housing or household
sectors, whose output is not readily measurable. Time is a
factor we do not want to build into our analytical models
because a timely decision is something that cannot be
counted on in the system. Instead, we will focus on the
"productive" sector, that is, the economic entities that
are producing tangible outputs that can be measured under
the current economic system. If the selected set of
enterprises finds a way to incorporate land values into its
economic product, we should be able to observe at the city
level the existence of differential rents and land versus
nonland factor substitution. The empirical test of the
hypothesis of limited land-use rationality, therefore, will
constitute the first task of this thesis.
Enterprise Competition
Whether enterprises behave rationally in some
aspects is the second hypothesis to be tested in the
thesis. This test is to discover that if differential
rents do exist at the city level, at least some enterprises
are motivated to capitalize them.
The notion that competition forces an enterprise to
behave rationally is a basic tenet in neoclassical
thinking. The concept of competition is so important to
this study that to a large extent it structures the entire
economic and econometric research of this dissertation. If
Chinese enterprises are indeed optimizing something at all
(under constraints, of course), then first-order-conditions
(f.o.c.) and second-order-conditions (s.o.c.) can be taken
and examined, and many neoclassical analytical tools can
subsequently be utilized. If the competition assumption
does not hold up, then we will have to retreat to
descriptive methods, using statistical rather than
econometric approaches.
China, being socialist, had a tightly regulated
economy until the early 1980s. Only limited authority was
given to the enterprises regarding production
decision-making. Competition among enterprises was weak or
nonexistent, and, as a result, rational behavior by the
enterprise could hardly be expected.
Another basic factor that inhibits competition,
which still prevails, is price distortions in the economy
(The World Bank, 1982; Lampton, 1983; Zhang, 1986).
Workers' monetary compensation is low, as judged by any
international standard. A large proportion of the wealth
created by the workers is channeled into social welfare,
which, in turn, covers workers benefits that in a market
economy would normally be a personal responsibility. The
economic performance of the whole urban housing sector,
which constitutes 30 to 40% of urban land consumption, is
deceiving because it, similarly, is largely provided by
enterprises to their employees at significantly subsidized
rental levels. Investment in housing has to come entirely
from various government funds and enterprise profits.
The enterprise is the victim of price distortions.
On the output side, state price controls are still applied
to certain products. On the input side, the price for
labor is likely to be "incorrect" due to low labor
mobility, frozen wages (enterprises cannot raise workers
base pay rate without approval of the state), and other
constraints. Raw materials and energy may not have a
"right" price, because in many cases they are still
rationed by the state. Land, as is described above, is a
free good, at least financially. The price for capital
could hardly be "correct" because there is no capital
market to enable the enterprise to raise funds. Credits
and loans for enterprise investment are largely allocated
by various government credit plans (Tidrick and Chen,
1987).
However, as discussed in the earlier chapter, the
Chinese economy has gone through many changes in the 1980s.
The impression gained from interviews we carried out during
the field survey is that enterprises now do have some
flexibility in making production decisions. They may
adjust workers' compensation by setting different levels
for wage bonuses, an alternative to going through the
trouble of raising basic rates. They can adjust the
quantity of labor input by hiring "temporary" workers. In
addition, more autonomy has been given to local government
and enterprises in appointing managers, making
production-related decisions, negotiating prices, etc.
An impressive enterprise financial reform in China
was completed in 1984 (Bahl, 1988). Since then, with the
exception of a few special industries, such as space and
military industries and public utilities companies, all the
enterprises, regardless of whether they are state-owned or
otherwise, are required to pay a uniform tax instead of
remitting whatever profit they made to the state.
Meanwhile, the state has stopped allocating free grants to
the existing enterprises as expansion funds or working
capital.11/ Under the current financial system, the wage
bonuses and welfare of managers and workers of the
enterprise are directly associated with the retained
profit. Thus, the managers and workers do seem to have
pressure, as well as incentives, to maximize their profits,
subject to certain financial and physical constraints (Byrd
and Tidrick, 1987).
The above presentation demonstrates that the
argument about whether the Chinese enterprise is facing
competition (and therefore they are forced to behave
rationally) is not conclusive. Hypothesis testing is
therefore warranted. In testing the hypothesis, we will
focus, in particular, on enterprise behavior in acquiring
factors, the amount they acquired, and how they reward the
factors. In addition, we will examine the productivity of
enterprises to provide insights on enterprise behavior.
Urban Land Market in a Competitive Economy
The central task of this thesis is to estimate de
facto economic value of land in the Chinese economic
setting. We must emphases the word de facto. We are not
after what should be the "true" economic value, or
11/ Different levels of government still put out grants to set up
new enterprises.
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"correct" price of land, defined as the price that reflects
the highest and best use of land resources. Our
justifications for determining only de facto economic value
of land are as follows. First, given the presence of
uncertainty of distortion in the economic system (in terms
of its scope, level, impact on prices, economic incentives,
resource allocation, etc.), our empirical data, which are
drawn from that system, may not yield sufficient
information to identify what is the "true" economic value
or "correct" price of land. Price, after all, is only a
relative index that at best could reflect the relative
scarcity of resources. In an economy where a great
uncertainty of economic distortion exists, we do not have
the luxury to talk about the "correct" price without
referring to the rest of the price system. Nevertheless,
the more rational behavior we can observe from the system,
the more confidence we will have about the closeness of de
facto economic value of land to its "true" value. On the
other hand, if we discover that the economic behavior of
the system is generally random, then determination of de
facto economic value of land in this exercise may be of
little value, because recognition of this value will not
help the economy allocate resources more rationally.
Discussions on testing the economic behavior of the system
are presented in the above sections.
Second, from a practical viewpoint, even if we could
identify the "correct" price of land with the data whose
degree of distortion is unknown, still the usefulness of
this information is limited, because, for one thing, we
cannot count on that setting up the "correct" price for one
commodity will help untie the whole distortion in the
system. Reducing the price and other distortions in an
economy is a complex task. To force the economic entities
to recognize the de facto value of that commodity in the
economy is already a major step towards a less distorted
economic system, a point iterated by many prominent
economists in China (Liu, et al., 1987).
Having said this, we still consider that a
discussion of the equilibrium of location and size of land
users in competitive land market, which reflects the true
economic value of land use, is relevant. This discussion
will help us establish a paradigm that illustrates how the
land market functions in a competitive economy, and in what
direction we should push so that the distortion in
allocating land resources, caused by using the de facto
land-value as a price indicator, can be reduced.
Many prominent classical economists have made
important contributions to the thinking concerning land
resources. David Ricardo, for instance, recognized the
concept of economic rent as early as in the 19th century
(1817). According to him, the rent on farmland is based on
its advantage over the least fertile land, and the
competition among farmers will ensure that the full
advantage of the relatively fertile land will go to the
landlords in the form of rent. Johann H. von Thunen (1826)
further enriched the theory by forming the concept of
location differential rent. He pointed out that rent at
any location is simply the surplus of doing business in
that location--a difference between the sale proceeds and
its production and transport costs. The decisive role of
location in formation of the urban land value was fully
examined by Alfred Marshall (1890). He promoted the notion
of "site value," a price for a site if cleared of
improvements and sold in the free market. He contends that
the "site value" is just the situation value plus
agricultural rent.
For our analytical goal set out for this section,
which is to establish a "norm" or a paradigm of how the
urban land market functions in a competitive market, a
complete discussion of the "bid-price function" is in
order. The "bid-price function" is a notion proposed by
Alonso in his influential publication Location and Land Use
(1964). According to him, the individual bid-price
function is a curve that links the price bid by the
individual at each location, such that, when the quantity
of land is optimized, the individual has a constant level
of profit, no less and no more. Because the level of
profit is constant, the individual is indifferent as to its
location and size. Alonso has shown (and proved) that the
individual bid-price function has the following properties:
(1) The bid-price function is single-valued, that is,
for any given level of profit (or utility), there
is one and only one price possible at any given
location.
(2) Two bid-price curves corresponding to different
levels of profits for the same tenant will not
cross.
(3) The lower bid-price curves represent higher
levels of profits, and consequently are
preferable from the viewpoint of the tenant.
(4) In general, the bid-price curve will slope
downward. And
(5) In general, the steeper the bid-price curve, the
nearer to the center of the city a tenant will
locate.
Using the properties of the individual bid-price
function, Alonso has demonstrated how the market
equilibrium is reached in which demand and supply of size
and location of land are matched by one transaction with
one price. The analysis is rather cumbersome, and, to say
the least, a tedious trial-and-error process must be
utilized. Because an understanding of Alonso's way of
thinking is essential to our further analysis, we in the
following will take up a simple two-dimensional market
equilibrium case to illustrate some methodologies and
terminologies used by Alonso, which will frequently appear
in our later studies.12/ As the game starts, all the
tenants, numbered 1 through n, are lined up from the
central business district (CBD) to the edge of the
settlement, with tenant number 1 having the steepest
bid-price curve (from property 5). The nth tenant, with
the least steep curve, will start bidding the land at the
edge of the settlement. The bid price he/she offers is
such that his/her bid-price curve goes through the price of
his/her "marginal price-location" (which is agricultural
land that yields zero profit). Then, the (n-1)th tenant
will settle at the next available location adjacent to n,
offering a bid such that his/her bid-price curve goes
through the nth tenant's bid. Then the (n-2)th tenant,
then (n-3)th, ...until the game is played n times and the
number 1 tenant is situated at the location closest to the
CBD, offering a bid such that his/her bid-price curve goes
through the bid offered by the 2nd tenant. It is most
likely, however, that some tenants may not be able to make
a successful bid (say, w of them) at any location because
of their low profit maximization levels; this means we
will run out of bidders before reaching the central
location. Then the game will be recommenced at a closer
starting location (n+1-w), and this time the nth tenant
12/ A more realistic game that takes into account the various
quantities tenants may demand will be considerably more
tedious and therefore will not be presented here.
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will offer his/her bid. Doing so by the nth tenant will
result in a lower price structure and some of those
low-bidders (in group w) may be able to enter now. Then, a
situation will occur that the central location is reached
while there are still bidders. Then the game will be
iterated at an appropriate further adjusted location that
can accommodate all the bidders, old and new. This game
will have to be played many times (in general less than w-1
times) until every potential qualified bidder is settled at
one location and the central location is rented out (see
Figure 2-3).
Thus, in equilibrium, the bid-price function of the
market is a curve that links the winning bid offered at
every location, with all the individual bid-price curves
touching the market price schedule exactly once. No tenant
can reach a lower bid-price curve by moving to another
location, and no landlord can increase his/her price
without losing tenants. The price for land paid by a
tenant at its "equilibrium location" is determined by
his/her bid-price curve, whose shape is determined by
profit potentials, passing through the "marginal
price-location," which is the location next in the
direction away from the CBD. The price difference between
the equilibrium location and the marginal price-location is
the location or situation differential rent which
economists since Ricardo have recognized. The absolute
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price levels are determined by an exogenous shadow price
for agricultural land at the edge of the settlement.
Alonso's model has great merits in helping to
enlighten our thinking. It is, however, based on some
rigid assumptions, including: perfect factor mobility,
perfect knowledge of every tenant and landlord, etc.;
therefore the conclusions we draw from Alonso's world are
rather fragile and unrealistic. The steepness and the
level of the bid-price curve, as indicated by Alonso, for
example, are determined by a tenant's profit positions,
which, as we see, fluctuate frequently over time. For the
Alonso market equilibrium to hold, a change in one tenant's
profit situation will force all the others to pick up their
assets and to queue for a new game, which will take
numerous rounds to complete. Moreover, because everyone's
bid price is a function of the bid-price function of the
next, the whole game is ruined if one person accepts a deal
that is not at equilibrium price.
In the following, we will extend the bid-price
notion to firms in a "less than perfect" or "almost
perfect" world, in order to draw some useful conclusions
that can serve as a referee as to how a competitive urban
land market would work. We define the "almost perfect
world" as one in which at least capital mobility is not
perfect. We will also make allowance for multiple firms to
locate in the same location (or rather, in the same zone),
based on observations that in general the price level of a
piece of land is more of a reflection of the zonal profile
than the exact location (which fine tunes the final price).
Given these additional conditions, a firm in market
equilibrium may not be located at its "equilibrium
location" (refer to Figure 2-3 for the terminology). There
are a number of reasons for this to happen. First, profits
of a firm fluctuate, and the firm cannot move easily
without incurring a high relocation cost; thus, the firm
may not want to situate itself at a location where it can
only afford the rent in its good years. It is completely
rational for the firm not to move to its equilibrium
location immediately as it begins to maximize a higher
level of profits than its previous cycle, so that in a
below-average year, it can still handle the rent. Second,
even if the firm has anticipated its solid profit
potentials and has sufficient funds to move to its
equilibrium location, the availability of land at that
location due to land speculation, government-zoning
regulations, etc., may force the firm to stay put.
As a result, a firm in an "almost perfect world" may
be found not at its equilibrium location, due to a
conservative growth strategy, or land unavailability. In
this case the firm chooses to be compensated by a "consumer
surplus" for the inconvenient location. It is impossible,
however, for a firm that is doing worse than its previous
cycle and is subsequently maximizing a lower level of
profit to still stay at the same location. When the firm
cannot afford its location at the prevailing market price,
it will have to move to a new and cheaper location; or, it
can choose to reduce its land consumption, which will
decrease further its profits level, and eventually it has
to move to a cheaper location. Therefore, the market price
curve (or gradient) we are likely to observe in the "almost
perfect world" will be a line crossing all the lowest
accepted bid prices.
A qualification should be added to this conclusion.
As long as there is a tendency for the firm to maximize its
profits (utilities), which is likely in this "almost
perfect world," the firm will tend to locate itself close
to its "equilibrium location," or at least within the
neighborhood of its "marginal price-location," unless there
are severe physical or other constraints (such as legal
restrictions) that prevent the firm from moving to the
location that facilitates maximization of a higher-level
profit (utility). This implies the variance in land prices
offered by firms (measured by how much the land at a given
location is worth to the firm) cannot be large at each
location. Figure 2-4 helps illustrate the discussion.
Another set of neoclassical tools and models to
analyze urban spatial structure were developed in the late
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1960s and the early 1970s in an effort to deal with dynamic
change in the urban economic and spatial structures. The
relevant principal works include Mills (1967, 1972), Muth
(1969), and Meyer, Kain, and Wohl (1965). All these
analyses made efforts to allow for the spatial interaction
of economic agents. A concept of locational equilibrium is
introduced to handle the spatial concerns, maintaining that
urban households will stay in the location where the
marginal benefits of moving away from the city center equal
the marginal costs.
The concept of locational equilibrium is most
elegantly explained by Mills (1972). In his model, he
places urban households, who have a two-element utility
function (namely, for housing and composite goods), under
the budget constraint that the household income equals
spending on housing and other goods, as well as commuting
to downtown to work. The constrained maximization of
utility yields:
[1] ap(u)/3u = -t/x(u),
where: p = Price of housing,
u = Distance to CBD,
t = Unit transportation cost, and
x = Total housing consumed.
The equation states that change in housing price is
negatively related to the ratio of unit transportation cost
and total housing consumption. In reality, however, people
will tend to consume less housing space if they live closer
to the CBD, and vice versa, because of income and
substitution effects. This implies a larger quotient in a
central city location and a smaller quotient in the fringe
areas. Thus the rent gradient is steeper moving towards
the CBD and it gets flatter as it moves away from the CBD
(Mills and Hamilton, 1989, pp.102-107). Smaller housing
units and disproportionally higher rents mean a higher than
proportional population density downtown; the reverse is
likewise (Ingram, 1982).
The standard neoclassical urban models, with the
exception of Alonso's (1964), rarely deal with use and
consumption of nonresidential land. The reasons are clear.
First, residential land makes up the largest proportion of
land use in most metropolitan areas, given the current
zoning regulations. Second, most land buying and selling
is of residential property-related, so that these
activities set the standard for land values. Third, real
estate developers often have to "buy-out" individual land
owners in order to implement their development schemes,
which, again, transfers the bargaining power to urban
households.
Increasingly, the standard urban model has met
criticism. Bradford and Kelejian (1973), Wheaton (1977),
Follain and Malpezzi (1981), and Hamilton (1982) argue that
the model is an inadequate predictor of important urban
spatial patterns. The model, for instance, wrongly
predicts that in equilibrium the higher income households
will occupy fewer central locations if the income
elasticity of housing demand exceeds the income elasticity
of marginal commuting costs. More recently, Blackley and
Follain (1987), after testing 1975 samples in 12 SMSAs in
the U.S., conclude that the standard model is too
restrictive to explain residential location decisions by
urban households adequately. They suggest that a more
general concept of location equilibrium, which goes beyond
the assumption that urban households choose their residence
locations based solely on work-place accessibility, should
be developed.
An Analytical Approach to China's Situation
In our study, we are facing a rather different task
than the standard urban models encounter. We will focus
our entire attention on nonresidential land rather than on
residential land. Our justification for this approach is,
first of all, that in an economy where markets are severely
distorted, and where the property-tenure system is not
paramount, there is no mechanism that permits residential
land to dominate patterns of land use and consumption.
China's urban land utilization, as discussed above, has
been determined historically by a bureaucracy. As a sector
that produces material output in a "shortage economy" (a
term due to Kornai's Economics of Shortage, 1980) and
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creates badly needed jobs, urban industry in China has long
been a priority sector. The late Chairman Mao was an
strong supporter for the principle of "production first and
livelihood second." Industry was always treated as a
"favored-son" and was given high-priority access to scarce
resources. Often times local government would be willing
to violate zoning regulations to foster industrial growth
in cities. On the other hand, housing was given a very low
development priority. Between the mid-1950s and the late
1970s, national spending on housing was well below five
percent of gross domestic product, and housing conditions
in urban areas had drastically deteriorated. After thirty
years construction, per capita floor space in China's urban
areas was lower rather than higher (Zhang, 1986). In
short, we have every reason to believe that in China it is
the enterprises rather than residents that shape the
pattern of land use and consumption.
Furthermore, heavy government intervention in
housing creates an obstacle to a proper assessment of the
contribution of housing in the economy. Thus, estimation
of the land contribution to housing is meaningless because
the ultimate goal of our research is to estimate the land
contribution to the general economy, not just to the
housing economy. Moreover, because the inputs and outputs
of the housing industry in China was independent of price
mechanisms, we are unlikely to learn much about rationality
and regularity by examining factor shares and the
elasticity of substitution inside the housing sector.
Enterprises, however, do face different
circumstances. They are relatively independent economic
entities with viable financial resources. Moreover, the
economic value of the enterprise product is measurable
under the current price system, although there are hidden
distortions.
In this section we will outline an analytical
approach to deal with the China's situation, which is
drastically different from what the base models described
above. In China, urban land is solely owned by the state
and is administratively, or, noncompetitively allocated.
As we discussed in the earlier section, the mechanism that
governs resource allocation is predominated by a so-called
"bureaucratic mentality" pertaining to bureaucrats, who,
contrasting to the "economic man" who has economic
incentives to maximize the utility, take no initiatives to
make best use of resources. The bureaucrats may follow
some criteria to judge whether land is used reasonably by
an enterprise from a technical point of view (spelt out by
the standard state books), but they have no sense how much
the enterprise actually values that land at the given
location. Thus, one relevant implication we can draw from
the process of noncompetitive resource allocation is that
the variance of land shadow prices at any given location,
valued by enterprises, is to be large.
For a government that wants to initiate a land
renting system based on land value without having gone
through bidding and competitive resource allocation, it
must find out how enterprises "value" the "importance" or
"usefulness" of land to their production, given the
quantity of output and inputs mix the enterprises choose.
This is the central task we set out for this study. To
accomplish the task, we surveyed more than 1,000
enterprises in two Chinese cities of their data on profit
and cost structures, and on their land-use situations. We
then use the production function technique and some basic
urban density models to analyze these data and to estimate
the marginal product of land and the "shadow land share" to
the economic product ("shadow" in the sense that land is
not shown on the financial balance sheet) for every
enterprise at any given location. The marginal product of
land estimated from the production function in this context
represents the maximum affordable land value the government
can justifiably take away under the present condition
without distorting the payment to other factors (measured
by de factor marginal product of the factors).
Two major hypotheses are tested as a precondition to
application of the production function models to China's
situation. The first hypothesis deals with enterprise
rational behavior at the micro (enterprise) level. We test
whether enterprises under the new Chinese institutional
settings, namely, the on-going economic reform, have
incentives, as well as pressures, to deal economically with
the unpriced land. Because land is a "free good"
(administratively assigned) to enterprises, as we briefly
discussed earlier, if enterprises, most of which are
state-owned, have no desire to make reasonable use of
resources, then there will be little land value
incorporated into the economic product, and then using the
production function technique to "separate out" the
contribution of the land factor will be a gross
underestimate of shadow value of land. This is why the
first hypothesis test is set up. Various aspects of
enterprise behavior on employing and rewarding factors are
studied.
The second hypothesis deals with the land use
rationality from macro (city's) point of view. If
enterprises do desire to use scarce resources reasonably to
serve their own interest, but the bureaucracy that controls
the land resource assigns enterprises to totally
inappropriate locations, then there will still be little
land value that could have been incorporated into the
economic product of enterprises. Thus, tests on whether
there are factor substitutions with respect to location,
and whether gradients for profit and factor employment
intensity, are relevant.
Having tested these two hypothesis, we then pursue
the production function approach to establish directly the
relationship between factor input and the economic product.
From estimated production functions (estimated via
cross-sectional data), we can calculate the marginal
product of land and land share for all the enterprises
individually. We examine the spatial distribution of the
marginal product of land. Using regression techniques,
aided by the urban density model, we identify a weighted
average enterprise affordable price curve (WAEAP curves
hereafter). This curve becomes a reference point for the
status quo land values.13/
Before we introduce how the WAEAP curves are applied
in our study, we should establish the characteristics of
the WAEAP curve. The WAEAP curve, in short, is just a
weighted average line that extends from the CBD to the
fringe and goes between the highest and lowest "shadow"
land values, revealed by the way enterprises convert inputs
into economic product in their production processes. It is
13/ We must point out that regardless of the result of the
hypothesis test (positive or negative), we can always
establish the WAEAP curve. The hypothesis testing, however,
is still relevant to the research because the result will
indicate to us that the WAEAP curve we estimated is far off
the market outcome, if the result is negative, or is close to
the market outcome, if the result is positive.
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a curve that reflects how an average enterprise values the
importance of land as a result of a noncompetitive land
allocation. Plotting this line and all the actual
enterprise affordable land rents against the distance to
CBD, about half of the enterprises are to be found
underneath that curve. This indicates that if the WAEAP
schedule is to be used as the proposed government land
rent, fifty percent of the enterprises will not be able to
afford the current location.
There are some fundamental difference between the
WAEAP curve and the bid-price curve in Alonso's sense, or
the prevailing market price curve in the "almost perfect
world." While the latter are a fair description how the
land rent is actually determined in a competitive process
of resource allocation, the former represents a status quo
average shadow rent schedule as a result of the
noncompetitive process of land allocation. This implies
that a rent charge based on the WAEAP curve may not
necessarily lead to the "best and highest use" of land.
Furthermore, in Alonso's world, a more efficient use of
land will enable the user to move to a higher level of
profit maximization. It may or may not affect the general
level of the bid-price curve of the market, depending on
the result of a newly reached market equilibrium described
earlier. In the "almost perfect world," it is clear that
an improvement of land use may not affect the land price
level, but will enable the user to enjoy a higher "consumer
surplus," if the user decides to stay put. Under the
Chinese context, however, an improvement in land use will
directly cause the WAEAP curve to move to a higher level.
This means that efficient land use will be penalized if we
decide to use the WAEAP curve as the government land rent
schedule. We will turn to discuss this issue more
completely later in this section.
Now let's focus on the different shapes of the
bid-price curve and the WAEAP curve. First, we simplify
Alonso's world into two sectors, commerce and industry, and
assume that both sectors have "well behaved" bid-price
curves, in the sense all the commercial firms have exactly
the same location tastes and are maximizing the same level
of profit, and that all the industrial firms are doing the
same (In estimating the production function from
cross-sectional data we will have to make similar
assumptions). For convenience, we further assume that the
bid-price curve of commerce is steeper than that of
industry. Given these assumptions, what we observe is that
two sectoral bid-price curves cross over at a point, say,
i, and between the CBD and i all the land is occupied by
commerce, and all the land beyond i is occupied by
industry. The WAEAP curve, on the other hand, is a line
that is below the commercial and industrial bid-price
curves between the CBD and i, and from i on, respectively
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(See Figure 2-5). The reason for the WAEAP curve being
below the commercial bid-price curve between the CBD and i
is because there are lower-bid industrial firms that, due
to the noncompetitive resource allocation, penetrate the
zone where commerce's bid is consistently higher (otherwise
the WAEAP curve would concur with the commercial bid-price
curve). By the same token, the penetration of commercial
firms into the zone where industries give consistently
higher bid, causes the WAEAP curve to go below the
industrial bid-price curve from i onward.l4/ The analysis
makes it clear that the WAEAP curve does not represent a
price schedule that reflects the best use of resources.
The resource waste, then, is exactly the areas between the
winning bid-price curves and the WAEAP curve (enclosed by
abdef in Figure 2-5).
The difference between the WAEAP curve and the
market-price curve of the "almost perfect world" is simple:
while about 50% of the enterprise are to be seen beneath
the WAEAP curve, none are to be found underneath the
market-price curve. This does not mean the WAEAP curve is
necessarily always located higher than the market price
14/ The worst case happens when, say, a land planning department
is fully controlled by "counter revolutionary elements," who
are committed to sabotage the economy. In this case, the
"counter revolutionaries" will systematically allocate land
between CBD and i to the industry and that between i and g to
the commerce. Consequently, the economy will suffer a loss of
the total land location value, represented by the areas
enclosed by ADC and DEGH.
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curve at any given location. It is only true if both the
market price and the WAEAP curves are derived from a
land-use situation that is a result of competitive resource
allocation. Because the WAEAP curve is derived from the
Chinese settings that is a result of noncompetitive
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resource allocation, it is likely that many enterprises
situated below the WAEAP curve just reflect land resource
abuse. It is these low points that bring down the level of
the WAEAP curve. Therefore there is no comparison as to
which curve, the WAEAP or the market-price curves, is at a
higher location, or by how much.
Because our data are a result of a process of
noncompetitive resource allocation, we run short of means
to identify the bid-price curves or prevailing market-price
curves for various land users. The WAEAP curve is all we
have. What can we do about the WAEAP curve? Given the
analysis we presented above, we design two applications
that may yield light for some practical policy decisions
that have to be made if the Chinese authorities decide to
impose a rent on the users who are using its land.
(i) Measuring resource gain from improving land use
efficiency. In Figure 2-5 we indicated a possibility to
study the issue of resource waste due to the noncompetitive
allocation of land. Unfortunately, this scheme cannot be
implemented because we do not have a reference for the true
bid-price curves for different sectors. Given the
information we have, however, we can take a different
approach to evaluate the social gain from improving land
use.
73
The WAEAP curve to a great extent reflects the
average status quo land "usefulness" to enterprises. The
extremely inefficient land users, who see land as not very
useful or important to them, will be located far below the
WAEAP curve. It is these inefficient land users that bring
down the level of the WAEAP curve. Thus, removing some
extremely low observations from estimation of the WAEAP
curve will result in a raised level of the WAEAP curve.
Removing low points can be envisaged as a result of
improved land use of those inefficient enterprises (to the
average level at their current locations), or relocating
the ones that are mislocated in the first place to
appropriate locations. Thus, the additional area covered
by the raised WAEAP curve shows the gain of the social
rental value that would result from improving land-use
efficiency in this manner (see Figure 2-6).
(ii) Setting the land rent schedule. Another practical
issue we intend to shed light on is how the government land
rent rates should be scheduled. In a fair game, landlords
(there is only one landlord in China: the government)
should be awarded the full marginal product that is due to
land, which is the economic rent seen by Ricardo. In the
Chinese situation, however, the government cannot go after
every tenant to negotiate an individual payment arrangement
that ensure that all the marginal product of land is taken
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Fig. 2-6: SOCIAL GAIN FROM IMPROVED LAND USE
by the government, because the marginal product of land is
determined in such a manner that the harder the user tries
to use land efficiently, the higher the marginal product of
land will be, justifying government to ask for a higher
rent. This suggests that an individually negotiated system
will discourage land users from using land efficiently.
Now let's consider if the WAEAP curve should be used
as a referee for the government land rent. If the full
level of the WAEAP curve is charged, then the public will
be able to realize the full current land value (as a result
of the noncompetitive resource allocation), but about 50%
of the firms will be located in the rent-deficit zone (area
below the WAEAP curve). This means they cannot pay the
rent without distorting the payment to other factors. A
lower rent, nevertheless, can always be considered to
reduce the proportion of enterprises that may have payment
problem,'as indicated by Figure 2-7. A schedule parallel
to the WAEAP curve but 1.65 standard error below, for
instance, will leave 5% of the firms in the deficit zone,
while the other 95% will enjoy a surplus. As a result, a
certain percentage of the land rent, which depends on the
shape of the WAEAP curve, is lost that could have otherwise
been collected by society. Using the kind of "if-then"
language, we can build a scenario evaluation to guide the
trade-off the government has to make: to stand more uproar
from the enterprises that are sunk in the rent-deficit
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zone, or to give up more land revenue that could be
collected, at least by theory.
If the WAEAP curve itself is adopted as the land
rent schedule, there are at least two major advantages:
(1) The status quo land value is fully realized by society;
and (2) The ones who use land efficiently, consequently
they are situated in the rent-surplus zone (above the WAEAP
curve), are rewarded by a rent surplus with amount that is
higher than the average curve. The ones in the
rent-deficit zone, as a result of using land inefficiently,
are punished. They have to make up the rent deficit
(distance between their actual marginal product of land to
the WAEAP curve) by squeezing other factor payments. This
effect creates a prisoner's dilemma: unless land users all
collude not to improve land use, so that everyone will end
up paying a low rent, there is a strong incentive for
individual users in the rent-deficit zone to move up to the
rent-surplus zone, despite everyone knowing that its effort
to move up contributes to a higher level of WAEAP curve
overall and therefore higher rent for everybody. In this
way, the prisoner's dilemma effectively offsets the adverse
effect that the WAEAP rent may penalize efficient land
users, a topic we touched earlier.
The prisoner's dilemma, however, does not help
countervail the adverse incentive effect of the WAEAP
schedule at the intercity level, i.e., the city that uses
land more efficiently will result in a higher level of the
WAEAP curve, which justifies the owner (the government) to
collect more rent from that city as a whole, and vice
versa. Therefore, some overall local communal efforts may
be made to curb the rise of the WAEAP curve. This means
that the goal of the rent schedule to improve land-use
efficiency will be compromised, along with the government
revenue. This effect signifies the necessity to make the
land rent in China a local charge rather than a central or
provincial charge. If this charge is nonlocal (central or
provincial), the local government may head a citywide
conspiracy to discourage efficient land use so as to avoid
a higher payment of rent to the higher levels of
government. If the charge is local, and if it set at some
kind of average level, then the "prisoner's dilemma" we
described earlier will work to improve land efficiency,
which is the whole purpose of having a land charge.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we study two aspects of the Chinese
institutional issues: land allocation and enterprise
competition. In short, China's property rights in urban
land can be characterized as the denial of private
ownership, limitations on the transfer of use rights, and
restrictions on its use. The voluntary relocation of
enterprises is rare.
The "bureaucratic mentality" describes the main
mechanism that governs land allocation process in China.
Fear of being punished makes bureaucrats extremely cautious
not to participate in a decision that might be technically
unjustified or that might violate state guidelines. We
argue, therefore, that the inefficiency arising from land
allocation in a centrally planned economy is not so much
the bad decisions the planners make; it is more the lack
of good ones, and the time it takes to make. Furthermore,
in case a mistake is made, there is no built-in mechanism
in the system to correct it. We will test whether some
enterprises under this system do nonetheless find a way to
capitalize the free land input into the economic product.
A second test for this thesis concerns whether some
enterprises do behave rationally, as reflected in the
pattern of their possession and acquisition of production
factors. Again, the argument is inconclusive. On the one
hand, we may argue that the Chinese economy is perhaps one
of the most regulated in the world, which makes factor
substitution and production adjustment very difficult. As
a result, the enterprises cannot be expected to utilize
production factors efficiently. On the other hand, we can
also argue that the economic reform in China has greatly
changed the behavior of enterprises. For a limited number
of enterprises in the economy, because the reward to
workers and managers has been somehow related to their
productivity, they may have incentives, as well as
pressures, to optimize their production when they are
permitted.
If limited rational behavior can be observed, i.e.,
if there is evidence that enterprises do find a way to use
land rationally; plus there is at least limited land use
rationality at the city level, then we can expect that part
of the land value is incorporated into the product of the
enterprise. Then, we can proceed with our analysis of the
composition of the enterprise product. If one of the two
or both conditions are not met, it means there would be
little value that has been incorporated into enterprise
product.
Regardless of the outcome of the hypothesis test, we
can always establish a weighted average enterprise
affordable price curve (WAEAP curve). The hypothesis
testing, however, is relevant to the research in the sense
that its result indicates whether the WAEAP curve we
estimated is far off the market outcome, if the result is
negative, or is close to the market outcome, if the result
is positive.
Since the WAEAP curve does not result from
competitive land allocation, there will be a "social rental
loss" if it is adopted as the proposed land rent by the
government; and moreover, 50% of the enterprises will have
to make up the rent by reducing payment to other factors in
the short-run when factor substitution has not taken place.
From a practical point of view, to establish the rent
schedule as parallel to but, say, 1.65 standard deviations
below the WAEAP curve, may alleviate the short-run
financial pressure on firms, but will cause further social
rental value loss.
Another policy implication of using the WAEAP curve
as proxy value measures for the newly established land rent
system is that the rent has to be administered by the local
government (as opposed to a central or provincial charge).
This because the rent is set up in such a way that the more
efficiently the individuals utilize their land (creating a
higher marginal product of land), the higher the WAEAP
curve will be. This implies that if all the individual
land users take a collusive action, not to improve land use
(i.e., not to increase the marginal product of land), then
they may end up paying a lower rent than otherwise. If the
rent charge is centrally or provincially established, there
might be a high incentive for the local government to lead
that collusive action. Only by putting the local
government in charge can a favorable "prisoner's dilemma"
situation be created that will not discourage the
improvement of land use.
Chapter III
FIELD SURVEY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In this thesis, quantitative analysis is the main
approach that helps us test various hypotheses on
enterprise behavior and land-use rationality. We also use
an econometric method to estimate the parameters of
marginal land-price models. Data quality is, therefore,
vitally important to this thesis. The data supporting this
thesis were generated from numerous field surveys conducted
in 1987 in two Chinese cities, namely, Yantai and Jinan in
Shandong Province in northeast China. We have not found
similar attempt made by international researchers to
collect financial data on Chinese enterprises on such a
large scale and in such a systematic manner. For this
reason, the mistakes made in the field and the lessons we
learned may be worth sharing.
This is a descriptive chapter in which we give
detailed descriptions of survey procedures and
methodologies and provide a general picture of the data.
In particular, we discuss how the survey instruments were
designed, how the survey was administered, and how the data
are defined and organized. We also provide some
descriptive statistics of the structure and the relations
in the data. Background information on the two survey
cities is compiled in an addendum to this chapter.
General Considerations of Sample Selection
Although the methodologies and procedures for the
two cities are different in several major aspects, the
general considerations imposed on sample selection in both
cities are virtually the same. First, the survey is
designed and limited to only "productive" sectors, i.e.,
industrial and commercial enterprises that produce
reasonably "measurable" output from reasonably "measurable"
input. Urban households and the housing sector are not
included in the survey, on the basis that the work to sort
out the price distortion caused by government subsidies to
urban households on food, housing, transport, etc., is well
beyond the scope of this research. The residential land
use is subsequently excluded from the survey. In Yantai we
sampled equally from both industrial and commercial
sectors; but after a more thorough study of the data, we
are convinced that the commercial sector is more dominant
in land use and more sensitive to location impacts than the
industrial sector. Therefore in Jinan we took more
commercial samples than industrial ones. Roughly two-
thirds of the Jinan sample consists of commercial
enterprises.
Second, because the goal of this study is to
estimate the shadow price of urban land, the sample is
drawn only from the built-up areas. Since China adopted a
policy calling for "putting counties under city
administration" in the early 1980s to encounter China's
unique problems of "territory and function" (terminologies
first used by John Friedmann and Clyde Waiver, 1984), large
tracks of rural land have been drawn into city boundaries.
The built-up area of Yantai, for instance, is only 0.03% of
the total land area of the "municipality." Consequently,
the variation of the potential land rent in outlying rural
counties, we believed, is likely to be very large, and to
depend more on the type of land use (agriculture versus
industry, for instance) than location. In addition, there
is not enough of the sample population in the outside areas
to establish the average trend of land value. We therefore
exclude enterprises located outside built-up areas from the
survey.
Third, the sample includes both large and small
firms, but more emphasis is given to the large ones,
because the latter is dominant in land use, and, as a
practical consideration, the latter often keep good
bookkeeping accounts. The sample also includes both state-
owned and nonstate-owned establishments, but most privately
owned enterprises fall outside of the survey because of
their small size, irregular locations, or their bookkeeping
practices which are not up to the survey standards.
Planners in both cities have divided the city into zones
that, in their judgement, reflect the centrality of
location; but since there are no statistics on the number
of each type of enterprise in each zone, it is not possible
to stratify the sample by location, while controlling for
type of enterprise (such as sector, size and ownership).
Some arbitrary decisions, therefore, are made by the survey
administrators to ensure that each zone was fairly
presented.
Fourth, data are drawn from three consecutive
financial years 1/ of 1984, 1985, and 1986. The intention
of drawing a short-span time-series data is to base our
analysis on an average enterprise performance over a few
years rather than a particular individual year. To our
knowledge, swift policy changes in China have caused great
fluctuations in enterprise performance, and a multiple-
years average-data set helps us reduce data instability.
The following data were obtained from the surveys:
(i) general information on the enterprise (type of
business, location, date of establishment, ownership,
sector/industry); (ii) size (number of employees, value of
assets, amount of working capital, designed output
capacity); (iii) revenue structure, cost structure, and tax
liabilities; and (iv) land-use information (lot size and
building area). Enterprises included in the survey were
all numbered, and the locations of them were marked on a
1/ In china, financial year is the same as calendar year.
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street map, and assigned x-y coordinates. The detailed
survey instruments are attached in Appendix 1.
In addition to the data collected directly from the
surveys, a set of location characteristics attached to
enterprises was assembled. These new observations include:
the distances to major urban amenities and municipal public
utility networks (such as central business district, bus
routes, long-distance bus stations, passenger- and freight-
train stations, sites of power and water supplies),
densities of population and enterprises, current and
planned land-use patterns, etc.
Survey Procedure and Methodology: Yantai
The Yantai survey, the first field work of this
research project, started in March 1987. The survey was
principally designed by a World Bank research team, jointly
administered by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS) and Yantai Economic Research Center (YERC). The
field work, from survey design to a prepared data set in an
electronic form, took about four months.
The survey procedure had several phases:
(i) Initially, we interviewed officers from the
municipal financial department as well as
accountants from enterprises to learn the local
financial system and enterprise accounting
practices.
(ii) Based upon the knowledge gained from
interviews, we designed questionnaires for both
industrial and commercial sectors. We then
administered a small-scale trial to detect potential
problems in filling out the questionnaire. The
survey instrument was subsequently modified.
(iii) Because neither we nor Yantai officials know
the exact number of enterprises by size and
ownership located in the built-up areas, it was not
possible to stratify the sample. Many ad hoc
decisions were made at this stage. Several over-
subsidized subsectors, such as food stores and
vegetable shops, and over-profitable businesses,
such as foreign tourist hotels, were excluded from
the survey. The Yantai Economic Research Center
(YERC) did, however, come up with a partial list
from which about 500 enterprises were randomly
chosen. Questionnaires are mailed or delivered to
the selected enterprises. For various reasons, only
388 enterprises are later found to have received the
questionnaires.
(iv) We asked the enterprises to return the
questionnaire within one month. If the
questionnaire was not returned after 30 days, a
reminder was sent by the YERC to urge the enterprise
to file the form. After another 30 days if there
was still no response, YERC and CASS officers made a
site visit to press for compliance. Eventually 307
questionnaires were recovered. Data were processed
in Beijing by the CASS research team.
From what we know of the accounting system of
enterprises, we set up a set of identities and we expected
that they would be satisfied. The returned questionnaires
are of uneven quality. About 80% of returned
questionnaires fail to pass our consistency check for cost
and profit structures of enterprise. For the records that
failed to pass the identity test, we took several actions
to "force" the account to balance. Two residual variables,
B1 and B2 , are introduced to facilitate this procedure,
where B1 is balancing cost, and B2 is tax treatment. Table
3-1 summarizes the identity system and the manipulations we
performed in preparing the data.
Survey Procedure and Methodology: Jinan
The Jinan survey was made in September 1987, two
months after the Yantai survey was completed. The survey
was agreed to and later closely assisted by the local
government and was administered by a four-member team fro
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). It took
about five months for the team to retrieve the
questionnaires and input the data into computer.
The design of the survey took a substantial amount
of our time in the field (11 days out of two weeks).
Having learned from the experience in Yantai, we
drastically modified our survey instrument. Unlike the
Yantai survey, the Jinan questionnaires were designed
Table 3-1
YANTAI: SUMMARY OF DATA PREPARATION PROCEDURE
-------------------------------------------------
Accounting
Identity Manipulations
-------------------------------------------------
Total Sales Value as reported
Sales Taxes - as reported
Total Cost - takin max {total cost, sum of costs}
Residual B1  + (>0 I subsidy, <0 if unreported cost)
Gross Profit = as reported
Profit Taxes - as reported
Residual B2  + (>0 if tax preference, <0 if additional tax)
Retained
Earnings ( as reported
-------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Bahl and Zhang, 1989.
m
differently for industry and commerce. We also provide on
the questionnaire the correct relationship between the
items. The costs and profits structures are logically
related one to another, so that the person who fills in the
questionnaire as well as the survey administrator was able
to check that the number filled in is correct.
The survey methodology and sampling procedures for
the Jinan survey were:
(i) From two separate 1985 censuses, one for
industry and one for commerce, we obtained a list of
all industrial and commercial enterprises located in
Jinan as of 1985. Based upon the list, we
eliminated all the enterprises that were located in
suburban counties. This leaves 682 industrial and
4,304 commercial enterprises which constitute the
total population.
(ii) Taking into account the budget and time
constraints, we arbitrarily decided on a sample of
700, with two-thirds (465) of it from commercial
enterprises and one-third (235) from industry. We
also decided that all large enterprises should be
included in the survey, since they contribute most
significantly to the city economy. By "large" we
mean all industrial plants classified by the State
Planning Commission as large or commercial shops
employing more than 50 persons if they are owned by
the state, or 40 persons otherwise. There are 303
such "large" enterprises, 66 are industrial, 237 are
commercial.
(iii) We then formulated the rules to draw the rest
of the sample. From the remaining 616 medium and
small industrial enterprises, 169 more samples were
needed to make up the required 235 industrial sample
size. We took every fourth enterprise
(169/616=27.4%) that appeared on our industrial
list. From the remaining 4,067 medium and small
commercial enterprises, 228 more are needed to make
up the commercial sample size of 465. We take one
out of 20 organizations (228/4067=5.6%) from the
commercial list. When surveyors report a missing
enterprise (i.e., it was moved, gone out of
90
business, etc.), we used the same stratification
rules to pick a new enterprise.
We had little problem in checking consistency of
Jinan data. Only some minor adjustments were required, for
instance, to correct typing errors (such as correct 423 to
432) and misuse of units.
Tables 3-2 and 3-3 contain sampling statistics.
Overall, 34% of the total industrial enterprises and 11%
commercial enterprises were sampled. In both commercial
and industrial sectors, large and state-owned enterprises
were over-sampled, while the others were under-sampled.
Variable Meanings and Measurement
There are four types of variables included in the
database for this study: (i) financial variables in 1,000
Table 3-2
JINAN: INDUSTRIAL SAMPLING STATISTICS
Ownership Scale
Administrator Total State Non-State Large Medium Small
Center 27 26 1 6 7 14
Province 33 24 9 0 7 26
City 130 77 53 9 36 85
Sub-City 45 2 43 0 1 44
Total samples 235 129 106 15 51 169
Total popula. 682 209 473 16 62 604
% of Sam/Popu. 34.5% 61.7% 22.4% 93.8% 82.3% 28.0%
SOURCE: Compiled from the survey data.
Sam/Popu.=The sampled over population.
Table 3-3
JINAN: COMMERCIAL SAMPLING STATISTICS
Ownership Scale
Subcity Large ---- ---- Small ----
District Total State Non-State State Non-State State Non-State
Lixia 107 43 64 26 36 17 28
Central 134 78 56 55 21 23 35
Tiangiao 58 26 32 15 12 11 20
Hulyin 65 27 38 12 13 15 25
Suburb 101 7 94 0 47 7 47
Total
Samples 465 181 284 108 129 73 155
Total
Population 4084 919 3165 108 129 811 3036
Percent of
Sam./Popul. 11.4% 19.7% 9.0% 100.0% 100.0% 9.0% 5.1%
SOURCE: Compiled from the survey data.
Sam./Popul.=The Sampled over Population.
yuan in 1986 constant value; most of which are
recalculated from the survey questionnaires; (ii) distance
variables, in kilometers; most of which are obtained from
calculations using the coordinates of enterprises and the
landmarks such as central business district (CBD), train
station, etc.; (iii) variables such as the number of
workers, square meters of land and building areas; and
(iv) dummy variables, such as state-owned or nonstate owned
operation (1 = state-owned and 0 = otherwise), industry or
commerce (1 = industry and 0 = otherwise).
The meanings of most variables are straightforward.
In the following we will provide detailed descriptions on
some key variables, especially the ones we created for our
analytical purposes.
o Labor The labor figures reported by enterprises are the
year-end numbers. There are basically two types of labor
included in the survey: permanent and temporary (or
contract) workers. Unless otherwise specified, variable
labor will refer to the total number of workers, including
both permanent and temporary.
o Capital There are different types of capital referred to
in this study:
KO = designated to the gross original book-value of
the fixed assets;
K1 = the net value of the fixed assets, i.e., the
asset value net of annual depreciation;
K2 = the total working capital, or circulation
funds, most of which is cash and banks loans and
credit; and finally,
K3 = the fraction of the circulation funds that is
set aside by the enterprise from its retained
earnings.
Unless otherwise defined, variable capital will refer to
the total value of the capital of the enterprise, i.e., the
sum of the net value of fixed assets and working capital.
o Building and Land areas Buildings are classified into
two categories: (i) the productive building, implying the
building is designated for production purposes, for
example, plants, workshops, shops, etc.; and (ii) the
nonproductive building, including the ones that are not
93
used directly in the production process, such as
dormitories, clinics, schools, etc. Land area reported by
the enterprise includes all lands assigned by the state,
i.e., it includes land for productive and nonproductive
buildings. If an enterprise shares the building with
others, the amount of land reported is the proportion of
the building it uses. We have adjusted the land area
figures; only the "productive" land is included in our
analysis unless otherwise specified.
o Output Measuring enterprise output can be tricky. To
illustrate, let us examine the profits formation process
and the accounting system of the enterprise. The system
can be epitomized in an over-simplified fashion. The
enterprise generates a turnover. Meanwhile it disburses
funds against production costs (such as raw materials and
energy, wages, and other expenses that are allowed to be
counted as costs under the regulations) and pays a share of
the turnover to the government as sales tax. Then, it adds
a net surplus or deficit generated from miscellaneous
operations (including special deductions such as interest
on loans) to calculate its taxable income. Subsequently it
pays profits taxes. The remainder will be retained
earnings for the enterprise.
Table 3-4 summarizes the stages of output/profits
formation. It indicates that there are three candidates
that can be
Table 3-4
considered in SIMPLIFIED ENTERPRISE PROFITS-LOSS ACCOUNT
measuring enterprise Stage Outcome
1. Turnover(+)
output: (i) 2. Total Costs (-)
2a. Raw Materials and Energy (-)
Turnover; (ii) 2b. Wages (-)2c. Other Legal Spending for Cost (-)
3. Sales Taxes (-)Taxable Incomes; and 4. Net Miscellaneous Income (+)
(iii) Retained Income(iii Retined6. Profits Taxes -
Earnings. Each of 7. Retained Earnings(-)7a. Investment(+)
7b. Wage Bonuses & Benefits(+)
these three --- ---- ------- ---- ----
indicators is SOURCE: Survey notes.
problematic; the
turnover does not reflect the real value the enterprise
created, and the other two indicators are distorted by the
government tax policies. To fit into our analytical
purpose, we create a new variable in an attempt to measure
the "value-added" of the enterprise. It has four
components: (i) labor payment; (ii) capital payment;
(iii) government taxes; and (iv) enterprise profits.
Labor payment includes funds allocated for wages, wage
bonuses from retained earnings of enterprise, deductible
wage bonus, and employees welfare. Capital payment
consists of depreciation (which is accounted as a cost
shown on enterprise profit-loss account), interest and loan
payments. The government tax includes all the sales taxes,
enterprise income tax and adjustment tax, payment to the
Central Energy and Transport Funds, and all other central
and local taxes, fees, and surcharge that siphon funds away
from the enterprise. What is left, then, are the
enterprise profits, which are mostly set aside for future
investment, or as working capital (liquid assets) and
reserved funds.
The value-added for Jinan Commerce, however, is
handled separately, because we neglected to include wages
and depreciation of that sector in the survey. We do,
however, have data on the turnover and "ordering cost"
(which, in a sense, is a "gate price" the commercial
enterprise paid to have the goods in stock). Thus, we take
the difference between the total sales and the ordering
cost to approximate the value-added of Jinan commerce.
Data Organization
The original survey data are contained in four
databases: namely, Jinan Commerce, Jinan Industry, Yantai
Commerce, and Yantai Industry. To put the data into a
useable form, the first step we take is to adjust all
financial data to 1986 prices.2/ Second, we calculate the
geometric means of the three-year data and generate a new
2/ The nominal figures are adjusted to the 1986 constant price
according to the following information:
1950 1984 1985 1986
Retail Price Index 100.0 160.0 174.1 184.5.
Rock Creek Research. 1987. "1987 China Statistical Handbook."
Washington, DC: Rock Creek Research.
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data set that contains the means of the sample data. If an
enterprise has a missing entry for one year, then the mean
will be for the remaining two years; if only one-year data
are available, then that year's data will be taken in. The
purpose of using the mean instead of each individual year's
financial data is to separate the normal production trend
of the enterprise from yearly fluctuations. We could use
pooled cross-section and time-series data, but then later
in estimating land shadow prices, the error term will be
artificially enlarged, because for every observed location
we have to deal with three different values of input and
output, instead of just one.
The third step is to make the data structure
computable. This is especially necessary for Jinan data
because the survey instruments are differently designed for
industry and commerce. In addition, a number of items that
appear on the survey questionnaire are only for the purpose
of checking data consistency. Hence, some consolidations
are necessary. After collapsing and rearranging the data,
we merge the financial data with other variables (such as
location, size of enterprises) and combine the four raw
databases into one. Variables to differentiate city and
sector are also created before merging. The database
structure and variables are shown in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5
DATABASE STRUCTURE AND VARIABLE NAMES
----------------------------------------------------------- 
------Variable Jinan Yantai
---------------------------- ------------------ ------------------
Name Label Industry Commerce Industry Commerce
------------------------------------------------------------------
ID Enterprise ID Number X X X X
LAB Total Number of Labor X X X X
TLA (of which) Temporary Labor X X X X
KO Fixed Capital, Original Value X X X X
K1 Fixed Capital, Net Value X X X X
K2 Total Working Capital X X X X
CAP Total Capital Assets (K1+K2) C C C C
VAD Value-Added C C C C
SAL Total Sales Value X X X X
PAY Total Wage Bill X E X X
DEP Depreciation and Interest X E X X
TAX Gross Taxes X X X X
WBO Workers Wage Bonuses X X X X
WEL Workers Welfare and Benefits X X X X
LAN Land Area Occupied X X X X
BUI Total Floor Area X X X X
PBU "Productive" Floor Area (Plant,etc.) X X X X
X X Coordinate X X X X
Y Y Coordinate X X X X
CBD Distance to CBD X X X X
LBS Dist. to Long-Distance Bus Station X X X X
PTS Dist. to Passenger Train Station X X X X
FTS Dist. to Nrt. Freight Train Station X X X X
PWR Dist. to Nearest Heating Station X X
WTR Dist. to Nearest Water Plant X X
TRF Dist. to Nearest Transformer Station X X
TEL Dist. to Nearest Telephone Station X X
WST Dist. to Nearest Waste Water Plant X X
PORT Dist. to Seaport X X
BUS Is There a Bus Stop within a Block X X
DBUS Dist. to Nearest Bus Stop X X
N127 Dist. to Frequently-Run Bus Stop X X
PDN Population Density of the Area X X
FDN Enterprise Density X X X X
YAN Yantai or Jinan D D D D
IND Industry or Commerce D D D D
NEW Firm Formed before or after 1980 D D D D
OWN State-owned or Non State D D D D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dist. = distance.
Nrt = nearest.
Key: X--Continuous variable; C--Newly created variable; E--Estimated
variable; D--Dummy variable.
Sampling Statistics
In this section we provide some simple tabulations
and tallies that describe the structure of data (in terms
of sector, ownership, location, size, and age of
enterprises). We also provide a brief discussion on
whether or how the categorical variables mentioned above
are related.
Sectoral and Industrial Structure
To minimize confusion in our later presentation, we
use the term "sector" to differentiate industrial and
commercial operations; we use the term "industry" to refer
to a special type of operation under industrial or
commercial sector. The industrial classification in China
follows the code used by the State Planning Commission
(SPC). The SPC code classifies the type of operations into
17 industries, 14 for the industrial sector, and 3 for the
commercial sector. We are aware that the incompatibility
of the SPC code and the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC) will impose some difficulties when we
do international comparisons with the data; yet the SPC
code is nationally enforced, and it is detailed enough to
meet the standard of our research. We therefore adopted it
for our survey and did not recode the sample into the ISIC
system (see Appendices to the dissertation).
Table 3-6 tallies the number of enterprises and
shows the respective percentage distribution of individual
industries. Of the total 898 valid enterprise sample in
our data set, 605 are from Jinan and 293 from Yantai. In
the Jinan sample, 212, or about 30%, are from the
Table 3-6
SECTORAL AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES OF THE SAMPLE
Jinan Yantai
Sector/Industry
Industry:
Metallurgical
building Materials
Textile
Light Industry
Machine Building
Electronics
Chemical
Pharmacy
Construction
Electricity
Transportation
Coal
Petroleum
Other
Commerce:
Retail and Wholesale
Restaurant
Services
TOTAL
Code Number Percent Number Percent
212 100.0
4 1.9
7 3.3
22 10.4
67 31.6
41 19.3
8 3.8
11 5.2
12 5.7
1 0.5
5 2.4
1 0.5
0 0.0
1 0.5
32 15.1
393 100.0
293 74.6
49 12.5
51 13.0
605 100.0
151
4
9
17
62
24
8
12
3
0
0
1
0
1
10
142
118
6
18
100.0
2.6
6.0
11.3
41.1
15.9
5.3
7.9
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.0
0.7
6.6
100.0
83.1
4.2
12.7
293 100.0
EXHIBIT -
Light Industry: 3,4,6,8
Heavy Industry: 1,2,5,7,9-14
Commerce: 31,32,33
SOURCE: Compiled from the Survey
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103
393
18.0
17.0
65.0
90
61
142
30.7
20.8
48.5
UI
industrial sector. The number of industrial enterprises in
Yantai enterprises is 151, or about 50%.
In passing, we should mention that both the Jinan
and Yantai samples are biased to large-sized enterprises,
as we described earlier. Having issued this warning, we
nonetheless intend to consider the industrial structures of
the two cities as not completely different. The most
dominant industry in both cities is light industry, which,
in rough terms, is domestic-oriented manufacturing,
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accounting for 30% of the total Jinan industrial sample and
40% of the total Yantai industrial sample. The other
relatively strong sectors are machine building (19% for
Jinan and 16% for Yantai), and textile (10% for Jinan and
11% for Yantai). Jinan's pharmacy (6%) and Yantai's
chemicals (8%) and building materials industry (6%) are
also notable in terms of the number of enterprises that are
included in the sample.
The sampling process for commercial firms is biased.
Some establishments are purposely excluded from the survey,
in order, for instance, to reduce the influence of the
price distortion on the study. Government food and grain
stores (under code 31), which entail heavy government
subsidies, are not included in the sample. For the same
reason, a number of hotels (which should be classified as
services, 33), are also excluded. Overall, retail and
wholesale enterprises make up the largest proportion of
Jinan and Yantai commercial samples (293 out 393, or 75%
for the Jinan Commercial sample, and 118 out of 142, or 83%
for the Yantai Commercial sample).
In later research, we may need to analyze data while
holding the sector or industry constant. The sample size
of several industries were too small to permit any
meaningful statistical analysis. We hence regroup the
industries into three major sectors: Light and heavy
industries and commerce. When it is needed, nevertheless,
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we can still carry out analysis separately for the light
industry, machine-building, and textiles, because in those
industries the sizes of the sample are large enough to
support statistical tests.
Ownership
In China, urban enterprises are owned by either the
government (or state) at the central, provincial,
municipal, and county levels, or by collectives, or by
private individuals. Recently joint-ventures, i.e., the
enterprises owned jointly by Chinese and foreigners, can
also be found in many cities.
The ownership of the enterprise is an important
variable to control for in analyzing enterprise data.
There are many differences between the State-owned
enterprise (SOE) and the nonstate-owned establishments
(non-SOE).3/ Generally speaking, the SOE, as compared to
the non-SOE, is bigger, better organized, with more funds
and access to scarce and controlled resources, and,
nevertheless, under a tighter scrutiny and control of the
government. Another generality is that employees in the
SOE enjoy better pay and benefits, better job security,
etc. Because of all these privileges, however, the SOEs
tend to be less motivated, and less responsive to price
3/ The Non-SOE sector include both collective and private
establishments.
102
changes and market needs--the syndrome common to many
publicly owned enterprises.
We did not intend to stratify the sample by
ownership, but during the survey, we discovered that
surveyors were keen on taking SOEs while avoiding non-SOEs.
We were told that the SOEs tended to have good bookkeeping,
while the data for non-SOEs, in some cases, had to be
"guessed;" therefore, we faced a dilemma: to allow the
trend to continue so that we would have better and more
reliable data, or to insist on including non-SOEs so that
our data set might contain more market elements. We were
inclined to the latter choice. At our insistence, the
collective enterprises are relatively well-covered, but few
questionnaires were collected from privately owned
businesses.
Table 3-7 summarizes the ownership structure of the
sample. It shows the number of SOEs relative to that of
non-SOEs is close to half in the samples for both cities:
321 versus 284 in Jinan and 133 versus 160 in Yantai, or a
ratio of 53:47 and 45:55. The Yantai commercial sector
contains significantly more non-SOEs than SOEs (87:55 in
numbers or 61:39 in percent). This could be due to the
fact that Yantai has only a limited number of state-owned
commercial operations. It should be noted, however, that
the state-owned enterprises are over represented in the
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Jinan sample (see Tables 3-2 and 3-3), and this is likely
to be the case for Yantai sample as well.
Table 3-7
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE SAMPLE
Jinan Yantai
TOTAL State Non-state TOTAL State Non-state
Commerce # 393 206 187 142 55 87
% 65.0 34.1 30.9 48.5 18.8 29.7
Industry # 212 115 97 151 78 73
% 35.0 19.0 16.0 51.5 26.6 24.9
TOTAL # 605 321 284 293 133 160
% 100.0 53.1 46.9 100.0 45.4 54.6
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Size of Worker Force
The behavior and production process of enterprises
may vary greatly just because of the size of worker forces;
therefore, this impact should also be taken into account in
data analysis. Our Jinan sample is large-enterprise
biased, as we described in the survey section. The Yantai
sample might also be large enterprise-biased, because the
SOEs are over-sampled, and it is suspected that size and
ownership are correlated, i.e., most large enterprises are
also state-owned.
Table 3-8 tallies the size distribution of the
sample. In both Jinan and Yantai, it appears that
industrial enterprises are generally much larger than
commercial firms. The average size of the industrial
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Table 3-8
SIZE OF ENTERPRISES
Number Jinan Yantai
-f
o ----------------- ---- - -- --- - ------
Employees Freq % Cum Freq % Cum
9.9
15.1
10.8
11.3
7.5
8.0
3.8
3.3
4.2
2.8
23.1
Industry
9.9
25.0
35.8
47.2 1
54.7
62.7
66.5 )
69.8
74.1
76.9
100.0 19
212 100.0 -- 151
------------- Commerce
151 38.4 38.4 47
103 26.2 64.6 39
69 17.6 82.2 16
22 5.6 87.8 7
13 3.3 91.1 3
9 2.3 93.4 5
3 0.8 94.1 5
1 0.3 94.4 5
4 1.0 95.4 3
3 0.8 96.2 2
15 3.8 100.0 10
393 100.0
5.3 5.3
13.2 18.5
15.2 33.8
21.2 55.0
9.9 64.9
3.3 68.2
8.6 76.8
4.0 80.8
2.6 83.4
2.0 85.4
14.6 100.0
100.0 --
------------
33.1 33.1
27.5 60.6
11.3 71.8
4.9 76.8
2.1 78.9
3.5 82.4
3.5. 85-.9
3.5 89.4
2.1 91.5
1.4 93.0
7.0 100.0
142 100.0
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
------------ Jinan---------------
870 1520.1 27 16913
54 110.4 4 1199
------------ Yantai--------------
573 523.8 29 2598
63 80.1 5 460
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Freq - frequency.
Cum - cumulative frequency.
Std Dev - standard deviation.
enterprise in Jinan is over 10
commercial firm,
times the size of the
and Yantai statistics show a similar
result. The size of Jinan industrial enterprises range
from 27 to 16,000 workers, but more than 50% have fewer
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0-99
100-199
200-299
300-399
400-499
500-599
600-699
700-799
800-899
900-999
>-1000
TOTAL:
0-19
20-39
40-59
60-79
80-99
100-119
120-139
140-159
160-179
180-199
>200
TOTAL:
EXHIBIT:
Industry
Commerce
Industry
Commerce
than 500 employees. The size of Yantai industrial firms
range from 29 to 2,600 workers, and over 55% have fewer
than 400 workers. As for commercial enterprises, the sizes
run from 4 to 1,200 in Jinan and 5 to 460 in Yantai, but
more than 60% of the firms, in both Jinan and Yantai cases,
have fewer than 40 workers.
Location
The location of the enterprise will be the major
subject to be examined in this study. Here, we will only
provide some simple statistics to show the spatial
structure of the sample.
The location of the enterprise is measured by
distance to central business district (CBD). Table 3-9
contains some relevant statistics on the spatial structure
of the sample. The sample is basically randomly drawn in
regard to location, because there is no control we can
impose on enterprise location during sampling; the lists
of enterprises in both Yantai and Jinan are not linked
according to location.
There appears to be a difference between the spatial
structure of commercial enterprises and that of industry.
Most commercial operations tend to be located close to the
CBD. About 90% of enterprises in Yantai are located within
3 kilometers (km) radius of the CBD, while in Jinan,
because the city is two times larger than Yantai, the same
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Table 3-9
LOCATION OF ENTERPRISES
----------------------------------------------------------------
Distance to CBD (Kilometers)
--------------------------------------
0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 >6 TOTAL
---------------------------------------------------
------------------------- Yantai -----------------------------
Commerce # 58 51 15 8 0 4 6 142
% 40.8 35.9 10.6 5.6 0.0 2.8 4.2 100.0
CUM 40.8 76.8 87.3 93.0 93.0 95.8 100.0
Industry # 21 30 21 29 0 16 34 151
% 13.9 19.9 13.9 19.2 0.0 10.6 22.5 100.0
CUM 13.9 33.8 47.7 66.9 66.9 77.5 100.0
------------------------- Jinan ------------------------------
Commerce # 117 97 83 60 22 7 7 393
% 29.8 24.7 21.1 15.3 5.6 1.8 1.8 100.0
CUM 29.8 54.5 75.6 90.8 96.4 98.2 100.0
Industry # 34 34 42 40 15 22 25 212
% 16.0 16.0 19.8 18.9 7.1 10.4 11.8 100.0
CUM 16.0 32.1 51.9 70.8 77.8 88.2 100.0
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
# = Number.
% - Percent.
CUM = Cumulative percentage.
proportion of commerce is located within 4 km. The pattern
is different for the industrial sample of both cities.
Industrial enterprises seem to be rather indifferent in
choosing their locations; they are relatively evenly
distributed in the city with regard to their distances to
CBD. This sectoral difference in spatial structure pattern
could be one piece of evidence that urban land use in China
is not completely random. Discussion of this issue will be
carried out in later chapters.
Age of Enterprise
We generally expect that the longer a firm remains
in business, the more mature it will become in terms of
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making production decisions. Other than this direct age
impact, the forming of Chinese enterprises may also be
affected by political focuses and orientation of the
country at different stages, which may also have some long-
term effect on enterprise behavior in various ways. Thus,
we need to examine this impact on data.
The age distribution of the sample Tis presented in
Table 3-10. It shows that more than 90% of the enterprises
were formed after the founding of the People's Republic in
1949. The three enterprise-birth peaks were 1955-59, 1980-
86, and 1975-79 for Jinan, and 1980-86, 1965-69, and 1955-
59, roughly, for Yantai. These peaks, as a matter of fact,
all correspond well to the major political movements in the
history of the PRC: the Great Leap-Forward (1957-1959) in
which radical industrial expansion programs were
instigated; the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976) in which
Mao pushed into being a large number of small "productive"
(or material-producing) enterprises; and the Post-Mao
Period (after 1980) in which a relatively more liberal
economic policy is carried out. The peaks of enterprise-
birth seem to indicate that the creation of enterprises may
somehow correlate to the political climate of China.
With understandable oversimplification, we may
stereotype how political focuses of the PRC at the
different periods affect the characteristics of the
enterprise. The ones established during the Great Leap-
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Table 3-10
AGE OF ENTERPRISES
-----------------------------------------------------
Jinan Yantai
Year Created Number % % CUM Number % % CUM
------------------------------------------
Before 1919 18 3.0 3.0 6 2.0 2.0
20-29 6 1.0 4.0 2 0.7 2.7
30-39 12 2.0 6.0 8 2.7 5.5
40-49 20 3.3 9.3 8 2.7 8.2
50-54 30 5.0 14.2 18 6.1 14.3
55-59 178 29.4 43.6 37 12.6 27.0
60-64 50 8.3 51.9 19 6.5 33.4
65-69 48 7.9 59.8 43 14.7 48.1
70-74 34 5.6 65.5 18 6.1 54.3
75-79 61 10.1 75.5 39 13.3 67.6
1980-86 148 24.5 100.0 95 32.4 100.0
TOTAL: 605 100.0 --- 293 100.0 ---
EXHIBIT -
Before 1949* 56 9.3 9.3 24 8.2 8.2
1950-1964 258 42.6 51.9 74 25.3 33.4
1965-1979** 143 23.6 75.5 100 34.1 67.6
After 1980 148 24.5 100.0 95 32.4 100.0
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: * Before the People's Republic of China was founded,
** The "cultural revaluation".
Forward are likely to be in a heavy industry sector (steel
mills or machine-building, for instance); their senior
workers are mostly recruited from rural areas with little
education; and their managers are likely to be
enthusiastic union organizers rather than industrialists.
The ones created during the "Cultural Revolution" are less
likely to be in commercial business;4/ the workers are
mostly urban youths with modest education; and the
4/ Mao's famous slogan should be remembered: Production First
and Livelihood Second.
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managers have to be "politically reliable" persons.
Finally, the enterprises formed after 1980 are less likely
to be in a heavy industry sector; workers have various
education levels, and some managers are "entrepreneurs."
These qualities and characteristics are likely to have
various impacts on the activities of the enterprise.
Correlation between Control Variables
We speculate that the size of the enterprise is
related to the ownership when the sector is controlled for
because the state, which has control of most capital
investment funds, is rather enthusiastic about creating
large enterprises. This hypothesis is tested by using the
chi-square test. First, we divide the sample into two
categories: large and small, according to whether the
number of employees in the firm is larger or smaller than
the median. Then, we construct a two-by-two table, i.e.,
size (small or large) by ownership (nonstate owned or
state-owned), as presented in Table 3-11. If there is a
relationship between size of firm and ownership, say, if
state-owned enterprises tend to be large and nonstate owned
tend to be small, then the frequencies in cells of
small/nonstate and large/state-owned will be significantly
higher than the expected frequency. The chi-square
statistic will measure whether the actual frequencies are
statistically different from the expected frequencies. The
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Table 3-11
CHI-SQUARE TEST BETWEEN SIZE AND OWNERSHIP BY SECTOR
(Number in parentheses is expected frequency)
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jinan Yantai
--------------- ------------------------
Ownership Small Large TOTAL Small Large TOTAL
-----------------------------------------------
----------------------- Commerce ------------------------
Non-State 86 101 187 45 42 87
(93.7) (93.3) 47.6% (43.5) (43.5) 61.3%
State-owned 111 95 206 26 29 55
(103.1) (102.8) 52.4% (27.5) (27.5) 38.7%
TOTAL 197 196 393 71 71 142
50.1% 49.9% 100.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Cells with Cells with
STATISTIC: Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5 Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5
-----------------------------------------
2.1378 1 .144 None 0.1187 1 .730 None
-----------------------------------------------
Jinan Yantai
----------------------------------------
Ownership Small Large TOTAL Small Large TOTAL
-----------------------------------------------
----------------------- Industry ------------------------
Non-State 73 24 97 49 24 73
(48.5) (48.5) 45.8% (36.7) (36.2) 48.3%
State-owned 33 82 115 27 51 78
(57.5) (57.5) 54.2% (39.3) (38.8) 38.7%
TOTAL 106 106 212 76 75 151
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 50.3% 49.7% 100.0%
Cells with Cells with
STATISTIC: Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5 Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5
-----------------------------------------
43.787 1 .000 None 14.666 1 .000 None
-----------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Small = Below the median size.
Large = Above the median size.
Chi-sq. - Chi-square statistics.
D.F. = Degree of freedom.
Sig. = Significance levels of Chi-square statistics.
E.F. = Expected frequency.
results in Table 3-11 indicate that there is no
relationship between enterprise size and ownership in the
commercial sector, but there is a clear correlation of the
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two in the industrial sector: the state-owned industrial
enterprises tend to be large and the nonstate-owned
industrial firms tend to be small.
Using the same technique, we conducted more tests.
There appears to be a relationship between sector and
distance to the CBD. Commerce tends to be located closer
to the CBD, and industry is the opposite. The result of
the test is contained in Table 3-12.
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Table 3-12
CHI-SQUARE TEST BETWEEN SECTOR AND DISTANCE TO CBD
(Number in parentheses is expected frequency)
Jinan Yantai
Sector Close Far TOTAL Close Far TOTAL
Commerce 244 149 393 107 35 142
(214.4) (178.6) 65.0% (73.2) (68.8) 48.5%
Industry 86 126 212 44 107 151
(115.6) (96.4) 35.0% (77.8) (73.2) 51.5%
TOTAL 330 275 605 151 142 293
54.5% 45.5% 100.0% 51.5% 48.5% 100.0%
Cells with Cells with
STATISTIC: Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5 Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5
24.863 1 .000 None 60.738 1 .000 None
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Close = Distance to CBD below the median.
Far = Distance to CBD above the median.
Chi-sq. = Chi-square statistics.
D.F. = Degree of freedom.
Sig. = Significant levels of Chi-square statistics.
E.F = Expected frequency.
There also appears to be a relationship between
sector and age of the enterprise. We hypothesize that new
firms are mostly commercial because before 1980 the state
had focused on investing in industrial enterprises and the
need for commercial retail shops and services had been
ignored. After 1980, the state relaxed the control on
capital investment, and starting a commercial business
became attractive since there is an unmet need for it. To
test for a relationship between sector and age of
enterprise, we divide the enterprises into two age groups:
old enterprises being the ones created before 1980, and new
enterprises being ones created since 1980. Use of a chi-
square test seems to confirm our speculation: newly
created firms tend to be commercial, and old firms are
proportionally more industrial than commercial. The test
results are summarized in Table 3-13.
Finally, is there a relationship between the age of
enterprise and ownership? We hypothesize that this
relationship exists. We have learned from the preceding
analysis that newly created firms tend to be commercial (as
opposed to industrial), because it does not require high
capital investment; the nonstate sectors, which tend to be
more responsive to the market need, are apt to take
advantage of market needs and lower capital requirements.
For this reason, we expect a significantly higher
proportion of firms created after 1980 to be nonstate
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enterprises, while a larger proportion of firms created
before 1980 are owned by the state. Again this speculation
proves to be supported. The chi-square test shows there is
a strong positive relationship between the age of firm and
ownership (Table 3-14).
Finally, we should be pointed out that the
statistical relationships between ownership, sector,
distance to CBD, and age of the enterprise, are consistent
in both Jinan and Yantai samples. There is no conflicting
evidence so far.
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Table 3-13
CHI-SQUARE TEST BETWEEN SECTOR AND AGE OF ENTERPRISE
(Number in parentheses is expected frequency)
Jinan Yantai
Sector New Old TOTAL New Old TOTAL
Commerce 142 251 393 75 67 142
(105.2) (287.8) 65.0% (47.5) (94.5) 48.5%
Industry 20 192 212 23 128 151
(56.8) (155.2) 35.0% (50.5) (100.5) 51.5%
TOTAL 162 443 605 98 195 293
26.8% 73.2% 100.0% 33.4% 66.6% 100.0%
Cells with Cells with
STATISTIC: Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5 Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5
48.713 1 .000 None 44.768 1 .000 None
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Old = Firm formed before 1980.
New = Firm formed since 1980.
Chi-sq. = Chi-square statistics.
D.F. - Degree of freedom.
Sig. = Significant levels of Chi-square statistics.
E.F. = Expected frequency.
Conclusion
This is a descriptive chapter. We have discussed
the survey methodologies and procedures, definitions and
the organization of data, and the structure of the data by
ownership, sector, size, location, and age of enterprise.
The Yantai sample is random, no sector or ownership
stratification is imposed. The quality of Yantai data,
however, is of uneven quality; we have to force the
balance-of-accounting identity for the profit and loss
account. Both industry and commerce are using the same
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Table 3-14
CHI-SQUARE TEST BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND AGE OF ENTERPRISE
(Number in parentheses is expected frequency)
Jinan Yantai
Ownership New Old TOTAL New Old TOTAL
Non-state 115 169 284 64 96 160
(76.0) (208.0) 46.9% (53.5) (106.5) 54.6%
State-owned 47 274 321 34 99 133
(86.0) (235.0) 53.1% (44.5) (88.5) 45.4%
TOTAL 162 443 605 98 195 293
26.8% 73.2% 100.0% 33.4% 66.6% 100.0%
Cells with Cells with
STATISTIC: Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5 Chi-sq. D.F. Sig. E.F.<5
50.050 1 .000 None 6.1665 1 .000 None
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Old = Firm formed before 1980.
New = -Firm formed since 1980.
Chi-sq. - Chi-square statistics.
D.F. - Degree of freedom.
Sig. - Significant levels of Chi-square statistics.
E.F. = Expected frequency.
questionnaire form for the Yantai survey. The Jinan survey
is fairly well organized. The Jinan questionnaire itself
provides a means to check on data consistency. Different
forms of questionnaires are used for industry and commerce.
These measures help enhance the quality of data collected.
There are some shortcomings and errors in the Jinan data
though. One shortcoming is that the Jinan sample is biased
toward large firms. One unredeemable mistake is that wage
data for the Jinan commercial sector were omitted from the
final survey form without being detected by us until after
the survey was completed.
There appear to be some statistical relationships,
which are also sensible conceptually, between ownership,
sector, location, and age of enterprise. In short, state-
owned industrial firms tend to be large, but the same
correlation does not hold for commercial firms. Commercial
firms tend to locate closer to the CBD, while industrial
firms tend to be dispersed. Most firms created after 1980
tend to be commercial rather than industrial; and,
finally, firms created after 1980 tend to be owned by
nonstate sectors.
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Annex
Description of the Study Cities
Both Yantai and Jinan are located in Shandong, a
coastal province of northeast China. Yantai is a sea-port
and tourist city, and Jinan is the capital of the province.
117
Figure 3-1
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They both are provincial-level cities. Figure 3-1 depicts
their political positions in the Chinese administrative
hierarchy.
Yantai City
Yantai is located on Jiaodong Peninsula, facing the
Yellow Sea. Due to hills and mountains to the south and
ocean to the north, expansions of the city have been
restricted into a relatively narrow strip of land. Yantai
is a major port between China, South Korea and Japan. The
mild weather and beautiful beaches contribute to the city's
fame for being a resort town, ideal for summer vacation.
The surrounding areas of the city are particularly rich in
natural resources. To name a few, the gold deposits in the
area account for one-half of the national total; fruit and
seafood products make up about 10% and 15%, respectively,
of the supply for all of China.
The municipality constitutes two sub-city districts
(Zhifu and Fushan), ten counties, and three towns. A 1984
year-end survey revealed that the total population in the
municipality was 8.15 million, with a land area of 18,993
square kilometers. If only the city proper is counted, the
population is 296,000, and the land area is 34.7 square
kilometers. The ratios of population and land of the
built-up areas to the municipality totals are 1:27 and
1:547, respectively. Of all the urban population, half is
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engaged in basic economic activities, 10% is in service
sectors, and 40% is not in the labor force. The per capita
income of the city proper is three times the municipal
average.
Yantai is a young growing industrial city as well.
The survey data indicate that more than half of the
enterprises were formed after 1970. In 1987 for the first
time in its history, the city became one of the twenty
cities in China that produced over 10 billion yuan in
industrial output. About 80% of the gross regional output
is from industry. Light industry contributes to about two-
thirds of the city's industrial output. No data are
available on an exact distribution of employment by sector,
but in terms of total product, food processing would appear
to be the most important industrial activity. Beer, wines,
canned foods, and seafood processing are dominant
subsectors. There is substantial production of heavy
machinery, e.g., refrigeration equipment and combustion
engines. Among the largest employers are a chemical plant,
several textile firms, a clock and watch producer, and a
lock production enterprise.
As a tourist and resort town, the commerce in the
city does not appear to have been as well developed as it
should be, judging from its relatively low contribution to
the city employment (only 10% of the total population).
The sector, however, does have a normal mix of retail and
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service shops, restaurants, and there is an area close to
the sea-port, where commercial shops and restaurants are
densely located, which can be designated as the central
business district. Land-use issues will be dealt in
Chapter Five.
Jinan City
Jinan, home of 1.43 million people and a land area
of 483 square kilometers, borders the Yellow River to its
north and the Tai Mountain to its south. The city spreads
out on a relatively flat plain from a typical CBD. This
2600 year-old walled city has been the provincial capital
for more than 600 years. It has a rich cultural heritage.
Most notably, among other cultural advantages, the hometown
of Confucius is nearby. With its three outlying counties,
the whole city area in 1985 had a population of 3.83
million and an area of 5,775 square kilometers.
Jinan has traditionally been a major distribution
and commercial center for the province, a territory rich in
agricultural and mineral resources. The modern industry of
the city, however, was not developed until early this
century, when Jinan-Tsingtao (a port city of the province)
and Tianjin-Jinan-Shanghai railroads were completed,
connecting the city to major sea-port cities and a vast
interior. The city now owns one of the busiest railroad
stations in China, and the volume of postal communications
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is also ranked among the largest in the country.
The city proper is formed by five subcity districts.
Following a 1985 survey, 1,769 industrial enterprises
(excluding rural industry) were registered in the city,
employing 427,000 workers. Machine-building, metallurgy,
chemistry, and textile, are the major industrial sectors in
the city. Heavy industry helps make up half of the total
industrial output. Unlike Yantai, Jinan has a well-
developed commercial sector. There were 15,884 commercial
establishments and operations based in the city with 87,500
employees. Foreigners and people from other provinces
owned about 300 of those operations.
Jinan has been actively engaged in improving public
utilities and infrastructure. Between 1981 and 1985, the
city made an investment of 132 million yuan in urban
infrastructure, which enabled the city to widen, extend,
and improve 27 major trunk roads. At present all the city
roads have met the national standard of "superior quality."
The household coverage of municipal water has reached 100%
and municipal gas 27%. The per capita green space is now
3.2 square meters, much higher than the national average of
2.0 square meters. The per capita floor space is 5.21
square meters, slightly lower than the national average.
Jinan has a long-recorded history of land use. As
early as 1371, the city had become brick-walled with an
area of approximately three square meters. In the year
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1861, an extended effort was made to enclose as much as 20
square kilometers of land behind the walls with 200,000
inhabitants living inside.
Commercial land
Table 3-15
use has always prevailed JINAN: EXPANSION OF BUILT-UP AREAS
(Square kilometer)
in Jinan, largely
Area Increase Increase
because the city was a Year (sq.km) (sq.km) Per Year
1371 2.3 --
designated "free-trade" 1861 20.0 17.8 0.041949 23.2 3.2 0.04
1957 37.1 13.9 1.74
zone between 1905 and 1965 57.9 20.8 2.60
1977 78.1 20.1 1.68
1949. At its peak in 1985 95.0 16.9 2.12
1942, it was reported SOURCE: CASS, 1988. General Report
on Pabing for-
that there were more China, memo, p.9.
sq. (m = square kilometer.
than 11,000 shops
registered in the city,
approximately 860
hectare of land was leased by the city government to the
businesses located in the trading zone. Table 3-15
presents the history of the urban expansion since 1371. It
indicates that most of land acquisition by the city took
place after 1949.
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Chapter IV
ANALYSIS OF ENTERPRISE PRODUCTION
Having established institutional contexts and
described the survey and data, we now turn to test the
first hypothesis we proposed in the earlier chapters:
whether there is partial rationality in enterprise
behavior. We analyze the major aspects of the production
process of the enterprise, including inputs, compensation,
productivity and efficiency, and the relationship between
productivity and compensation. Study of labor-rewarding
behavior is a major subject of this chapter.
Recent research on Chinese enterprise behavior is
found in the works of Tidrick and Chen (1987), and Bahl and
Zhang (1989). To summarize their points briefly, they all
argue there is a strong possibility that Chinese
enterprises are actually optimizing production to some
extent, by using the newly found autonomy resulting from
economic reform. Bahl and Zhang argue that the "manager
motive" may drive enterprises to maximize profits because
the profits tax is a principal income source for different
levels of government. Higher profits increase the
government revenue; these in turn cause the managers to be
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favored by the government who administers the enterprise.1/
Another reason is that higher profits increase the amount
of internal funds the managers can allocate at will for
capital investment and worker benefits.
The same motive could also drive enterprises to
maximize total output. The reasoning goes that managers
see their success as being measured in terms of whether
they meet or exceed output targets. They have little
control over product prices, factor input prices, or
endowments of capital, land, and labor. If the enterprise
is to alter production processes, it will have to be in the
direction of increasing output rather than reducing costs.
Another possibility is that enterprises are mostly
driven by what Tidrick, et al., call the "family motive."
Under this paradigm, enterprises attempt to maximize the
extra wages, which are composed of wage bonuses and worker
benefits provided to labor. This argument, however, would
mean that maximization of profits is the driving force in
enterprises since extra compensation to labor currently in
China is almost entirely drawn from after-tax profits.
The analytical approach used here will be
drastically different from the approaches mentioned above,
namely, we rely on quantitative analysis either to support
1/ Under the current Chinese fiscal system, profits taxes of
enterprises are paid directly to their administrators
(different levels of government that "own" the enterprises).
See Bahl and Zhang (forthcoming).
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or refute arguments. In analyzing the production process,
we focus our attention on whether there are indications
that limited and partial rationality is incorporated into
enterprise behavior. Detecting regularities in production
process, confirming and explaining statistical
relationships between various empirical observations, and
building econometric models are the main approaches we use
in testing the rationality of enterprises behavior. The
land issue is not discussed here; all land-related
analysis will be dealt with in the next chapter.
This chapter is organized into eight sections. The
first two are devoted to the studies of production factors,
namely, labor and capital. Enterprise behavior in factor
utilization is compared after controlling for sector,
ownership, size, and the age of enterprises. Comparison
between cities is also provided. The next two sections are
the analyses of factor costs and pricing. Again, behavior
patterns are compared, controlling for the key control
variables. In a fifth section productivity and production
efficiency are analyzed. A sixth section describes the
composition of enterprise income, which precedes a detailed
analysis of enterprise factor rewarding behavior. In this
section, we use two approaches to assess whether
enterprises behave rationally in rewarding the labor
factor. Finally, conclusions are summarized in the last
section.
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Labor
We have examined the basic data on the labor force
in the preceding chapter. We learned that, in general,
state-owned enterprises tend to be larger than nonstate-
owned enterprises, commercial firms tend to be smaller than
industrial firms, and old firms tend to be larger than new
firms. In this section, we turn our attention to labor-
force composition, especially the temporary/contract worker
components. The issue of temporary workers is particularly
important to this study because it reflects the dynamics of
input-mix adjustment inside an enterprise. If the
enterprises in general are sluggish in using this limited
leverage to adjust labor input, it implies that they are
likely to be indifferent to relative price changes between
factors; in which case, we may speculate that little
rationality is to be found in overall enterprise behavior
in the economy.
Looking at this issue from the historical
perspective may help us understand the significance of the
emergence of temporary and contract workers. Before
economic reform started in 1980, planned allocation of
labor, capital, and raw materials and energy, could be
characterized as three major pillars of the centrally
planned economy (Gregory Chow, 1987). Before an enterprise
could hire new workers, it had to obtain approval from the
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government. Moreover, it had to agree to meet many
conditions. These included a guarantee of a life-time
position for the new workers regardless of their
performances; a "free" pension fund ("free" in the sense
that workers do not have to contribute to the fund directly
from their take-home pay) with medical insurance, and if
possible housing and other benefits. These rigid
conditions made labor input adjustments extremely
difficult, which contributed, in turn, to poor-performance
of an economy that was handicapped by severe inefficiency
and bureaucracy. Allowing enterprises to hire temporary
workers was a major policy breakthrough, which was
introduced by the reformers in the early 1980s. The
temporary and contract workers, as the name implies, are
not entitled to a life-time position in the enterprise.
The enterprises are no longer responsible for new workers'
housing and other benefits. On the other hand, it is
understood between workers and employers that temporary
workers will be paid a slightly higher salary as
compensation for the lack of benefits.
The empirical survey data on labor composition are
summarized in Table 4-1. The data show that a rather large
percentage of enterprises (Jinan 42.6% and Yantai 43.7%)
reported hiring temporary workers. For the enterprises
that hire temporary workers, the temporary workers, on
average, make up about 20% of the labor force. For all
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Table 4-1
LABOR COMPOSITION: TOTAL VERSUS TEMPORARY WORKERS (%)
(Significance of t-test is in parentheses)
Jinan Yantai
Mean Std Dev Cases Mean Std Dev Cases
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By sector:
Commerce
Industry
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm
New
Old
TOTAL
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Sector:
Commerce
Industry
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm
New
Old
TOTAL
---- Firms that
36.5 35.9
10.8 20.7
(.000)
36.9 37.5
9.3 14.6
(.000)
34.7 36.1
13.4 23.3
(.000)
35.1 34.5
17.0 28.3
(.000)
23.2 31.7
15.9
4.5
(.000)
12.2
5.6(.000)
13.5
6.2(.000)
19.0
6.5(.000)
9.9
29.8
14.4
27.6
12.2
28.2
17.2
30.8
19.3
23.6
Hire
124
134
130
123
118
140
88
170
258
Total
284
321
393
212
303
302
162
443
605
Temporary Labor
25.1 71.6
13.1 14.8
(.300)
17.0 42.4
13.2 48.8
(.046)
27.0 65.3
10.8 13.9
(.090)
36.4 72.1
8.8 13.1
(.025)
17.0 42.4
41
87
39
89
49
79
38
90
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Firms ---------------
6.4 37.5 160
8.6 13.5 133
(.502)
7.0 15.3 142
7.8 37.9 151
(.827)
9.0 39.6 147
5.9 11.5 146
(.360)
14.1 48.0 98
4.0 10.0 195
(.042)
7.4 29.2 293
EXHIBIT - Percent of firms reported hiring temporary labor:
Jinan--42.6%; Yantai--43.7%
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: "#" indicates two-tail probabilities of t-values for pooled
variance estimates, otherwise for separated variance.
Std Dev = Standard deviation.
Small = Firms below the median size.
Large = Firms above the median size.
New = Firms formed since 1980.
Old = Firms formed before 1980.
enterprises (including those who do not hire temporary
employees), temporary workers account for 10% and 7.5% of
labor force for Jinan and Yantai, respectively.
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Several interesting behavior patterns can be
identified from the data. First, on average, the nonstate
enterprises have a higher proportion of temporary workers
than do the state-owned enterprises. This is not
unexpected because, as several independent studies done in
China have suggested, the nonstate owned enterprises are
noticeably more responsive to price changes and market
needs (see, for instance, Tidrick and Chen, 1987).
Second, commercial enterprises are more willing to
hire temporary and contract workers than industrial
enterprises perhaps because commercial firms have far lower
capital and training costs barriers to hiring new workers.
It does not require, for instance, a large sum of capital
investment to create a new position nor is a lot of
training for the new workers required. Another factor
affecting the pattern is the mounting pressure of
unemployment in most Chinese cities. The social problems
due to the lack of jobs for urban youths have aroused
discontent in the society. Because commercial enterprises
are relatively flexible in creating jobs, we speculate that
pressure from the government might encourage commercial
enterprises to hire more temporary workers than they really
need.
Thirdly, smaller firms have a higher percentage of
temporary workers than do large firms. This observation is
consistent with conclusions found in an earlier chapter,
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that is, smaller enterprises tends to be commercial, and
the commercial sector tends to hire a higher proportion of
temporary workers.
Finally, it appears that the enterprises created
since the reform hire a higher percent of temporary workers
than the old firms do. The new firms may be responding to
the market needs, given the circumstances under which they
were created. Moreover, we should also remember one of our
earlier findings that new firms tend to be commercial and
nonstate owned. Both enterprise types tend to maintain
their labor force by hiring more temporary workers. It
should not be a surprise, therefore, that the proportion of
temporary workers in new firms is significantly higher than
that in old enterprises.
On the whole, enterprises would seem to have the
means to adjust input-mix if they wish by keeping a
reasonable number of positions for temporary workers. A
more rigorous analysis of labor-substitution and labor-
rewarding activities of enterprises will be conducted in
later sections and chapters.
Capital
Capital is another important independent input of
enterprises. In China, until now, channels to raise
capital funds for enterprises were limited to self-retained
profits and loans from the bank. The latter is tightly
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controlled by government credit programs. Enterprises do
not hold stocks in one another; nor is there any borrowing
between enterprises. Stocks or bonds are not issued, so
borrowing from citizens is also rare (Bahl, 1988). These
rigid arrangements leave little room for enterprises to
modify their use of capital. Because we can say little
about the behavior of enterprises in handling capital
input, we will instead focus on descriptive statistics of
capital.
Industrial enterprises normally have a much larger
total net value of fixed assets than do commercial ones,
because the production process of the former has a more
complicated machinery and equipment requirement. The
average capital size of industrial firms in Jinan is about
50 times that of commercial ones, and in Yantai it is
tenfold.
The absolute size of capital may not be the dominant
element in production. It is the mix of capital with other
factors that is more important in influencing production.
One index we use to evaluate the capital input is the
capital endowment per worker, obtained by dividing the
total net value of fixed assets by number of workers.
Table 4-2 contains the capital endowment statistics by
ownership, size, and age of enterprises, controlling for
sector. The statistics of mean, and standard deviation are
provided as well as number of valid cases, as well as the
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Table 4-2
PER WORKER CAPITAL ENDOWMENT STATISTICS (yuan/worker)
(Significance of t-test is in parentheses)
Jinan
Mean Std Dev Cases
Yantai
Mean Std Dev Cases
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm
New
Old
Total Sector
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm
New
Old
Total Sector
EXHIBIT - Average
Jinan:
Yantai:
----------------- Commerce -----------------
1543 2039 174 2059 3483 79
2974 11191 178 7067 7641 33
(.095) (.001)
2362
2182(.841)
3818
1313(.026)
2267
8107
10602
12792
1900
8107
166
186
2010
4257
(.007)
134 3352
218 3705(.739#)
352 3535
4726 36
5766 76
5990
5118
5533
54
58
112
----------------- Industr ----------------
3236 3662 96 5795 6740 73
8579 8489 114 7551 4703 78
(.000) (.067)
4572
7453(.001)
5336
6216(.614#)
6136
6308 96 6724
7696 114 6679(.962)
9025
7044
7224
19
191
210
9769
6151(.006)
6701
7497 76
3439 75
11677
3801
5825
23
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enterprise size by net value of fixed capital:
Commerce--120,340; Industry--6,588,580;
Commerce--330,800; Industry--3,785,440.
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: "#" indicates two-tail probabilities of t-values for pooled
variance estimates, otherwise for separated variance.
Std Dev
Small
Large
New
Old
Standard deviation.
Firms below the median size.
Firms above the median size.
Firms formed since 1980.
Firms formed before 1980.
significance level of the independent t-test for difference
between means.
In both Jinan and Yantai, per worker capital
endowment of state-owned enterprises is significantly
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higher than the nonstate-owned enterprises. This is not an
unexpected result because it is a well-known fact that for
years the state sector has been given greater access to
financial resources than has the nonstate sector.
Large enterprises may have a higher per worker
capital endowment because large operations are often
associated with a complicated organization of production,
which would require high capital investment. This is not
always true, however. Jinan commerce and Yantai industry
do not observe this rule. In fact, the relation is
reversed, although the t-test indicates that the difference
between the means of large and small enterprises is not
statistically significant. One speculation is that there
may be some highly labor-intensive firms in the Jinan
commerce and Yantai industry that scale down the per worker
capital endowment of the large firms; the large standard
deviations associated with those means seem to support this
speculation. There is no regularity of per worker capital
endowment in terms of new enterprises (the ones created
since 1980) and old firms.
Wage Rates
In China, as in many other developing countries,
wage incomes are the principal, if not the only, source of
income for the overwhelming majority of urban households,
because no other household income can be drawn from, for
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instance, investment in stocks or property (nonexistence of
stock and property markets). The government seems to
appreciate fully the power of wages for promoting the
efficiency of the economy. To allow enterprises to
establish funds for "wage bonus" and "employees benefits,"
for instance, is a major component of the new policy
adopted by the reformers in the economic reform. The
government is keen on controlling wage rates to countervail
the negative consequences of wage increases. The
enterprise may, if allowed, maximize the short-run wage
income of its workers to such an extent that it diverts
necessary capital investment funds to workers wages. The
net result is a severe decline in enterprise capital
accumulation (Kornai, 1980). Furthermore, a rapid increase
of wages will trigger a high rate of inflation, which will
upset urban households and discredit the government. As a
result, the government often takes inconsistent stands in
handling the wage issue. On the one hand, it makes every
effort to freeze wages; on the other hand, it allows
enterprises to use wage bonuses to stimulate the
performance of workers. The inconsistent wage policies are
further complicated by the process of implementation, which
134
is carried out by the local governments, who often see
things differently from the central government.2/
A worker's wage is composed of two parts: (i) the
basic wage, which is set by the government, and (ii) extra
wages, including wage bonuses and employee welfare, which
are delivered by enterprises from their after-tax retained
earnings. The wage rates are calculated by dividing the
appropriate year-end wage bills by the year-end number of
workers. It should be noted that the measurement of reward
to labor by nominal wages is not necessarily proper. The
wage referred to by this study does not include the social
welfare beriefits, including government subsidies in food,
housing, transport, pensions, education, health and medical
care, child-care, etc. No study has been found in regard
to the average value of government subsidies to urban
households.
The design of the Jinan Commerce survey has a
serious fault. The wage item was left out of the final
version of the survey questionnaire; consequently, we have
no wage data for the Jinan commercial sector. While
admitting this mistake is unredeemable, the surveyors told
us that wage is lumped into the item "circulation cost."
They suggest that the wage bill typically accounted for 50%
2/ A good discussion on the central-local relationship and on
roles of policy-making and implementation in China is given by
Roy Bahl (1988).
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to 75% of the total cost. After comparing the wage data
between Yantai and Jinan industries, and between Yantai
commercial and industrial sectors, we decided that
attributing 75% of the circulation cost to workers pay, on
average, seems to be a reasonable guess. Because these
data are only a rough guess, the legitimacy of deriving any
serious conclusion from them is questionable.
Statistics on total wages, which include the basic
take-home salary, wage bonuses and employees benefits, are
summarized in Table 4-3a. In general, there is no
significant difference between the mean wages of large or
small, new or old enterprises. The state-owned enterprises
and commercial firms, however, appear to maintain higher
total wages than their respective counterparts (nonstate-
owned and industrial firms). Several observations can be
drawn from these statistics. On the one hand, small wage
variations may reflect the fact that government still has
an effective control on the wage rates. We can reason that
if it is the government (rather than the enterprises) that
has the deciding voice on the total wage rates, it may be
hard to justify some sectors having a better pay than
others. Especially when price distortion can always be
used as an excuse for poor financial and economic
performance, the managers in low-paid enterprises would
protest to the government, using the price distortion as an
excuse to push for a higher pay to their workers.
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Table 4-3a
TOTAL WAGE EARNINGS (yuan/worker/year)
(Significance of t-test is in parentheses)
Jinan Yantai
Mean Std Dev Cases Mean Std Dev Cases
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm
New
Old
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm
New
Old
----------------- Commerce -----------------
1209 716 185 1234 414 83
1372 647 202 1625 916 54
(.019#) (.004)
1265
1324(.396#)
1368
1252(.135)
670
700
795
611
193 1381
194 1395(.907#)
141
246
1341
1441(.392#)
654 69
717 68
622
747
----------------- Industry ----------------
1131 858 97 1076 379 73
1296 374 115 1017 275 77
(.083) (.279)
1081
1361(.002)
1113
1232(.433#)
394 106 1073
802 106 1018(.315)
591
652
20 1070
192 1041(.799)
379 75
271 75
513
288
23
127
------- Jinan ------
1294 658 387
1221 646 212
(.200#)
1388
1046(.000)
Yantai ------
684 137
330 150
T-test significance for Jinan and Yantai Industries: (.000)
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: "#" indicates 2-tail probabilities of t-values for pooled
variance estimates; otherwise for separated variance.
Std Dev = Standard deviation.
Small = Firms below the median size.
Large = Firms above the median size.
New - Firms formed since 1980.
Old - Firms formed before 1980.
On the other hand, we can also argue that the small
variations in wage rates are a result of enterprises'
active engagement in using their limited autonomy to adjust
wage levels. If the economy is highly competitive, there
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EXHIBIT
Commerce
Industry
Total
Total
could be an equilibrium wage level the enterprises will
offer in order to maintain a viable labor force.
Meanwhile, a worker cannot expect to receive a higher pay
just by changing job from one sector to another. This
alternative is highly unlikely. The more likely
explanation is that enterprises are all trying to maximize
worker's pay, while the government tries to stop wage hikes
by punishing aggressive employers. During this process
somehow a equilibrium wage level is reached such that no
enterprise pays too little, while the government is content
that no enterprise is too aggressive in raising workers'
pay. Further studies on the relationship between wage
rates and productivity will be provided in a later section
of this chapter.
In passing, it should also be pointed out that there
is perhaps a reason commercial workers receive higher pay
than industrial workers, as indicated by Table 4-3a. In
the past few years the government has begun to relax price
controls on many commodities. The price scrutiny process
for industrial output, in general, is tighter than for
commercial goods, because the government fears that a price
hike in intermediate goods may cause a chain-reaction in
other sectors. We speculate that some commercial
enterprises may have benefited from this "unsymmetrical"
control by raising the prices of the goods they are selling
to reach a new level of profits.
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The device an enterprise can use to adjust wage
rates is extra pay, which is composed of wage bonuses and
benefits (the latter may not be take-home cash). This
extra amount of pay is mostly generated from enterprise
retained, or after-tax, earnings. Table 4-3b presents the
statistics on the percentage of extra wages to total wages.
It shows that the extra wage is relatively more important
to the state-owned enterprises then to the nonstate-owned
enterprises. This is perhaps due to the fact that the
SOEs, as far as the basic wage levels are concerned, are
under tighter control of the government; but these
enterprises, due to their advantage in capital endowment
and labor quality, do have funds to enhance their workers
pay. Rather than going through all the trouble of
obtaining formal government endorsement for basic salary
increase, the SOEs simply raise the total wage levels by
channeling more funds into extra wage allocation.
On the whole, we gained an impression that
enterprise behavior in allocating wages is not completely
random. There seem to be logical explanations that support
most of the statistical observations.
Cost of Capital
Measuring cost of capital is much harder than
measuring the cost of labor. The general theory tells us
that the cost of money is determined by the prime lending
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Table 4-3b
WAGE BONUSES AND BENEFITS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL WAGES
(Significance of t-test is in parentheses)
Jinan Yantai
Mean Std Dev Cases Mean Std Dev Cases
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
B Age of Firm
New
Old
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large -
By Age of Firm
New
Old
EXHIBIT
Commerce Total
Industry Total
21
28(.000)
27
23(.034)
23
25(.287)
--------- Commerce -----------------
12 141 18 15 67
19 179 50 19 40
(.002#)
18 155 32 22 50
15 165 29 23 57
(.411#)
15 106 32 20 55
17 214 30 25 52
(.561#)
----------------- Industry ----------------
21 20 90 9 8 65
31 15 113 24 10 74
(.000) (.000)
25
29(.164)
34
26(.281#)
25
27(.132#)
20 98 14
16 105 19(.008#)
30 1 11
16 185 18(.036)
Jinan ------
16 320
18 203
11 68
11 71
9 18
12 121
------ Yantai ------
30 22 107
17 11 139
(.000)
T-test significance for Jinan and Yantai Industries: (.000)
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: "#" indicates a 2-tail probability of t-values for pooled
variance estimates; otherwise for separated variance.
Std Dev = Standard deviation.
Small = Firms below the median size.
Large = Firms above the median size.
New = Firms formed since 1980.
Old = Firms formed before 1980.
rates of the central bank, the administration cost of the
local bank, the risk premium, and the bank margin of
profit. The administration cost, moreover, is affected by
the scale and duration of the loan. This general
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knowledge, however, is a long-shot at best in helping us
determine the cost of capital incurred by each individual
enterprise.
In this thesis, we propose to measure the cost of
capital to an enterprise in the following way. We consider
this cost to be the premium an enterprise has to pay in
order to obtain the privilege of utilizing the capital
assets, including working capital and fixed assets. We
therefore define the capital-utilization premium as the
total capital consumption incurred by the enterprise during
a period of production (one year). The cost of capital,
then, is the ratio of the premium over the total value of
capital assets the enterprise has. To use this definition,
we first need to measure the annual consumption of capital,
so that we can calculate the ratio of the premium to the
total value of capital assets.
Only two items in an enterprise's profit-loss
account are related to capital consumption: interest and
loan payments and depreciation allowance. Interest payment
is the cost of working capital borrowed from banks. We
were told that a small number of enterprises do borrow
money from the bank for some minor investments. We have,
however, no means of separating the interest paid for
production from that paid for future investment.
Depreciation, on the other hand, is a fund created by
writing off an amount, which is fixed by the government, as
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the cost of production. If this is done properly,
depreciation should be a good index for measuring the cost
of fixed capital. It is analogous to the wage compensation
that enables labor to continue participating in production.
Adding together these two types of capital consumption
seems a reasonable measurement of the capital consumed by
enterprise in production. Due to our survey error, the
depreciation allowance of Jinan commerce was lumped in an
item "circulation cost." As a rough guess, we took 15% of
the circulation cost as the depreciation allowance.
In order to see whether the assembled index for
capital consumption is of any relevance, we construct an
independent test, using the concept of opportunity cost.
In our survey, over 90% of the enterprises reported their
working capital and the net value of fixed assets. In a
crude way, we propose that if the enterprise can convert
its fixed assets into cash, encountering little transaction
cost, and put the money into a bank, it would expect to
earn interest on the money. The interest earned, then, can
be seen as the opportunity cost of the fixed assets owned
by the enterprise. It is a reasonable guess that the
average saving interest rate offered by banks in China
between 1984 and 1986 was somewhere around 8%. Likewise it
is fair to estimate that the prevailing lending rate in the
same period was about 10% (Rock Creek Research, 1987). We
then create an index by summing 10% of working capital and
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8% of the total fixed assets. We then employ the paired-
sample t-test to assess the difference between the means of
the two indices. The results presented in Table 4-4 are
obtained by assuming that the enterprise in an average year
would consume the equivalent of 8% of its net value of fix
assets.
The test has two components. Part I of the test
uses all the data, including the estimated Jinan commerce
data. Part II excludes the estimated data. The reason for
doing the second test is that the depreciation data for
Jinan commerce are estimated rather than the true values.
Isolating the impact of Jinan commerce data helps ensure
that the test is not distorted due to the estimated data.
The indices formed from the two methods are
strikingly close. The differences between the means of
capital consumption are small (300.66 versus 299.30 for the
whole sample and 500.58 versus 501.15 without Jinan
commerce data), and are not statistically significantly
different (a .925 significance level for the former and a
.982 for the latter). A high correlation (.923 for the
former and .921 for the latter) with a .000 significance
level for both tests exists between the two approaches.
Thus, the result of the paired t-test seems to indicate
that the cost of capital to the enterprises is not too far
from the real opportunity cost. If this is the case, we
should consider that there might be some undiscovered
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Table 4-4
PAIRED-SAMPLE T-TEST: MEASUREMENT OF COST OF CAPITAL
---------------- With Estimated Jinan Commerce Data ----------------
Number Standard Standard
Variable of Cases Mean Deviation Error
Cap1 (Interest+Depreciation) 765 300.66 1016.83 36.76
Cap2 (Opportunity Cost) 765 299.30 856.26 30.96
Mean Standard Standard 2-Tail t 2-Tail
Difference Deviation Error Corr. Prob. Value D.F. Prob.
1.36 399.11 14.43 .923 .000 .09 764 .925
--------------- Without Estimated Jinan Commerce Data --------------
Number Standard Standard
Variable of Cases Mean Deviation Error
Cap1 (Interest+Depreciation) 439 500.58 1303.69 62.22
Cap2 (Opportunity Cost) 439 501.15 1081.11 51.60
Mean Standard Standard 2-Tail t 2-Tail
Difference Deviation Error Corr. Prob. Value D.F. Prob.
-0.57 521.04 24.87 .921 .000 -.02 438 .982
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Corr. - Correlation Coefficient.
Prob. - Probability.
D.F. - degree of freedom.
mechanisms in the system that force at least some
enterprises to use capital rationally.
Productivity
Productivity is another component we need to analyze
in order to understand the enterprise production process.
Two aspects of productivity of the enterprise will be
examined: labor productivity and capital efficiency.
Labor productivity is defined as the value of output,
measured by value-added per worker per annum. Capital
efficiency, on the other hand, is defined as the ratio of
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total value-added to the total value of capital assets,
i.e., the sum of the value of fixed assets and working
capital (cash), of the enterprise. The capital efficiency
measurement is understandably crude because fixed assets
and cash are used in very different ways in production, but
because our study is merely to detect whether some
"standard" rational behavior pertaining to enterprises, for
this practical purpose, we feel this level of
classification is sufficient.
First, let us examine the labor productivity data in
Table 4-5. The most striking observation is the high
productivity of the Yantai commercial sector, which is as
much as three to tenfold that of the industrial sectors and
of the Jinan commerce. We were not able to relate this
observation to any data error. In the data analyses we
have just presented, however, a pattern emerges. The
Yantai commercial sector is the one that pays the highest
salary to its labor (Table 4-3a), and the extra wages
(employees benefits and wage bonuses) are the highest
proportion of total wages (Table 4-3b). These independent
observations seem to suggest that our data are consistent.
There is a possibility that Yantai commerce is highly
productive. Yantai is very popular in China as a beach
city. Tourism is a major industry that creates jobs and
earns income for the city, although there are no proper
statistics to show the importance of this economic
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Table 4-5
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (yuan/worker/year)
(Significance of t-test is in parentheses)
Jinan
Mean Std Dev Cases
Yantai
Mean Std Dev Cases
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm
New
Old
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm
New
Old -
EXHIBIT
Commerce Total
Industry Total
---------------
4229 3875
4707 4365
(.252)
4495 5106
4463 2881
(.940)
4511 3411
4461 4508
(.909)
-- Commerce -----------------
187 11440 12554 87
205 62626 132597 55
(.006)
196 31795 92556 71
196 30737 80317 71
(.942#)
142 26909 81146 75
250 36143 92194 67
(.527#)
----------------- Industry ----------------
3249 2342 97 4095 2879 73
7162 18351 115 4640 3307 77
(.025) (.283#)
3168 2004 106 4122 3155 75
7575 19092 106 4635 3062 75
(.020) (.313#)
4596 3642 20 4821 4739 23
5452 14373 192 4297 2736 127
(.518) (.611)
4479
5372(.356#)
Jinan -------
4140 392
13721 212
31266
4376(.000)
Yanta
8634
310
T-test significance for Jinan and Yantai Industries:
T-test significance for Jinan and Yantai Commences:
i ------
7 142
9 151
.000)( .309)
Sectoral Total 4792 8785 604 17408 61534 293
T-test significance for Jinan and Yantai grand means: (.001)
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: "#" indicates two-tail probabilities of t-values for pooled
variance estimates, otherwise for separated variance.
Std Dev - Standard deviation.
Small = Firms below the median size.
Large = Firms above the median size.
New = Firms created since 1980.
Old = Firms created before 1980.
I'
activity. Commerce, naturally, benefits directly from
tourism. The benefit from tourism is further enlarged by
the government relaxation of price controls, which, in
itself, has created confusion in the price system.
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Tourists from an outside region have not adapted themselves
into the new price system (which itself changes often) and
cannot judge what is a reasonable price to pay for local
goods and services.
Another observation is that Jinan state-owned
industrial sector is over twice as productive as its
nonstate-owned counterpart. One plausible reason to
explain this is perhaps the per worker capital endowment by
the state sector is much higher than the nonstate sector
(8,579 yuan/worker versus 3,236 yuan/worker), as suggested
by Table 4-2. Therefore, the total-factor productivity of
the state-owned industry may be actually lower than its
nonstate-owned counterpart. In passing, we should also
mention that in Jinan larger industries are significantly
more "productive" than the small ones (7,575 yuan/worker
versus 3,168 yuan/worker). Again, the difference in
capital endowments may be the factor that explains the
productivity differences (7,453 yuan/worker versus 4,572
yuan/worker, also see Table 4-2). Moreover, as the earlier
chi-square test (Table 3-14) indicated that large
industrial firms tend to be owned by the state and small
ones by the nonstate sector; therefore the behavior
pattern of large industrial enterprises should bear a
resemblance to that of state-owned enterprises.
Now, let us turn to capital efficiency issues.
Table 4-6 contains the capital efficiency statistics,
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controlled for city and sector. Again, the Yantai
commercial sector, especially state-owned commerce, has the
most impressive performance. On average, the value-added
Table 4-6
CAPITAL EFFICIENCY OF ENTERPRISES (%)
(significance of t-test is in parentheses)
Jinan Yantai
Mean Std Dev Cases Mean Std Dev Cases
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm:
New
Old
By Ownership:
Non-State
State-Owned
By Size:
Small
Large
By Age of Firm:
New
Old
EXHIBIT
Commerce Total
Industry Total
----------------- Commerce -----------------
144 219 183 644 924 86
244 353 195 1539 2791 46
(.001) (.040)
248 369 186 1233 2168 62
145 200 192 710 1481 70
(.001) (.113)
160 303 138 773 1321 70
216 296 240 -1162 2296 62
(.083#) (.527#)
----------------- Industry ----------------
47 32 97 58 31 73
40 32 115 53 32 78
(.119#) (.314#)
42 31 106 57 33 76
44 33 106 54 30 75
(.560#) (.476#)
60 55 20 53 41 23
41 28 192 56 30 128
(.139) (.773)
196
43(.000)
Jinan
299
32
378
212
956
56(.000)
Yan
1
T-test significance for Jinan and Yantai Industries:
T-test significance for Jinan and Yantai Commences:
tai ------
848 132
32 151
(.000)
Sectoral Total 141 251 590 475 1337 283
T-test significance for Jinan and Yantai grand means: (.000)
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: "#" indicates 2-tail probabilities of t-values for pooled
variance estimates; otherwise for separated variance.
Std Dev
Small
Large
New
Old
= Standard deviation.
- Firms below the median size.
- Firms above the median size.
- Firms created since 1980.
- Firms created before 1980.
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of the Yantai commercial sector is 9.5-fold the total
capital assets it employed, which is 4 times better than
Jinan Commerce, and about 20 times that of the Jinan and
Yantai industrial sector. Combining the statistical data
compiled in the earlier tables of this chapter, the
evidence is overwhelming that Yantai commerce manages a
superb performance.
On the whole, commercial sectors in the two cities
are more capital efficient than the industrial sector
(Jinan 196% versus 43%, and Yantai 956% versus 56%). The
likely reason is that commerce is more a labor- rather than
capital-intensive industry. In a developing economy, there
is always a shortage of capital. Because of different
production requirements, commerce is the sector where labor
substitution for capital is easier than it is in the
industrial sector.
Compared with the dynamic commercial sector, it is
also interesting to notice that the returns to capital seem
to have less deviation and variation within the industrial
sector, between cities, ownership types, sizes, and ages of
the enterprises. We might speculate that it is the
government price policies, rather than the performances of
enterprises, that affect measured productivity of
enterprises. It is a widely observed phenomenon that the
government, in fear of a chain-reaction that would lead to
run-away inflation, has been cautious in loosening price
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controls on intermediate industrial goods, while imposing
less regulation to final commercial goods pricing. The
shortage of supply in the economy and confusion in the
price system because of the transition seems to have helped
the commercial sector to improve its financial performance
by raising the prices of goods and services. Another
factor that supports a commerce boom is perhaps the large
unmet demand for commercial shops and services. Before
economic reform, the government was adamant about not
allowing the nonstate sector to enter markets; but the
government itself, due to a shortage of funds, made little
investment -in commerce after putting the overwhelming
proportion of investment funds into industrial activities.
In many cities the population was growing rapidly while the
number of commercial shops was decreasing sharply (Zhang,
1986). The distorted state investment policy might have
helped to create a large market, while holding monopoly
power, for the commercial sector. Industry, in this
context, became the disadvantaged sector.
Enterprise Income Composition
The main purpose of studying enterprise income
composition is not to see whether there is rational
behavior embodied in enterprise production process;
instead, the purpose is to gain an understanding about how
the income composition differs among sectors, ownership
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types, sizes, and ages of enterprises. This knowledge will
be vital to understanding the enterprise production process
and behavior in the later analysis in which the production-
function technique will be used.
For analytical purposes, we divide the income of
enterprises, measured by value-added, into four components:
labor payment, capital payment, government taxes, and
enterprise profits. Details on each component are given in
Chapter Three. The statistics on composition of enterprise
income with intercity comparisons are compiled in Table
4-7a and 4-7b. If we look first at the general and inter-
sectoral comparison shown in the lower part of Table 4-7a,
we find that with the
exception of Jinan
Table 4-lb
commerce, in all cases ENTERPRISE INCOME COMPOSITION BETWEEN CITIES
(Significance of t-test is in parentheses)
the highest proportion -
Labor Capital Firm's
of enterprise income is City Share Share Tax Profits
---------------------- City Total --------
taxed away by the Jinan 0.395 0.115 0.298 0.192
Yantai 0.290 0.113 0.456 0.141
government, ranging (.000) (.811) (.000) (.000#)
------ Commerce --------
from 35% (Jinan Jinan 0.426 0.083 0.273 0.219
Yantai 0.299 0.053 0.480 0.167
industry) to 48% (.000) (.004) (.000) (.014)
--- - Industry ---------
(Yantai commerce), and Jinan 0.335 0.179 0.349 0.137Yantai 0.282 0.161 0.431 0.120(.001#) (.115#) (.000#) (.182)
the lowest proportion
of income goes to the SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: "V" indicates 2-tail probabilities of
capital share, ranging t-values fortpooled varianceestimates, o terwise for separated
vany ance.
from 5% (Yantai
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Table 4-7a
COMPOSITION OF ENTERPRISE INCOME
(Significance of t-test is in parentheses)
Jinan Yantai
Labor Capital Firm's Labor Capital Firm's
Share Share Tax Profits Share Share Tax Profits
By Ownership: ------------------------- Commerce --------------------------
State-owned 0.429 0.082 0.274 0.215 0.291 0.041 0.526 0.141
Non-state 0.422 0.084 0.272 0.223 0.316 0.080 0.378 0.226
(.682#) (.739) (.883) (.598#) (.607#) (.166) (.019#) (.068)
By Size:
Large 0.407 0.080 0.264 0.249 0.338 0.022 0.456 0.184
Small 0.441 0.085 0.281 0.193 0.254 0.090 0.509 0.147
(.031#) (.302) (.260) (.000) (.060#) (.001) (.379#) (.339#)
By Age:
New 0.443 0.093 0.271 0.194 0.302 0.057 0.460 0.181
Old 0.416 0.077 0.274 0.232 0.295 0.049 0.504 0.151
(.101#) (.015) (.852#) (.010) (.880#) (.680) (.453#) (.442#)
By Ownership: ------------------------- Industry ---------------------------
State-owned 0.383 0.154 0.292 0.171 0.304 0.160 0.408 0.128
Non-state 0.290 0.203 0.402 0.105 0.261 0.162 0.465 0.112
(.000#) (.001#) (.000) (.000) (.062#) (.912#) (.068#) (.336)
By Size:
Large 0.372 0.142 0.287 0.199 0.293 0.159 0.434 0.113
Small 0.300 0.214 0.408 0.078 0.271 0.163 0.439 0.127
(.001#) (.000) (.000) (.000) . (.323#) (.802#) (.870#) (.433#)
By Age:
New 0.326 0.145 0.287 0.242 0.300 0.190 0.379 0.130
Old 0.336 0.183 0.356 0.125 0.279 0.156 0.447 0.118
(.784#) (.142#) (.082#) (.025) (.512) (.258) (.123#) (.621#)
Sector Total: --------- Jinan ------------- ----------- Yantai -----------
Commerce 0.426 0.083 0.273 0.219 0.299 0.053 0.480 0.167
Industry 0.335 0.179 0.349 0.137 0.282 0.161 0.437 0.120
(.000#) (.000) (.000#) (.000) (.474#) (.000#) (.191) (.026)
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: "#" indicates 2-tail probabilities of t-values for pooled
variance estimates; otherwise for separated variance.
Std Dev - Standard deviation.
Small - Firms below the median size.
Large - Firms above the median size.
New - Firms created since 1980.
Old - Firms created before 1980.
commerce) to 18% (Jinan industry). The labor share of
income, in general, with the exception of Jinan commerce,
makes up about one-third of the total enterprise income
(Jinan commerce was 42.%). In both cities, the retained
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commercial profits are significantly higher than the
industrial profits (Jinan 21.9% versus 13.7% with
probability of t-value .000, and Yantai 16.7% versus 12.0%
with probability of t-value .026). Jinan labor share is
merely an estimation that appears to be inaccurate.
Commerce in both cities pays a significantly lower percent
of income to capital than industry (Jinan 8.3% versus 17.9%
while Yantai 5.3% versus 16.1%). While Yantai industry is
taxed most heavily (about half of its income), Jinan
commerce seems to enjoy a favorable tax treatment (about
27% of its income).
Turning to comparisons within each city between
sectors, we see that the labor share, only a few sectors
allocate significantly higher percent of income to labor
than their respective counterparts (Jinan large commerce
versus small commerce, state-owned industry versus
nonstate-owned industry, large industry versus small
industry; Yantai large commerce versus small commerce,
state-owned industry versus nonstate-owned industry). In
general, it looks as if labor share of enterprise income is
rather homogeneous between ownership types and sizes and
ages of enterprises. The evidence seems consistent with
earlier conclusions. The government may still exercise a
strong control on what enterprises can pay for labor.
The share of capital is also rather homogeneous,
except for few sectors whose capital shares are
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significantly higher than their counterparts, such as Jinan
new commerce versus Jinan old commerce, state-owned versus
nonstate-owned, large industrial enterprises versus small
industrial enterprises, and Yantai large commerce versus
small commerce.
Compared to their counterparts, Jinan nonstate,
small, and old industrial enterprises, Yantai state-owned
commerce, and nonstate industry are taxed significantly
heavier. A higher percentage of income is retained by
enterprises for investment purposes in Jinan large and old
commerce, state-owned, large, and old industry, and Yantai
non-state commerce. In order to explain why there are such
variations in tax treatment and income retaining of
enterprises between ownerships, sizes, and ages, we need to
do a careful study of the tax structure and government tax
policies and implementation, which are beyond the scope of
this research.
From the city level (see Table 4-7b), it looks as if
the composition of enterprise income in the two cities is
significantly different. Jinan allocates a significantly
higher share of its income to labor than Yantai does,
apparently because it pays a significantly lower share of
its income to government as taxes. The lower tax rates
also allow Jinan enterprises to retain a significantly
higher percentage of income as profits. It seems to us
that tax treatment is a crucial element in determining the
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share of income of enterprises. What is still not clear,
however, is whether the discrepancy in tax treatments of
the two cities is a result of the local government
policies, or due to variations in the industrial structures
of the two cities. We do not have complete industrial
structure information, but our sample data suggest that the
industrial structures of the two cities are similar (see
Table 3-6). Thus, we can only speculate that local
governments have a strong impact on determining the
effective tax rates and wage policies.
A final word on the government tax structure.
Because land is not priced, could government tax somehow
have taken into account this fact and therefore designed a
tax structure in such a way that enterprises that have
better land must pay more tax? We built a small double-log
model to detect in general whether there is a relationship
between tax rate and land productivity. We use the three-
year mean data, pooling the two cities and all the sectors.
The result of the test is presented in Table 4-8. It shows
that the land productivity variable has a positive
estimator (.07749) and a significant t-value level (.000),
indicating that there is a positive relationship between
the tax rate and land productivity. However, the
explanatory power of the model is very poor (R-square =
.02473), and the tax rate elasticity of land productivity
is less then 1/10 of a percent (Namely, 1% increase in land
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Table 4-8
LAND PRODUCTIVITY VERSUS TAX RATE(Coef./Standard Error/Significance of t-value)
Variable Log-scale
Label Interpretation Tax Rate (%)*
ZPD Log-scale land .07749
productivity .01847
(Y1,000/sq.m./year) (.0000)
(Constant) -.98226
R-square .02473
Standard Error .67043
(Sig F) (.0000)
D.F. 694
NOTE: * Tax rate is defined as:
(Total taxes + fees)/value-added.
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
Coef. - Coefficient.
sq.m. - square mater.
Sig F - Significance of F-value.
D.F. = Degree of freedom.
productivity will result in .08% of tax rate increase).
All in all, we consider that the government tax structure
has taken little account of land productivity.
Enterprise Factor-Rewarding Behavior
One of the major questions that requires special
attention is whether there is evidence suggesting
enterprises behave either rationally or irrationally. We
will use two models, one statistical model and one
conceptual model, to evaluate the factor-rewarding behavior
of enterprises. First, let us examine the statistical
relationship between labor productivity and wage rates. If
there is no statistical relationship at all between the
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two, we can conclude that enterprise factor-rewarding
behavior is random. On the other hand, a strong
statistical relationship between the two would suggest that
more strict conceptual models should be used to test
whether there is some certainty that rationality is
attached to the behavior of enterprises.
In building the statistical regression models, three
dependent wage variables are chosen:
(1) Basic wages, which is the total deductible wage
bill divided by the total number of workers.
This rate is controlled by the government.
(2) Extra wages, which is the total amount of wage
bonuses and employee's benefits allocated from
dnterprise retained profits divided by the total
number of workers. Enterprises have great
control in determining this rate.
(3) Total wages, which is the sum of total basic wage
bill and extra wage funds divided by total number
of workers.
The independent variables are labor productivity,
its variations, and a number of dummy variables. Labor
productivity is measured by dividing the value-added of the
enterprise by the total number of workers. We tend to
believe the relationship between wages and productivity is
different for enterprises with different levels of
productivity. To detect this effect, we divide the
productivity of firms into three segments: less productive
(the lower 25 percentile), median (between 25 and 75
percentile), and highly productive (the upper 75
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percentile). Two dummy variables are created for low and
median productivity firms:
LOW = 1 if firm is in low productive;
LOW = 0 otherwise;
MED = 1 if firm is in median productive;
MED = 0 otherwise.
Then we multiply the dummy and productivity to obtain two
interaction variables: LOPRD and MDPRD. Finally, to make
the model more complete, we include several qualitative
variables. These are: a city variable (YAN=1 if the firm
is from Yantai, and YAN=O if from Jinan), an ownership
variable (OWN=1 if the firm is owned by the state, OWN=0
otherwise), and an industry variable (IND=1 if it is an
industrial enterprise, IND=O otherwise, i.e., commerce).
Jinan commerce is not included in the model because of the
problem with its wage data.
Having tested the models in several functional
forms, we finally adopted the double-log functional form to
fit the data for three reasons. First, it is the best fit
to the data. Second, it helps explain the regression
result, because the coefficient of each continuous variable
is the wage elasticity of that variable. Finally, there is
the heteroscedasticity that was present in the linear form
of the regression; use of the double-log form helps scale
down the data on the high value side, thereby helping to
correct the heteroscedasticity. The regression models are
presented in Table 4-9.
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Table 4-9
WAGE RATES AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY: STATISTICAL MODELS(Coefficient/Standard Error/Significance of t-value)
Variable - Dependent Variable*Variable 
---- ----------------------
Label Interpretation TWAGE XWAGE BWAGE
LPRD Lo -scale labor 0.1378 0.2315 0.0882
Productivity 0.0250 0.0602 0.0303
(Y1,OOO/worker/year) (.0000) (.0001) (.0038)
MDPRD Interaction term**: Median 0.0047 -0.0285 0.0149
range productivity 0.0062 0.0148 0.0075
(.4413) (.0545) (.0466)
LOPRD Interaction term**: Lower -0.0089 -0.0426 -0.0028
range productivity -0.0092 0.0221 0.0111
(.3317) (.0543) (.8034)
YAN Dummy: =1 if Yantai; -0.1700 -0.7258 -0.0509
=0 if Jinan 0.0364 0.0875 0.0442
(.0000) (.0000) (.2496)
OWN Dummy: -1 if state-owned; 0.1147 1.0114 -0.1019
=0 otherwise 0.0323 0.0777 0.0392
(.0004) (.0000) (.0096)
IND Dummy: -1 if industry; -0.1908 -0.7627 0.0062
-0 commerce 0.0466 0.1120 0.0565
(.0001) (.0000) (.9125)
(Constant) 6.0605 3.9940 6.0129
R-square 0.2753 0.4734 0.0662
Standard Error 0.3271 0.7863 0.3965
(Sig F) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
.F. 434 434 434
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
NOTE: * Dependent Variables:
TWAGE--Total annual wages per worker.
XWAGE--Extra annual wages per worker.
BWAGE--Basic annual wages per worker.
** See the text for definition the interactions.
Sig F = Significance of F-value.
D.F. - Degree of freedom.
We first examine the regression of total wages on
productivity. The models shows that the labor productivity
variable is positive and significant. The wage elasticity
of productivity is rather inelastic (.14). No significant
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difference is found in the elasticity of different levels
of productivity. All the control variables are
significant. Overall, the model explains slightly more
than a quarter of the variation in the wage rates. From
these observations, we may conclude that, statistically
speaking, there is a positive relationship between the
total wage offered and productivity, but its power to
explain is weak, as demonstrated by the low R-square value.
When we look into the components of the total wages,
namely, the extra and basic wages, we find a great
difference between the two. The extra wage model in Table
4-9 appears to explain convincingly the relationship
between extra wages and productivity. With only
productivity variables and a few qualitative variables, the
model explains about half the variation in the extra wage
rates. A significant positive relationship between the
extra wage offered and productivity is suggested. If the
firm is highly productive, for every 1% rise in its
productivity, the extra wages are raised by .23%. If the
firm is of median productivity, the extra wages are raised
by .2(.23-.03). For low productivity firms, the figure is
.19(.23-0.4). All the interaction terms are significant.
Although the sizes of the interaction terms are not large,
we could still speculate that incentives might have been
built into enterprise behavior that enable us to observe
extra wage rates moving in the same direction as
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productivity, such that the higher the productivity the
enterprise can reach, the higher the extra wage rates it
can draw from its profits.
The model of basic wage rates (set by the
government) also suggests that there is a significant
positive relationship between labor productivity and labor
pay, but overall the model can explain only 6% of the
variation in the basic wage rates. This indicates that the
total productivity has had little relationship with the
basic wage rates. Combining these three statistical
models, we may conclude that the total wages the
enterprises offers to labor is not totally random, limited
and partial rationality is incorporated into the wage
rates. This limited rationality is a result of combined
forces, from the most irrational basic wage levels set up
by the government, on the one hand, and from the rational
extra wages set by the enterprises, on the other.
A more rigorous conceptual model is introduced in
Table 4-10 to test whether there is rationality embodied in
enterprise labor-rewarding behavior. The theory of
production says that under perfect competition, payment
that the firm offers to a factor will be no more, but no
less, than the marginal product of that factor. Following
this theory, we designed a test strategy. We will first
estimate a simple two-factor (labor and capital) one-output
(revenue) production function. Then, based upon the
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Table 4-10
ESTIMATION OF TWO-FACTOR ONE-OUTPUT PRODUCTION FUNCTION
(Coefficient/Standard Error/Significance of t-value)
Dependent Variable
Variable
Label
LLAB
LCAP
Interpretation
Log-scale labor input
Log-scale capital input
LLABSQ Log-scale labor square
LCAPSQ Log-scale capital input
LLABCAP Product of log-labor and
. log-capital
YAN Dummy: -1 if Yantai
=0 if Jinan
IND Dummy: -1 if Industry
=0 if Commerce
(Constant)
R-square
Standard Error
(Sig F)
D.F.
Log-Gross
Value-added
0.88507
0.17054
(.0000)
-0.17033
0.08754
(.0520)
-0.16697
0.03182
(.0000)
-0.02978
0.01594
(.0622)
0.20127
0.04036
(.0000)
0.42524
0.05483
(.0000)
-0.60159
0.08191
(.0000)
1.87446
0.85484
0.68745
(.0000)
773
Log-Net
Value-added
0.89254
0.08680(.0000)
0.07172
0.01575(.1650)
-0.11914
0.01642(.0000)
-0.02536
0.00726(.0005)
0.13510
0.01843(.0000)
0.11821
0.03574(.0010)
-0.35438
0.05175(.0000)
0.21068
0.94130
0.43334(.0000)
757
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
Sig F = Significance of F-value.
D.F. = Degree of freedom.
Il
parameters in the estimated production function, the
marginal-product-of-labor factor will be calculated for
every enterprise, then a paired-sample t-test will be
applied to test the difference between the two means and
the correlation level.
162
The form of the production function we adopted is
translog, a widely used production function formulated by
Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau (1971 and 1973). The
reason we use this production function is that we have
little knowledge about the competition condition of the
economy and the factor-substitution elasticity. The
translog production function is just a convenient Taylor
expansion of any unknown production function; it does not
require prior knowledge of the existence of competition,
and of the range of factor substitution. Two production
functions are estimated. First, the total value-added
production function (including taxes and enterprise
profits), which helps estimate the total marginal product
created by labor. Second, we estimated the net value-added
production function (net of taxes and profits) to help
evaluate whether the enterprise has paid the "right" prices
to labor, knowing its tax status and availability of funds.
The estimated production functions are included in Table
4-10. Statistically speaking, the regression results seem
reasonable. All the t-tests, except for one (capital in
the second equation), are significant at about the 5%
level. R-square is high enough (.85-.95) to establish the
explanation power of the equations. From the estimated
production functions, the first-order condition (f.o.c.) is
taken with respect to labor to obtain:
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[1] MPL = V/L(al + 2a2ln(L) + clln(K)), and
where: MPL = Marginal product of labor;
V = Value-added;
L = Labor input;
K = Capital input;
a,, a2 and c are the estimates contained in
Table 4-10.
Then the MPL is calculated for each individual enterprise
(except for Jinan commerce because of the bad wage data).
The paired-sample t-test is utilized to test the difference
between the means of the calculated marginal product of
factor. This theoretically should be equal to the price of
the factor if competition prevails and the actual price
paid to the factor. The t-test results are summarized in
Table 4-11.
The first part of the test indicates that on average
the marginal product of labor is 8300 yuan/worker/year, but
because the enterprises have to pay taxes and to set aside
part of their earnings for future investment, the workers
are actually paid, on average, 1202 yuan/worker/year, or
only about 15% of the marginal product of labor. However,
if we remove the taxes and enterprises profits before
estimating the production function, which is labeled as the
"net output estimate," the marginal product of labor is
1178 yuan/worker/year, while workers are paid 1198
yuan/worker/year. There is a high correlation between the
marginal product estimate and actual payment (.634), which
has a reliable significance level (.000). There is no
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Table 4-11
PAIRED-SAMPLE T-TEST: THEORETICAL VS. ACTUAL FACTOR PAYMENTS*
Standard Stand. 2-Tail t 2-Tail
Variable Mean Deviation Error Pairs Corr. Prob. Value Prob.
Total Wage Rate 1202.1 585.3 27.3 439 .200 .000 -3.84 .000
Marg. Prod. of Labor 8299.9 39684.6 1852.3
(Gross output est.)
Total Wage Rate 1197.8 580.9 27.8 1 439 .634 .000 .50 .617
Marg. Prod. of Labor 1177.7 1080.4 51.6
(Net output est.)
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
NOTE: * Excluding Jinan Commercial Sector
Corr. = Correlation.
Prob. - Probability.
Marg. Prod. - Marginal Product.
est. = Estimate.
significant statistical difference between the two means
(the 2-tail probability of the t-value is .617). What this
second part of the test tells us is that the enterprises,
on the average, appear to have a correct sense of what
labor should be paid, given the output level, the taxes
that have to be paid, and the profits the enterprises must
retain for future investment. This result, however, does
not suggest that the wage policies enforced by the
government are rational. On the whole, labor pay is low
(only about 15% of the value created by labor input). This
excessively low level of pay could hardly qualify as
"correct" incentives for labor. The government, on the
other hand, may argue that it provides a variety of social
benefits and subsidies to workers. We will not pursue this
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discussion further because what is the right division of
profits between labor and government is clearly beyond the
scope of this thesis.
Finally, a warning should be given to this factor-
marginal-productivity model. This is a less than complete
production-function model. Not all the production factors,
such as land, are included. Because there is no prior
restriction on scale imposed on the model, it predicts the
increasing returns to scale for a large percentage of
firms--this implies the sum of individual factor payments
will be greater than the total factor payments; therefore
the estimated marginal productivity may be biased toward
the high end. Having said this, we feel that our minimum
goal at this stage of research, i.e., to show that there is
rationality that is incorporated into the behavior of
enterprises, is accomplished. More rigorous research on
production functions will be presented in Chapter Six.
Conclusion
In this chapter we analyzed the behavior of
enterprises. The analysis suggests that enterprises may
have been given limited autonomy in deciding factor input
and compensation. It appears that enterprises are not
sluggish in adjusting their labor input, as indicated by
the dynamic utilization of temporary and contract workers.
Extra wages, which are controlled by the enterprise, have
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become an important component of the total salary of
workers.
In a number of occasions, we had opportunities to
confirm the consistency of the data. Qualitatively, we
tend to believe that commercial and nonstate enterprises
are "more" rational than their counterparts, which is
reflected in their factor-endowment structure that enables
them to be more apt than the other enterprises to respond
to price changes and market needs.
To our surprise, consumption of capital seems to be
related to the "opportunity cost" of capital defined by us;
furthermore, statistical correlation is found between
productivity and total wage rates, although this
relationship could have been stronger if the basic wage
rates set by the government had not been random. More
strikingly, study of the marginal product of labor
indicates that enterprises seem to act as if they had a
sense what should be the "right" level of wages to be paid,
having taken into account tax status and provided for
future investment.
On the whole, we do not feel that the behavior of
enterprises in the two case-study cities can be categorized
as random or irrational. If rationality is incorporated
into their behavior, there is a chance they will try to
take advantage of the "free" land factor unless they are
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totally handicapped by the bureaucracy created by the
system, which will be the subject of the next chapter.
In passing, we wish to point out that government
behavior in a number of accounts is of disappointment. The
government-controlled base wage rate bears no relationship
with labor productivity. The government tax structure does
not take into consideration the fact that land is not
priced and, therefore, the economic product solely due to
land should have been collected in public interest in other
forms of tax payment.
One important conclusion can be drawn from the
analysis of the marginal product of labor is that the
government should not expect that taxing land will directly
enhance its revenue. Our analysis indicates that workers
are already being paid excessively little, compared to the
whole wealth they created. Any new taxes that squeeze
income from workers would further distort their incentives
to work. If the government wishes the new land rent to
help rather than to harm the economy, it should consider
cutting other enterprise tax liabilities in order to help
them pay for the rent.
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Chapter V
LAND USE AND THE DENSITY GRADIENT
Land in China is not priced and cannot be traded,
therefore it does not carry any direct financial value, at
least not in the sense of enterprise accounts. However,
due to its acute scarcity, land has a high economic value,
which is recognized by society by making obtain an
additional amount of land extremely difficult to obtain.1/
There is little doubt that the impact of land scarcity is
keenly passed on to most enterprises.
In the last chapter, we showed that Chinese
enterprises, once given limited autonomy, do not behave
randomly. There is evidence to suggest that elements of
profit-maximization behavior appear in enterprises,
although the degree to which this is so varies among
sectors, ownership types, sizes, ages of enterprises, as
well as type of resource use. Now the issue is that even
if enterprises attempted to make economic use of unpriced
land, given that they do have some incentives, pressures,
and means to optimize their production, such attempt might
be in vain because they would be building in a pattern of
1/ For example, it is stated in a state ordinance that any land
acquisition that involves above 10 mu of agricultural land
needs a approval from the provincial government. Ten-mu,
however, is just about size of 5 standard Olympic swimming
pools.
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mislocation of enterprises. A mass-mislocation of firms
will prevent intensified land use, a concept introduced by
Ricardo in the 19th century for fertile agricultural land,
because at a given location with fixed amount of land, any
increase of factor may not be able to bring an adequate
marginal product to compensate the marginal cost. This
could be the case in China because land is noncompetitively
allocated.
On the other hand, the harm the bureaucracy does to
an economy could be through a mechanism called
"bureaucratic mentality" that delays good decisions more
often than making bad decisions.2/ As we pointed out
earlier, fear of being punished for making a bad or stupid
decision may force the person-in-charge to take undue time,
but eventually to deliver an adequate decision. If this is
true, our sample, which is a selected one in the sense that
it does not include notorious failures of the land delivery
system, may show a limited rational land use, and, as a
result, the economic value (or rent) of land may have been
partially embodied into the economic product of the sampled
enterprises.
2/ one may argue, of course, not making a good decision in time
is making a bad decision. Our response is that because the
temporal dimension is not included in our study, we loosely
qualify any final decision that leads to a logical and
reasonable land use as a good decision, regardless of how long
it took.
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In this chapter, we try to discover, at the macro
(city) level, whether limited and partial rationality in
land use can be seen. In particular, we examine the
patterns of enterprise location, use and consumption of
land;3/ we explore whether there is factor substitution in
regard to more (or less) valuable locations; and we test
whether differential land productivity exists. If we
conclude that land use patterns in the two study cities are
not completely random, then we can proceed to estimate the
shadow contribution of land to the economy, even though we
know in advance that the full value of land is not to be
found in the enterprise product (further justifications of
this approach will be provided in Chapter Six). If the
land-use patterns are random, then any estimated marginal
product of land will be far below a rent level that would
occur if land were competitively allocated. The worst
possible land-use scenario could be, referring back to
Figure 2-5, that all the commercial shops are located
beyond i and all industrial plants are between the CBD and
i. Then the realized "social rental value" will be a
minimum, represented by area OCDH, and resource waste is
maximized, represented by area ACDEGH. This indicates that
3/ The term "Land use and land consumption" will be frequently
used in this chapter. In the conventional Urban Economics,
"land use" emphasizes location and agglomeration aspects of
land users. "Land consumption" is mostly referred to the
quantity of land occupied by land users.
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if we have reason to believe that land resource has been
severely abused, then even though a serious resource
shortage is present, we should abandon the effort to
estimate the status quo land shadow contribution to the
economy, because the estimated land "usefulness" becomes
grossly misleading. This chapter is set out to examine
this concern.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we
take up a comparison of land-use structures between the
two-study cities and an industrialized country in the late
1960s, namely, the United States. We then analyze the
spatial distribution of commercial and industrial
enterprises. Following that section, we examine land use
and consumption patterns of the enterprises. Then, a model
that estimate gradients of land productivity are
introduced. Finally, the last section presents
conclusions.
Land-Use Structures
The structures of land use in the two-study cities
seem to be typical in China. A distinctive central
business district (CBD) can be identified, and population-
or building-density differences between built-up and fringe
areas are easily noticed. We have obtained the land-use
structure data from the two cities, and they are presented
in Table 5-la. In order to put our analysis into an
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Table 5-1a
YANTAI AND JINAN: LAND-USE STRUCTURES
Yantai
ha sq.m/p %
Residence
Residential Housing
Commerce/Public Building
Residential Green Space
Roads
Industry.
Warehousing
Intercity Transport
Non-local Government
Municipal Parks
Water/Rivers
Public Utility
Education & Research
Agriculture
1147
551
184
102
310
1023
526
301
28
89
28
25
110
38.8
18.6
6.2
3.5
10.5
34.6
17.8
10.2
1.0
3.0
0.9
0.8
3.7
33.0
15.9
5.3
2.9
8.9
29.5
15.2
8.7
0.8
2.6
0.8
0.7
3.2
Jinan
ha sq.m/p %
2215
1409
289
159
358
2928
342
310
497
292
080
25.9
16.5
3.4
1.9
4.2
34.2
4.0
3.6
5.8
3.4
0.9
28.4
18.1
3.7
2.0
4.6
37.5
4.4
4.0
6.4
3.7
1.0
372 4.4 4.8
Other 194 6.6 5.6 770 9.0 9.9
TOTAL 3471 117.4 100.0 7806 91.3 100.0
EXHIBIT - Population in city proper:
Jinan (1977): 850,000; Yantai (1985): 290,000.
NOTE: Jinan data are 1977, and Yantai data are 1985.
SOURCE: Yantai data are supplied by the Yantai Economic Research
Center, 1987. Jinan data are from Liu, et al., 1988, p.10.
ha = Total amount of land in hectare
(1 ha - 0.01 square kilometer = 0.003861 square mile).
% - Percent.
sq.m/p = Per capital amount of land, square meter per person.
international perspective, we compare the land use
structure of the two cities with that of cities in the
United States, based on a land-use survey of 106 large U.S.
cities conducted in the late 1960s (Manvel, 1968; presented
by Clawson, 1972, p.39). The U.S. data are shown in Table
5-lb.
Table 5-la shows that the industrial sector in both
Yantai and Jinan are among the largest land consumers
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Table 5-lb
THE UNITED STATES:
LAND-USE STRUCTURES OF 106 LARGE CITIES 1969
(Percent)
Cities of 100,000 Cities of 250,000
and over and over
Whole Built-up Whole Built-up
city area city area
Undeveloped, privately owned 22.3 0 12.5 0
Public streets 17.5 23.6 18.3 20.9
Privately owned and used 42.1 54.3 44.5 50.8
Residential 31.6 40.7 32.3 36.9
Commercial 4.1 5.3 4.4 5.0
Industrial 4.7 6.1 5.4 6.2
Railroads 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.7
Publicly and semi-publicly 13.7 17.7 16.2 18.7
Recreation areas 4.9 6.3 5.3 6.1
Schools and colleges 2.3 3.0 1.8 2.1
Airports 2.0 2.6 2.5 2.9
Cemeteries 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.3
Public houses 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5
Other (by subtraction) 3.0 3.9 5.1 5.8
Unaccounted (due to data compiling) 4.4 4.4 8.5 9.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Original from Manvel, quoted by Marion Clawson, 1972, p.39
(Yantai 30% and Jinan 38%). In addition, if we weigh the
fact that a large proportion of warehousing (Yantai 15% 4/
and Jinan 4%) is also used for industrial purposes, the
actual industrial land use in both cities may account for
35% to 40% of land use. The high proportion of industrial
land use contrasts sharply to that of the United States,
which in the late 1960s devoted only about 6% of the built-
4/ The reason warehousing in Yantai uses an unusually high
proportion of land use is because the city is one of the major
seaports for the northeast part of China.
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up areas to industrial use. The large discrepancy is of
course a reflection of different economic structures of the
two countries. The United States by then was already a
highly developed country while today's China is still
struggling for modernization. Productivity differences,
therefore, explain partially why China allocates a much
higher proportion of land to industrial production.
There is another explanation to the discrepancy in
the land-use figures between the two countries. As we
discussed in the previous section, industry has long been
treated as a priority sector to receive scarce resources.
Taking into account the fact the urban land was for "free"
and industrial enterprises have no burden to possess as
much as it can, industry may have grossly abused its
privilege. Therefore, waste of land resources may be an
important factor explaining why industry takes up such an
exceptionally high proportion of urban land in the two
cities. This conclusion has been supported by many
empirical studies that report acres of unused or underused
industrial lands that are returned to the government as a
result of experimental land taxes imposed by some local
authorities (Liu, et al., 1987).
Residential land in the two cities, on the other
hand, makes up a much smaller proportion of the total urban
land as compared to the U.S. data (Table 5-1b). To make a
cross-comparison possible, we lump together housing and
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green space lands, which makes Yantai's residential land
17.8% of total land use, and Jinan, 20.1%. The compatible
figures from the U.S. survey data are 41% for cities of
100,000 residents and up, and 37% for cities of 250,000 and
up. These figures support our earlier argument that
residential land use does not dominate patterns of land use
and consumption in China, mainly due to a combined force of
market absence and development priorities taken by the
official policy.
Compositions of other major land uses, such as land
for commerce, education, intercity transportation
(railroads, airport, and long-distance bus stations), etc.,
are quite compatible between the two sets of data.
However, proportions of municipal park lands in the two
Chinese cities (2.6% and 3.7% for Yantai and Jinan
respectively) are understandably much lower than the U.S.
average (about 6%) due to different levels of living
standard.
It should be noted that we did not draw the
comparisons on a per capita basis. On a per capita basis,
U.S. residents consume much more land than Chinese
residents in almost every category of land use. This
supposition is indicated by our analysis in "Urban Land
Resources in China" in Chapter One, where we demonstrated
that urban China may be among the most crowded places in
the world. Thus, a per capita comparison may only tell us
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that there is a difference in abundance of land resources
between the two countries, but yields no hint on whether
land is economically used.
Spatial Distribution of Enterprises
As indicated in the standard urban model, the closer
to the city center, the higher intensity of land use and
population density, both in daytime and at night. The
intensity of land use and population density are the
dominant factors that drive the value of residential land
in a market economy.
The production processes of industrial and
commercial sectors will respond to intensity of land use
and population density in different ways because of
different input requirements, infrastructure needs, and
immediate market conditions. These differences will
inevitably lead to different patterns of land use and
consumption for commerce and industry. Empirical evidence
seems to support this view of dichotomous behavior. For
this reason later we must pay particular attention to the
difference in commercial and industrial land uses.
The commercial sector, which is formed by retail and
wholesale shops, restaurants, and service stations, may be
more responsive to densities of land use and population
than manufacturing industry because, among other
considerations, the market of commercial establishments is
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affected by the population density in a relatively small
radius of the shop. Land-use intensity and population
density often make a significant contribution to the
"location value" of the commercial sector.
If land use and consumption patterns are not
completely random in the two cities, we should be able to
detect some regularities in the spatial dimensions of
location values. One approach we take is to see whether
there is a tendency that commercial enterprises prefer
central locations. This is what we intend to show in Table
5-2a. In constructing the table, we first divide the two
cities into a number of rings. Each ring covers the area
as a result of increasing the distance from the CBD
(central business district) by one kilometer. We then
calculate for each ring the frequency of sampled
enterprises, percent of the frequency to the total sample
size, cumulative percentage, and enterprise density, and
these are all done with control for sector. The data seem
to suggest that there is a tendency for commercial
enterprises to locate close to the city's central zones.
The first ring (0 to 1 kilometer to the city center)
concentrates 30% of Jinan commercial enterprises and 40% of
Yantai's. As a comparison, fewer than 10% of commercial
firms are located beyond 4 kilometers and 3 kilometer to
the CBD in Jinan and Yantai, respectively.
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Table 5-2a
DISTRIBUTION OF ENTERPRISES BY SECTOR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Distance to CBD (kilometers)
---------------------------------------
0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 >6 TOTAL
-------------------------------------------------
--------------------------- Commerce ------------------------------
Jinan # 117 97 83 60 22 7 7 393
% 29.8% 24.7% 21.1% 15.3% 5.6% 1.8% 1.8% 100.0%
CUM 29.8% 54.5% 75.6% 90.8% 96.4% 98.2% 100.0%
F/D 37.24 10.29 5.28 2.73 0.78 0.20 --
Yantai # 58 51 15 8 0 4 6 142
% 40.8% 35.9% 10.6% 5.6% 0.0% 2.8% 4.2% 100.0%
CUM 40.8% 76.8% 87.3% 93.0% 93.0% 95.8% 100.0%
F/D 18.46 5.41 0.95 0.36 0.00 0.12 --
--------------------------- Industry ------------------------------
Jinan # 34 34 42 40 15 22 25 212
% 16.0% 16.0% 19.8% 18.9% 7.1% 10.4% 11.8% 100.0%
CUM 16.0% 32.1% 51.9% 70.8% 77.8% 88.2% 100.0%
F/D 10.82 3.61 2.67 1.82 0.53 0.64 --
Yantai # 21 30 21 29 0 16 34 151
% 13.9% 19.9% 13.9% 19.2% 0.0% 10.6% 22.5% 100.0%
CUM 13.9% 33.8% 47.7% 66.9% 66.9% 77.5% 100.0%
F/D 6.68 3.18 1.34 1.32 0.00 0.46 --
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
#= Frequency.
%= Percent.
CUM = Cumulative percentage.
F/D = Firm density (Number of firms/square kilometer).
There is also evidence suggesting that the density
gradient is related to city size. The population size of
Yantai is only about one-third of that of Jinan. As
distance to the CBD increases, the number of commercial
enterprises in Yantai falls much faster than that in Jinan.
The decline of commercial enterprise density (the number of
firms per square kilometer) is most dramatic. The area of
each ring increases in proportion to the geometric series
(i.e., 1,3,5,7...). In Yantai, the sharp density drop
occurs at locations between 2 and 3 kilometers from the
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center, while in Jinan the decrease in density is much more
gradual. In summary, the empirical data suggest that there
is a density gradient of commercial firms.
Industrial enterprises in the two cities, however,
do not appear to have a tendency to concentrate in the
central urban areas (see the bottom two panels of Table
5-2a). The densities of industry (the number of firms per
square kilometer, the fourth row indicator in each panel)
does decline as distance to the CBD increases, but the
gradients are much more gradual when compared to those of
commerce.
The decline of firm density alone cannot be taken as
evidence of rationality in land use. Being "urban" implies
that land is used more "intensive" than surrounding rural
areas. Measured densities of, for instance, population,
buildings, or firms, is always higher than in the
surrounding non-urban areas. Because the line between
"urban" and "rural" is vague, it is only natural for us to
observe a decline of land use intensity toward the city's
boundary. Moreover, unlike for commercial enterprises,
centrality may not be a crucial consideration in
determining industrial location. It is possible, for
instance, that localized infrastructure may be more
relevant than centrality in realizing industrial profits;
specifically, transportation costs of raw materials and
products from and to other regions might be minimized if
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the firm is located close to the intercity highway
networks.
It is also relevant to analyze the variation in
sector distribution of enterprises while controlling for
location. Table 5-2b is designed for this purpose. An
enterprise distribution pattern unfolds from Yantai data.
In the rings close to the CBD, commercial enterprises make
up the largest proportion of the total. As we move away
from the center, the proportion of industrial enterprises
begins to increase, and eventually they outpace the
commercial firms. If we divide industrial enterprises into
light and heavy industries, we see that the increasing
proportion of light industry is relatively slow, while that
of heavy industry is rather rapid. All these seem to
indicate that the distribution of enterprises may reflect
the common sense of the location value.
Because sector stratification is imposed on the
Jinan survey, the Jinan data are not suitable for use in
this analysis. It is biased towards commercial enterprises
(We assigned 65% of the sample to the commerce sector in
the survey). Still, a trend of enterprise distribution
similar to that of Yantai exists.
Because centrality for commercial enterprises is
important, following the law of diminishing returns to
scale, the planners, if they have any common sense, should
avoid assigning large industrial firms to central zones.
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Table 5-2b
DISTRIBUTION OF ENTERPRISES BY LOCATION
Distance to CBD (kilometer)
<1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 >=6 TOTAL
-- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---# %
--------------------------- Yantai -----------------------------------
C 58 73% 51 63% 15 42% 8 22% 4 20% 1 6% 5 21% 142 48%
L 20 25% 22 27% 7 19% 18 49% 12 60% 4 25% 7 29% 90 31%
H 1 1% 8 10% 14 39% 11 30% 4 20% 11 69% 12 50% 61 21%
Sum 79 100% 81 100% 36 100% 37 100% 20 100% 16 100% 24 100% 293 100%
--------------------------- Jinan ------------------------------------
C 117 77% 97 74% 83 66% 60 60% 22 59% 7 24% 7 22% 393 65%
L 14 9% 21 16% 27 22% 26 26% 6 16% 4 14% 11 34% 109 18%
H 20 13% 13 10% 15 12% 14 14% 9 24% 18 62% 14 44% 103 17%
Sum 151 100% 131 100% 125 100% 100 100% 37 100% 29 100% 32 100% 605 100%
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
# = Number.
% = Percent.
C = Commerce.
L = Light Industry.
H = Heavy Industry.
As a result, the percentage of larger firms should rise as
distance from the CBD increases. This is a hypothesis, the
test results of which are shown in Table 5-3. In
constructing the table, we first define the large firms as
the ones over the 70th percentile of labor and land sizes
for all enterprises. Then, we tally the number of large
and small/medium firms that appear in each ring of cities.
The data from both Jinan and Yantai suggest that the
tendency is that the farther away the ring is located, the
higher the percentage of the larger land-consuming
industrial enterprises. This implies that the pattern of
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Table 5-3
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE LOCATION BY SIZES
By Land By Labor
Jinan Yantai Jinan Yantai
Ring S L L/(S+L) S L L/(S+L) S L L/(S+L) S L L/(S+L)
<1 km 22 12 0.353 22 3 0.120 25 9 0.265 19 6 0.240
1-2 31 3 0.088 30 9 0.231 27 7 0.206 21 18 0.462
2-3 33 9 0.214 25 9 0.265 30 12 0.286 25 9 0.265
3-4 30 10 0.250 16 6 0.273 26 14 0.350 18 4 0.182
4-5 8 7 0.467 8 5 0.385 9 6 0.400 9 4 0.308
>=5 km 28 19 0.404 8 10 0.556 32 15 0.319 14 4 0.222
TOTAL 152 60 0.283 109 42 0.278 149 63 0.297 106 45 0.298
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Ring = Distance to CBD.
S - Small and medium firms (below 70th percentile).
L = Large firms (above 70th percentile).
industrial land use on this count is not completely random.
It should be noted, however, that the percentage of large
firms in the central area of Jinan is exceptionally high
(35% of all different sizes of firms combined), higher than
the average percentage of large firms to the total (30%).
This is not surprising. We must remember that the data we
are analyzing were generated by a planning-dominated
economy where resources are noncompetitively allocated and
mechanisms for correcting misallocation of resources are
limited. Common sense may tell planners there exists a
misallocation of land in the downtown area, but it is
entirely possible that there are no incentives nor
pressures in the bureaucratic system that motivate the
planners to correct the mistake.
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While the large land-consuming industrial
enterprises tend to locate further away from downtown, this
tendency is not repeated for the enterprises with a large
labor force--they tend to be distributed rather evenly in
both Jinan and Yantai. This land-use pattern may be
related to residential land-use patterns. In the field
survey, we observed that workers resisted moving to
suburbs. A saying in Shanghai goes "rather a bed in
downtown than an apartment in suburb." This is because
living in downtown means a higher quality of services,
better public infrastructure, including better public
schools, for example (Bahl and Zhang, 1989). Many workers
travel out of city each day to places of work in the
outskirts. It could be the case that saving commuting time
and traffic volume is also taken into account in land-use
planning. Because we do not have residential land-use
data, this hypothesis remains untested.
Commercial Land Use and Land Consumption
Because land is a scarce and valuable resource to
the economy, if the planners in a centrally planned economy
are interested in land-use efficiency, they should
encourage a factor substitution for land, especially for
the land in the CBD. In particular, they should locate
labor- and/or capital-intensive (but not land-intensive)
enterprises in the city center. In addition, they should
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encourage enterprises to substitute other factors, such as
labor and capital, whose price does not vary with locality
for land.
We establish a set of regression models to test
whether there exist factor intensity gradients (such as,
capital/square meter land, labor/square meter land) for the
commercial sector. We use a log-factor-intensity
measurement as the dependent variable, and the distance to
CBD as the independent variable. In every case the
regression result is inconclusive. Typically a correct
sign (negative) and significant t-value for the independent
variable are observed, but the R-square is excessively low
(often ranging from 0.01 to 0.03). We therefore conclude
that factor substitution for land in a strict sense did not
take place in these two Chinese cities.
After a more careful scrutiny of the data, we
discover that the reason for the excessive low R-square is
because the regressand, when plotted against distance, has
a great dispersion tendency. When we use our "ring"
tabulation method to re-examine the data, certain trends
emerged. We present these results in Table 5-4, which
contains the mean, standard deviation, and number of cases
for variables firm size, land-labor ratio, floor-area
ratio, capital-land ratio, and product-land ratio, broken
down by city. A number of Yantai's outer rings are
combined in order to increase the degrees of freedom of the
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Table 5-4
USE AND CONSUMPTION OF LAND: COMMERCE
Jinan Yantai
Land Land Capital Output Land Land Capital Output
/Firm /Labor FAR /Sq m /Sq m /Firm /Labor FAR /Sq m /Sq m
------------------------------- <1
Mean 686 12.71 1.26 1.61 0.75
StdDev 1282 11.2 0.71 3.03 1.03
Cases 94 94 86 85 94
------------------------------ 1-2
Mean 909 17.98 1.18 1.34 0.52
StdDev 3653 31.01 0.63 2.43 0.61
Cases 71 71 68 59 71
------------------------------ 2-3
Mean 1672 18.75 1.16 1.34 0.34
StdDev 4832 17.29 0.7 1.8 0.39
Cases 56 56 54 54 56
km ------------------------------
5795 55.04 1.07 1.77 2
12506 87 0.78 2.57 3.41
48 48 47 46 48
km ------------------------------
5899 58.19 0.98 1.94 1.31
19869 145.69 0.59 2.56 2.58
29 29 28 22 29
km ------------------------------
16817 113.15 0.61 0.64 0.70
28866 131.36 0.38 0.3 0.85
5 5 5 4 5
-------------Mean 778 24.59
StdDev 996 46.31
Cases 33 33
3-4 km
1.09
0.9
30
------------- 4-5 km
Mean 1961 29.3 0.98
StdDev 3802 45.51 0.39
Cases 15 15 14
------------- >=5 km
Mean 2343 57.25 0.65
StdDev 4652 77.81 0.33
Cases 11 11 10
------------
1.23 0.39
1.36 0.35
32 33
------------
1.67 0.31
1.2 0.24
15 15
------------
1.48 0.24
1.23 0.33
11 11
-------------- >=3 km
27330 128.56 0.52
62738 221.45 0.37
6 6 6
------------------------------ TOTAL -------------------------------
Mean 1084 19.29 1.16 4.8 0.52 7924 64.39 0.98 2.7 1.61
StdDev 3219 31.46 0.71 9.48 0.73 22593 122.53 0.7 5.75 2.96
Cases 280 280 262 262 280 88 88 86 84 88
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Land/Firm = Average land size of enterprises (square meters).
Land/Labor = Square meters of land per worker.
FAR = Floor area ratio (Building floor area/land).
Capital/Sq m = Fixed assets (1,000 yuan) per square meter.
Output/Sq m = Output (Value-added, 1,000 yuan) per square meter.
statistics.
The first observation we draw is that the average
size of land consumed by enterprises in different rings
rises as the distance to the CBD increases (From 686 square
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------------
0.63 0.69
0.57 1.21
6 6
meter/firm to 1084 square meter/firm for Jinan, and from
5795 square meter/firm to 27330 square meter/firm for
Yantai). This perhaps is an indication that many small
commercial firms are allowed to be established in downtown
where the common sense tells them that they can realize a
higher profits than being located outside.
Second, there is a trend for both cities that the
closer the enterprise is to the city center, the lower the
amount of land used by each worker in the commercial
sector. This is evidence that there is a substitution of
labor for land, although the substitution attempt is weak,
because it failed to pass a more strict regression model.
In any case, the location value of land for commerce might
have been sensed.
Third, the floor area ratios, or FAR, compiled for
each ring of the two cities, test whether substitution of
capital for land takes place. Again, a weak factor
substitution is observed. On average, the FARs in the CBD
of the two cities are about twice as large as in fringe
areas.
Another indicator, the ratio of fixed assets to size
of land, is a direct measurement of capital-land
substitution in static terms. This index, however, does
not seem to support the hypothesis that there is a capital-
land substitution in either city. This could be true
because the lack of capital mobility may prevent
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enterprises from making substitutions. It might also be
the case that an enterprise cannot invest more in fixed
assets merely because there is no physical space to absorb
it (e.g., it cannot obtain more land downtown and it
exceeds its financial capacity to expand
horizontally--demolishing the old building and build and
taller new one). We must also remember that factor
substitution is not the only way to achieve a higher profit
margin. For example, lodging is a rather land-intensive,
but not labor-intensive, business. It is nevertheless
highly profitable if the operation is located downtown. In
the case of hotels, a high land-labor ratio downtown does
not indicate land-allocation planners enterprises are
irrational; rather, they are an exception to the rule.
Moreover, we could always attribute the irregularity
of the capital-land ratios to a data problem. The data may
be spurious because enterprises do not have a good sense of
the true value of the fixed assets they own for various
reasons. First and most obviously, there is no assets
exchange market that would help establish and maintain a
price system. Second, the methods for calculating the
depreciation of assets could be inaccurate and outdated.
Third, enterprise bookkeeping is universally poor. In any
case, it is prudent for us to keep in mind that the
measurement of the fixed capital might be problematic.
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If many enterprises are located sensibly (not
necessarily perfectly in a market sense) so that they can
increase the factor until the marginal cost of that factor
is close to the marginal product, then we should observe
the land productivity, measured by value-added per square
meter of land, to rise from fringe areas to the CBD. This
is the last indicator shown in Table 5-4. The data for
both Jinan and Yantai seem to support the speculation that
most of commercial firms are not mislocated. Land
productivity of the CBDs in both cities are roughly a
factor of three times those of the fringe areas.
It-is interesting to note that the data show that
Yantai enterprises consume more land than do those in
Jinan, even though the Jinan sample is large enterprise-
biased. This may very well be the case because land is
more valuable (or more scarce) in Jinan which is more than
three times the size of Yantai. In a market economy, we
would expect that land value of a large city (Jinan) would
be higher than that of a small city (Yantai). It should
also be noticed that, on average, productivity of land in
Yantai is twice that of Jinan. There could be reasons for
this difference. Strong exogenous factors may have an
important impact on Yantai's boom because Yantai is well-
known for being an energetic and dynamic participant in the
present economic reform movement. On the other hand,
constraints on land supply in Jinan, if there were any,
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could be considered to be an endogenous cause, which could
inhibit Jinan economy from becoming more productive. These
speculations will be further analyzed when we conduct a
comprehensive review of factor productivity in the later
chapters.
Industrial Land Use and Land Consumption
The same set of indices used in evaluating
commercial land consumption and land use are compiled for
industry, and they are presented in Table 5-5. The table
shows no sign for the Jinan industry that there is a
regularity in terms of their average firm sizes, land-labor
ratios, FARs, capital-land ratios, and product-land ratios
by ring. We replaced the CBD by freight train, passenger
train, and long distance bus stations, thermal power
stations, water plants, waste water plants, transformer
stations, and telephone exchange stations. Again, no sign
of location-oriented regularity is found; nor could the
land productivity gradient to any particular direction be
determined.
There are a number explanations for the random land
use and consumption of industrial enterprises in Jinan.
First of all, industry does not seem to have an impact on
land use and consumption in the cities. Comparing Table
5-4 and 5-5, we see that in Jinan the average industrial
firm uses more than five times the land used by the average
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Table 5-5
USE AND CONSUMPTION OF LAND: INDUSTRY
Mean
StdDev
Cases
Mean
StdDev
Cases
Mean
StdDev
Cases
Mean
StdDev
Cases
Mean
StdDev
Cases
Mean
StdDev
Cases
Mean
StdDev
Cases
Jinan
Land Land Capital Output
/Firm /Labor FAR /Sq m /Sq m
----------------------------------<1
73954 95.73 0.6 0.11 0.12
90426 88.69 0.52 0.11 0.18
32 32 32 31 32
------------------------------- 1-2
19068 33.34 0.99 0.23 0.19
34974 34.49 0.61 0.27 0.15
32 32 32 32 32
------------------------------- 2-3
42702 48.27 0.84 0.16 0.15
64297 49.38 0.57 0.12 0.15
39 39 38 38 39
-------------- 3-4 km ------------
130775 61.28 0.68 0.15 0.15
357955 49.44 0.48 0.19 0.17
39 39 39 39 39
Yantai
Land Land Capital Output
/Firm /Labor FAR /Sq m /Sq m
km------------------------------
20292 23.11 1.03 0.2 0.21
45105 22.59 0.55 0.15 0.15
23 23 22 23 23
km -----------------------------
28477 36.64 0.98 0.25 0.22
30975 26.32 0.72 0.22 0.23
39 39 38 39 39
km -----------------------------
31443 76.12 0.55 0.15 0.1
25921 94.40 0.32 0.11 0.1
33 33 32 33 33
--------------
53941 111.34
54656 103.83
47 47
>=3 km
0.37
0.21
46
-----------
0.14 0.12
0.32 0.29
47 47
-------------- 4-5 km ------------
80612 62.99 0.55 0.09 O07
96964 37.85 0.25 0.03 0.04
14 14 14 14 14
------------ >=5 km -----------
101655 107.26 0.57 1.84 1.01
147901 89.05 0.68 11.61 6.1
45 45 45 45 45
------------------------------- TOTAL ------------------------------
76843 70.71 0.71 0.92 0.34 26269 68.35 0.69 0.1 0.16
182977 70.09 0.58 10.28 2.89 43256 83.96 0.55 0.19 0.22
201 201 200 201 201 142 142 138 139 142
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
Land/Firm = Average size of enterprises (square meters).
Land/Labor = Square meters of land per worker.
FAR - Floor area ratio (Building floor area/land).
Capital/Sq m = Fixed assets (1,000 yuan) per square meter.
Output/Sq m = Output (Value-added, 1,000 yuan) per square meter.
commercial firm. The average land productivity of
commercial enterprises is as much as two to ten times
higher than the industrial enterprises. If central
planners were interested in maximizing the profits for
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enterprises under the current price system, industry for
certain could not compete with commerce in many parts of
the city, especially the prime central locations. A city,
nevertheless, can only support a limited number of
commercial establishments, and commerce can only take up a
portion of the total land, therefore, whatever is left over
by commerce will become industrial. This could be one
scenario.
Second, industrial enterprises in general require a
large amount of land. Location patterns of large land-
consuming enterprises, as presented in Table 5-3, suggest
that land use choice for large firms is usually rather
passive in that industrial firms may be located where the
land is less desirable for commercial activities.
Moreover, difficulties in assembling large tracts may
prevent industrial enterprises from locating at desirable
areas. This is perhaps why we detected little land use
regularity or density gradient around freight train
stations and locations as this sort, which we considered
favorable for industrial location but assembling large
tract of land for industry in those areas are difficult due
to high density houses that were erected before the surge
of industrial development.
Third, industries may value the relative quality of
the locality (such as localized infrastructure and
facilities or concentration of a special set of related
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industries) over centrality (or closeness to other
landmarks, such as train stations or water plants) in
choosing location. The access roads to intercity highways,
for instance, is perhaps more relevant to an export-
oriented industrial firm than being located downtown.
These types of effects, however, are difficult to measure,
and it seems that our location-related variables, most of
them being network infrastructure-related, have not caught
these effects.
Finally, other nonlocational factors, such as
material and energy supply conditions, demand from other
regions for the product, and, above all, government
intervention and price distortions, may have a greater
impact on industrial output than location, especially one-
dimensional activity, factors. The scale of the impact for
these factors has been shown in previous chapters. In
addition, modern technology has fostered many "footloose"
industries. These factors may account for the lack of
evidence for very general land and nonland factor
substitutions in certain zones of industrial land use and
no general density gradient pointing to any particular
direction.
As a result, closeness to the CBD may not explain
the location of the industrial sector. A comprehensive
test on Cincinnati metropolitan area data in found in
Schmenner (1981). He concludes that most manufacturers can
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locate successfully almost anywhere within a metropolitan
area; few, if any, manufacturers are constrained to locate
within the central city. Peiser's study on nonresidential
value of land in Dallas (1987) concludes that only
proximity to employment appeared to be important to
industrial location. Lee's study of Colombia (1981) shows
that the CBDs are the zone with the lowest growth rate of
"mature" manufacturing firms, and he concludes that
industrial agglomeration is the most important factor that
contributes to manufacturing growth. Other studies that
reveal no industrial gradients can be found in works of
Sant (1975), and Struyk and James (1975). Some empirical
studies are also done in China (cited in Bahl and Zhang,
1989).
We do observe, however, that Yantai industrial
indices show very similar trends to what we observed from
the commercial sector. The partial rationality of Yantai
industrial location data might be due to a "subordinate
effect": it could be the case that a relatively high
productive commercial land use brings pressure to the
industrial enterprises that is located next. As a result,
the managers of industrial firms are under constant
pressure from an energetic and reform-oriented government,
which Yantai government is well qualified, that an
improvement of land use is needed. Another factor that
plays a role in industrial location in these two cities is
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the residential location: workers prefer to and most of
them do live in central parts of the city. Less commuting
to an industrial firm in downtown may in general make
workers happier, which may contribute to a higher labor
productivity that indirectly raises land productivity as
well.
The Density Gradient
The density gradient models are often used to
demonstrate the existence of differential rents at the city
level. The negative exponential density is observed and
examined by many analysts (e.g., Clark, 1951, 1982;
Ratford, 1973; Wheaton, 1974; McDonald and Bowman, 1976,
1979; Fountain, 1977). Empirical studies to test the
gradients have been carried out by, among others, Isard
(1956), McDonald and Bowman (1979), Clark (1982). In
particular, McCauley (1985) has shown that density
gradients of 18 U.S. SMSAs he studied are negative, varying
between -.11 and -.47, with the median of -.22. Kao and
Lee (1976a, 1976b), on the other hand, show that the
negative density gradient test failed in approximately 50%
of the cities in the United States, and that the density of
the urban area is generally stochastic instead of
deterministic. Mills and Tan (1980) did a comparison of
urban population density gradients in more than two dozen
developed and developing countries.
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The negative exponential function is perhaps the
only form used in empirical studies to estimate density and
rent gradients because of its simple form and the correct
geometric shape (convex to the origin), and most
importantly, it is not a pure descriptive function but is
derived with consideration of the behavior aspects of
economic agents.5/ A direct test of the rent gradient,
however, is impossible for this research because the
dependent variable, land rent, is not observable due to the
nonmarket situation, or, of an implicit government auction
in allocating land. Test of population and other density
gradients is also not possible because the data are
unavailable. To overcome these problems, we proposed to
test differential land productivity (value-added per square
meter of land) to reveal the implicit differential land
"rent."
We can mathematically prove that the theoretical
form and shape of the unit land output gradient coincide
with those of the land-rent gradient. We first assume
perfect competition and, for the sake of simplicity, a
Cobb-Douglas production function. Production requires
5/ Other functional forms to study urban densities include the
cubic-Spline function (see, e.g., Anderson, 1982) and trend
surface analysis (see, e.g., Schroeder and Sjoquist, 1976;
Parker III, 1981; and Johnson and Ragas, 1987). Due to their
pure descriptive nature that yield little light on behavior
patterns of economic agents, these functions receive much less
attention than the negative exponential density function.
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three factors: labor, capital, and land. The profit
function, then, is:
[2] v = R - C = phLaKbZr - wL - iK - (eExp(-qU))Z
where v = Profit
R = Revenue, measured as value-added
C = Production cost
p = Price of output
L = Labor
K = Capital
Z = Land
w = Wage rate
i = Interest rate
U = Distance to CBD
h,a,b,r,e and q = Constants estimated from the
model.
The price for land is replaced by the theoretical land rent
determined by the density function. To maximize the
profit, the partial differentiation of profit with respect
to land must be set to zero as follows:
[3] f7r/fZ = rR/Z - eExp(-qU) = 0. Or
[4] R/Z = (e/r)Exp(-qU) = jExp(-qU)
where j = e/r.
R/Z is the unit land product. Therefore, in a less
theoretically restricted form (we have not proven that this
is true for all different forms of production functions),
we can consider that the differential land productivity
implies an existence of the differential land "rent."
Because of the problem of degrees of freedom, the
regressions of gradients based upon individual industries
are mostly inconclusive. To solve this problem, we pool
the data and use dummies and interaction terms to
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differentiate the gradients between sectors in our models.
The original regression models all show the correct signs
for most variables, but statistically they are not
significant for a few important variables, such as the
distance variable (CBD) and the interaction term CBDIND,
which is the product of the continuous variable CBD and
dummy variable IND (where commerce=O and industry=1). In
the process of searching for the causes, we notice that the
interaction term, CBDIND, seems to be the one that drives
both the Yantai and Jinan models.6/ We subsequently
discovered the gradient of Industry 4, light industry,
resembles more the pattern of commerce than that of
industry. When we switched light industry into the
"commerce" category and reran the regression, we obtained
models that not only have correct signs but are significant
as well. The final results are summarized in Table 5-6.
The Yantai model shows that at the center, the
implicit "rent" of industrial land is lower than that of
commercial and light-industry lands (IND=-1.34); the
decline of the commercial gradient, however, is much faster
than that of industrial (-.401 vs. -.176(i.e.,
-.401+.225)). As a result, at approximately 5.95
kilometers (km) from the CBD, the profits position of
6/ For instance, the partial correlations between the dependent
and most independent variables are at the 30% to 40% levels,
while CBDIND is at an 80% level.
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Table 5-6
EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE LAND PRODUCTIVITY GRADIENTS
(Coefficient/Standard error/Significance of t-test)
Variable Label Yantai Jinan
CBD Distance to CBD -0.401 -0.216
.081 .040)
.000 .000
IND Industry dummy: -1.339 -1.153
0-Commerce & Light industry .322 .223
1-Otherwise 000 000
CBDIND Interaction term: 0.225 0.112
Industry * CBD .115 .060)
(.051 .060
BIGLAND Land size dummy: -0.948 -0.454
1-land size >75 percentile (.197 .121)
O-Otherwise .000 .000
OWN Ownership dummy: -0.404
1-State-owned .109
O=otherwise .000
(Constant) -0.444 -0.589
R-square 0.329 0.289
(Standard Error) (:317 (1.081
(Sig F 000 (.000
D.F. 221 428
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
Coeff. B - Coefficient.
SE B - Standard error of coefficient.
Sig t - Significance levels of t-value.
Var - Variable.
Sig F - Significance levels of F-test.
D.F. - Degree of freedom.
industry becomes such that it can offer higher rents than
commerce for a similar land size, under the same ownership
arrangement. (Otherwise, the hypothetical rent the larger
land-consuming firm's can offer is lower (i.e., -.95).)
The Jinan model shows a strikingly similar result.
Commercial rent is higher at the CBD and declines faster
than industrial rent. At the city center, the implicit
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industrial land "rent" is lower than that of commercial and
light-industry lands (IND=-1.15); the commercial gradient,
however, falls faster than that of industry (-.216 vs.
-.104 (i.e., -.216+.112)). Two gradients cross-over at
approximately 10 km from the CBD (controlled for land size,
and ownership).
There are, however, two differences between the
Jinan and Yantai models. One is that the gradients of
Jinan industry and commerce are much flatter than their
counterparts in Yantai. As a result, the profit position
of Jinan industry does not become superior to commerce
until it is located 10 km away from the CBD (In Yantai the
crossover point is 6 km). This difference demonstrates the
impact of city size. Jinan's population is almost three
times as large as that of Yantai.
Another difference between the two cities is that on
average the value of the land gradient at the center of
Yantai is higher than that of Jinan (Exp(-.444)=641
yuan/square meter for the former and Exp(-.589)=555
yuan/square meter in Jinan). Jinan is a much larger city.
Its CBD is more developed, and there is little doubt that
land value in the Jinan CBD is much higher than that in the
Yantai CBD. The regression model, however, tells an
opposite story. This contradiction arises from the
methodology we utilized. The dependent variable in our
model is the product estimate rather than a true land
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value. The more that land value is incorporated into the
product, the higher the estimated land value that will be
predicted by our models. In other words, the real story
our model tells us is not that the value of land in Yantai
is higher than in Jinan, but that Yantai enterprises are
much more efficient and competitive than Jinan's. A severe
policy implication of this output approach to estimation of
land status quo value is that the proposed rent penalizes
those efficient land users, because a higher land implicit
"value," which is due to the effort of land users,
justifies a higher rent the government can collect (since
the government is the only legal owner of the land). The
negative impact of this approach will be given detailed
consideration in section "Policy Implications" in Chapter
Six.
Conclusion
In this chapter we study separately patterns of
industrial and commercial land use and land consumption.
We provide justification that residential land is excluded
from our study mainly due to its subordinate status in land
use in China. The current Chinese price system that has
created a heavily distorted household sector is another
major reason residential land is excluded from the study.
We compare land-use structure of Jinan and Yantai to the
U.S. cities in general in the late 1960s. We find that
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although overall per capita land consumption in China is
much lower that in the United States, industrial land use
in the two cities takes a disproportional large amount of
land, resulting in an excessively low proportion of
residential land use. Other than low productivity which
requires more input (land) to produce output, land resource
waste due to the noncompetitive land allocation could
contribute to a highly disproportional industrial land use
in those two cities.
We studied the spatial distribution of enterprises
and we find commercial firms have a tendency to concentrate
in central locations and industrial firms do not. We also
noticed that the farther away from the city center, the
more large firms are found. These are the evidence we are
looking for to support the hypothesis that land-use
patterns in Jinan and Yantai are not random.
Factor-substitution with respect to more "valuable"
location, however, is of disappointment, because we do not
see any strong indication that substitution activities are
going on. When we use a less restrictive method
(tabulation instead of regression), nevertheless, we
discover that there is a loose trend that a "weak" factor
substitution exists, in the sense marginal labor and
building space are substituted for more valuable land by
the commercial sector and the Yantai industry. Finally, we
estimate the differential land productivity to reveal the
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possible existence of an implicit different "rent," and we
find the answer is positive.
All in all, we find that with "bureaucratic
mentality" plus some common knowledge, the central planners
have created a land use pattern that is not random in the
two cities. There is, of course, abundant evidence that
land has not been used anywhere near to its "best and
highest," as indicated by disproportional industrial land
use and weak factor substitution; there is also evidence
that, once the temporal dimension is dropped, limited and
partial spatial-rationality exists, indicated by spatial
location of firms by sector and size, and a possible
existence of an implicit differential land "rent."
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Chapter VI
EVALUATION OF THE LAND VALUE
The empirical analysis presented in the previous two
chapters establishes the fact that first, at the micro-
level, some enterprises, such as the ones selected in our
sample, behaved partially rationally, judging from the way
they handle their production processes. Second, at the
macro-level, despite the notorious waste of land resources,
we observed differential land productivity, which implies a
possible existence of an implicit differential land "rent."
These two findings help us justify that in this chapter we
pursue the original task we are assigned to do, that is, to
separate shadow land contributions from the total product
and evaluate the marginal price of land to the enterprise
economy.
To accomplish our mission, we develop a set of
analytical tools and models, based on the theories and
techniques of production functions. Three key concepts of
the production function theories, namely, the factor share,
the marginal product of the factor, and the elasticity of
substitution, are examined in great detail in this chapter.
Practical issues, such as, how a rent schedule is to be set
and how to estimate the benefit of improving land use, are
also dealt with in this chapter.
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In the following, we first review some relevant
properties of various production functions. Based on the
review, we select one pertinent type of production function
to serve as the base model. Then, we modify the model to
fit into our research purpose. We then use the model to
describe the production process and to estimate the factor
shares and the marginal products of factors. In order to
assess independently whether the estimation of the marginal
product of land is reasonable and realistic, we study the
elasticities of substitution and the implied "land-rent"
gradients generated by the model, and compare our results
with other studies reported in the literature. Finally, on
the foundation we built in this research, we take up some
practical issues concerning establishing a land-rent system
and present a detailed analysis of the policy implications
of the findings yield by this study.
Model Building
This section consists of two subsections. First we
provide justification on which type of production function
we use for this study. Second, we show how the base model
is modified so that it can meet our research requirements
more adequately.
Selection of a Production Function
There are three basic types of production functions
to select from in studying factor shares and the marginal
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products of factors: (i) Cobb-Douglas, (ii) constant
elasticity of substitution, and (iii) transcendental
logarithmic production functions. The Cobb-Douglas
function is the most widely known production function. It
was jointly developed by Douglas, an economist and later a
U.S. Senator, who, from empirical observations, inferred
its properties, and Cobb, a mathematician, who suggested
the functional form. When this function was first
introduced at the 1927 American Economic Association
conference, it met with a very hostile reception. Not
until 20 years later did the Cobb-Douglas production
function find acceptance and become popular (Douglas,
1967). Without doubt the research based on this function
has created the richest output of production theory.
A second major step towards an improved
understanding of an economic production process was taken
35 years after the Cobb-Douglas production function was
presented. In response to an empirical test of whether the
factor rewards were constant as implied by the Cobb-Douglas
function, or whether instead a more general function should
be developed, Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow jointly
formulated the constant elasticity of substitution
production function (Arrow, et al., 1961). They showed
that the constant elasticity of substitution model is a
more appropriate functional form in describing the
production process. They also demonstrated that the
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Cobb-Douglas function in a two-factor situation is merely a
special case of the constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function.
A still more dramatic contribution to the production
theory is the development of the transcendental logarithmic
production function, or translog function, by Chirstensen,
Jorgensen, and Lau (1971, 1973). The key extension
provided by this function is that it allows the long-run
average cost (LRAC) to take a "U" shape. For both the CES
and Cobb-Douglas functions, the returns to scale are fixed,
this results in the long-run average cost (LRAC) curve that
is either continuously falling, a horizontal line, or
continuously rising. Thus, the LRAC curve does not take
the "U" shape which is suggested by the standard theory of
the firm. The translog function allows the elasticity of
scale to change with output and/or factor proportions. In
addition, it does not require the assumption of perfect
competition. Thus this function removes several rather
unrealistic assumptions required by the CES and the
Cobb-Douglas functions. The translog function may be
regarded as a production function in its own right or as a
two-step Taylor series expansion of an arbitrary function.
Interesting enough, the Kmenta approximation demonstrates
that the CES is a special case of the translog when the
assumption of the constant returns to scale is imposed
(1967).
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Of these three general types of production
functions, which should we select to serve as the basic one
in estimating the factor shares and the marginal product of
land? A pre-test to assess the elasticity of substitution
(a) of the underlying production technology was proposed by
Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow (1961, we will call it
the ACMS method). The equation used for testing is:
[1] ln(V/L) = ln(a) + oln(w),
where: V = Product,
L = labor,
w = wage rate,
a = the elasticity of substitution, and
a = constant, determined by the model.
The ACMS method concludes that, generally speaking, if a is
close to 1.0, then the Cobb-Douglas production function may
be considered. If otherwise, the CES or translog
production functions is recommended.
The ACMS method is widely used in empirical studies.
Bruno (1962) and Liu and Hildebrand (1965), however,
suggest a more generalized form to test the elasticity of
substitution. They introduce a term, log-scale capital (K)
per labor (L), or ln(K/L), into Equation [1]. Based on
their empirical studies, they conclude that this ratio,
which essentially measures the capital endowment impact,
can exert a strong influence on the elasticity of
substitution. Conveniently, this impact can be taken into
consideration within the framework of the CES production
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function (Nerlove, 1967). Thus, the modified functional
form for estimating the elasticity of substitution is:
[2] ln(V/L) = ln(a) + aln(w) + gln(K/L),
where g is a constant, which is assumed to be 0 by the
standard CES.
In the following analysis, we use Equation [2]
instead of [1] to estimate the elasticity of substitution
(a). We estimate a separately for each industry that has
sufficient degrees of freedom. The industrial data for
cities, however, are pooled in order to have adequate
degrees of freedom. We also estimate a by sector, i.e., by
industry and commerce. These results are summarized in
Table 6-la. Our result shows that the new item ln(K/L) is
indeed a relevant estimator. Roughly in three-quarters of
the cases the coefficient of g is significant.
In order to see whether our estimation is realistic,
we compiled Table 6-lb in which the results of Liu and
Hildebrand's study of 1957 census of manufactures of the
U.S. are presented (as quoted in Nerlove, 1967, pp.78).
The range and general appearance of our estimation are
similar to those of Liu-Hildebrand. A detailed comparison
between the two studies, however, is not possible because
of data incompatibility. For the few compatible
industries, there are some minor differences between our
results and Liu-Hildebrand's. In particular, our
estimation of a for textiles is slightly lower, while that
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Table 6-la
ESTIMATION OF THE ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION
JINAN AND YANTAI(Coefficient/Standard Error/Significance of t-test)
Industry or Sector a g R-square N
Textile Mills
Machine Building
Chemicals
Electronics
Building Materials
Light Industry
Retails & Wholesale
Restaurants
Services
Jinan Commerce
Jinan Industry
Yantai Commerce
Yantai Industry
0.625
0.315(.055)
0.517
0.187(.007)
1.000
0.373(.015)
0.978
0.546(.099)
1.150
0.384(.010)
0.700
0.100(.000)
0.939
0.098(.000)
1.045
0.050(.000)
0.952
0.080(.000)
0.841
0.042(.000)
0.777
0.097(.000)
1.156
0.339(.000)
0.451
0.125(.000)
0.514
0.109(.000)
0.307
0.105(.005)
0.719
0.186(.001)
0.638
0.211(.011)
0.365
0.199(.089)
0.509
0.070(.000)
0.091
0.042(.031)
-0.003
0.034(.936)
-0.006
0.034(.856)
0.112
0.022(.000)
0.097
0.055(.000)
0.047
0.100(.641)
0.382
0.068(.000)
.433 39
.323 65
.586 22
.677 15
.498 16
.583 128
.263 383
.945 53
.723 58
.641 372
.566 211
.104 125
.254 149
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
a = Elasticity of substitution.
g = Coefficient of capital-labor ratio.
for machinery, chemicals, and electronics are all higher.
We cannot, of course, draw any meaningful conclusions from
this simple comparison because the structure of today's
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Table 6-1b
ESTIMATION OF THE ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION:
LIU-HILDEBRAND DATA(Coefficient/Standard Error in parentheses)
Two-digit Industry a g R-square N
Textile mills 0.975 0.160 .695 18
(.175) (.109)
Machinery except 0.222 0.258 .343 25
electronics (.263) (.100)
Chemicals & 0.866 0.201 .424 31
products (.231) (.085)
El ectronic 0.300 0.278 .483 22
machinery (.210) (.071)
Stone, clay, & 0.539 0.295 .611 25
glass products (.177) (.064)
Lumber & wood 0.990 0.002 .943 14
products (.135) (.070)
Furniture & 1.258 -0.154 .859 19
fixtures (.128) (.072)
Food and kindred 0.407 0.446 .548 35
products (.177) (.139)
Leather & leather 0.890 -0.050 .368 15
goods (.457) (.113)
Primary metal 0.298 0.321 .234 28
products (.704) (.141)
Fabricated metal 0.401 0.178 .336 32
products (.207) (.068)
Pulp, paper, & 0.386 0.331 .730 28
products (.322) (.050)
Apparel and related 1.071 0.097 .669 18
products (.273) (.086)
Transportation 1.008 0.214 .504 26
equipment (.448) (.060)
Instruments & 0.601 0.217 .681 12
related products (.294) (.116)
SOURCE: Liu, and Hildebrand, 1965, pp.36-9.
a = Elasticity of substitution.
g = Coefficient of capital-labor ratio.
N = Number of cases.
Chinese economy may be very different from that of the U.S.
economy 30 years ago.
Because most of the u estimates in Table 6-la are
not unitary, use of the Cobb-Douglas production function
for our data seems to be improper. This leaves us with the
CES and translog functions. We have two additional
restrictions to impose on choosing from the remaining two
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production functions. First, we must relax the assumption
of competition. In the preceding chapters, we have
carefully demonstrated that partial rationality is attached
to behavior in Chinese enterprises. This would allow the
partial "value" of the unpriced land to be incorporated
into the economic product. On the other hand, we find
factor substitution with respect to locations is weak,
there is abundant evidence that industrial land abuse
exists. On top of those technical conclusions, we remain
highly skeptical that it is sensible to assume perfect
competition, given the conditions of the economy where much
government intervention, price distortion, and inflexible
property tenures, to name a few, still prevail.
The translog production function does not require
the perfect competition assumption, therefore in this
regard it meets our research requirement. The standard CES
production function does require the assumption of
competition. This assumption, nevertheless, can be relaxed
by adding an error term (w') into the wage equation of the
CES where the assumption is invoked. This would make the
ACMS condition (Arrow, et al., 1961, p.228) of the marginal
product of labor equal to the wage rate (i.e., Equation [2]
in ACMS paper) becomes:
[3] y + x(dy/dx) = w + w',
where: y = Product per labor,
x = Capital per labor,
w = Market wage rates,
w'= Error term.
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The right-hand side of Equation [3], however, can be
rewritten as:
[4] w + tw = w(l+t) = w",
where t is a constant such that tw = w'. This yields:
[5] y + x(dy/dx) = w".
Here w" is no longer a market wage rate. This "white-
noise" is now absorbed into the parameters of the CES model
(the treatment is given by Sato, 1975, pp. 73-75). Thus,
both the CES and translog production functions meet the
first condition, i.e., relaxation of the perfect
competition assumption.
The second condition we want to impose is that the
function must be capable of handling multiple factors,
i.e., more than two. This is because besides the land
factor, which is the main subject of study, labor and
capital, which typically account for approximately 55% to
70% and 20% to 30%, respectively, of the total value-added,
must be included. Only by doing so can we ensure that our
estimation of land shadow contribution is not biased and
our model is relatively complete.
The CES is derived particularly to fit the two-
factor and one-output situation. Symmetrical expansion of
the CES function to include multi-factors is possible, but
it has not been mathematically justified. Part of the
difficulty arises from measuring substitution not just
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between, but among, factors. The works of Uzawa and
McFadden have indicated that expansion of CES into more
than two factors is unrewarding (Solow, 1967, pp.42-45).
Because the translog production function can be
expanded at least theoretically into multiple-factor
dimensions, it looks to be the best solution. There are
indeed advantages to using the translog production function
in our study. It allows the elasticity of substitution to
change with output and/or factor proportions. Best of all,
it does not require perfect competition in the economy.
There are, however, two problems we anticipate in the use
of this production function. One concerns econometric
techniques. If this function is directly estimated, there
will be nine independent variables on the right-hand-side
(RHS) of the equation. Because all these variables are a
variation, or combination, of the three basic variables:
labor, capital, and land, there will be inevitably high
correlations between the RHS variables. The resulting high
multicollinearity in the model will lead to an estimation
that has high variances, wide confidence intervals, and,
most importantly, unstable estimators.
The second problem is trickier. As indicated by the
Kmenta expansion of the CES, the translog function should
not be taken as a production function that is valid over
the full input range of {O, w}, because the expansion is
around a = 1, which is the case of the Cobb-Douglas
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function (Kmenta, 1967). Unfortunately, it is extremely
difficult to express the legitimate input range in terms of
the parameters of the function (Heathfield and Wibe, 1987,
p.110). Because we do not have a direct technique for
testing what is the legitimate input range for the
empirical estimation of this function, we will run a risk
of estimating a production function that has totally
inappropriate estimators. We therefore check carefully the
consistency of our results and make frequent comparisons
with other empirical studies.
Modification of the Production Function
The ordinary translog production function with
three-factors and one-output zakes the form of:
[6] ln(V) = ln(t?) + ajln(L + blln(K) +2 rln(Z)
+ (1/2A[a2(ln(L)) + b (ln(K)) + r2 (ln(Z))2
+ tiln(L)In(K) + t2 ln( )ln(Z) + t3ln(K)ln(Z).
where: L = Labor,
K = Capital,
Z = Land, and
a1 , a2 , b1 , b2 ' r1 , r2, t0, t1 , t2, and t3 are
constants estimated from the equation.
We impose a restriction on the production function such
that summation of the estimated individual factor shares is
1.0, or 100%. To guarantee this result, the necessary and
sufficient condition is that constant returns to scale
(CRTS) is assumed for the production function. If CRTS is
not imposed, we will have to explain why the individual
shares do not add to the total. Of course, it is always
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possible to find explanations. Denison (1974), for
instance, explains that the reason that his estimated
factor shares do not add up is because there exists
increasing or decreasing returns to scale in the economy,
and/or there are factors that are unaccounted for or
improperly measured in the model. In this study, however,
we feel it is important to maintain accounting properties
such that individual factor shares total to the value-
added. With the CRTS imposition, we will not have to
wrestle with the issue of where the rest of the value is
from or where it has gone to each time when summation of
individual factors turns out to be greater or less than
100%.
To impose the restriction of the CRTS, we first
construct the expression for the scale elasticity of
factor. To do so, we take the total differential of
Equation [6], yielding:
[7] dV/V = adL/L + b dK/K + r dZ/Z
+ a2 ln(L)dL/L + b2 ln(k)dK/K + r2 ln(Z)dZ/Z
+ t ln(L)dK/K + t ln(K)dL/L + t ln(L)dZ/Z
+ t ln(Z)dL/L + t3 ln(K)dZ/Z + t3ln(Z)dK/K.
For constant return to scale to hold, we set:
[8] dL/L = dK/K = dZ/Z =dF/F,
where F represents any factor.
Substituting Equations [8] into [7] and moving dF/F to the
left-hand side, we have:
[9] (dV/V)/(dF/F)= a1 + b 1 + r, + (a2 + t1 + t2)ln(L)
+ (b2 + t1 + t 3 )In(K) + (r2 + t2 + t3 )ln(Z).
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Now the left-hand-side is the expression for the scale
elasticity of factors. To make the right-hand-side equal 1
and not vary with factor change, which is the definition of
a CRTS, we have:
[10] a1 + bi + r, = 1,
a 2 + t1 + t 2 = 0,
b2 + t1 + t 3 = 0'
r2 + t2 + t3 = 0. Or,
[11] ri = 1 - a - b
a 2 =(~)R1 +
b2 = (-1)(ti + t3),
r2 = (-l)(t 2 + t ),
Inserting Equations [11] into [6], we obtain:
[12] ln(V) = ln(t9 ) + alln(L) + bl (K) + (1-al-b1 )ln(Z)
+ (-1/2)(tl + t2)(ln(L))2
+ (-1/2)(ti + t )(ln(K))
+ (-1/2)(t2+ t )(ln(Z))
+ tiln(L)ln(K) t2ln(L)ln(Z) + t3ln(K)ln(Z).
Combining log difference as logs of ratios, it yields:
[13] ln(V/Z) = ln(t9) + ajln(L4Z) + blln(K/Z)
+ t1 (-1/2)(ln(L/K))2 + t2 (-1/2)(ln(L/Z))2
+ t 3 (-1/2)(ln(K/Z)) .
Equation [13] is a constant-return-to-scale production
model. Use of this model to estimate the parameters in the
production function will guarantee that the elasticity of
scale is equal to 1.0. This, in turn, will guarantee that
a summation of individual factor shares will always be one
or 100%. Comparing Equations [13] with [6], we now have
five instead of nine estimators after we introduce the
restriction of constant returns to scale. This
manipulation obviously helps in reducing technical
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difficulties of having too many independent variables in
one equation.
The functional form of Equation [13] is appealing.
It states that the factor productivity is determined by the
intensity of factor employment (terms associated with
coefficients a1 and b1 ). In this case, productivity and
factor intensity are all measured by land. Under normal
circumstances, we expect both a1 and b, to be positive,
which means that the more intensively the factor is
employed, the higher the output will be, given a fixed
amount of land.
There could be, however, an "over-crowdedness"
effect that affects the economy. If a factor, say, labor,
is already over-employed, a continuing increase of the
labor input will cause the total output to fall, rather
than rise, because, for obvious reasons, the work place
will become over-crowded, management will become unduly
complicated and subsequently less effective, etc. This
"over-crowdedness" effect, if it prevails in the economy,
will be captured by estimator t2 and t3.
There is, however, one term that is not conceptually
meaningful. It is the term associated with estimator ti.
We will call it the L-K term for narrative purposes.
Because (ln(L/K))2 = (ln(K/L))2 , this implies that the
effect of L >> (reads as "much greater than") K on land
productivity is just the same as that of K >> L--either
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circumstance brings a high value case into the estimation.
Proportionally, the closer the K and L are, the lower the
value of the term.1/ We do not see any conceptual meaning
to this term.
Because of the conceptual difficulty in explaining
this term, we attempt to see whether inclusion of this term
in the model is justified by the empirical data. We plot
the land-productivity variable (the left-hand-side, LHS
variable) with all the factor-intensity variables (the
right-hand side, or RHS variables) of the equation, both in
log-scale. We also calculate the correlation matrix for
these variables. The results are shown in Table 6-2 and
Figures 6-1 and 6-2.
The diagrams show there is no evidence to support an
empirical relationship between the LHS and the L-K term.
The relationships between the LHS and all the rest RHS
variables, on the other hand, are strong and visually
identifiable. The pattern of those plots suggest the
partial relationship between land productivity and lower-
order estimators, i.e., a, and bl, are positive and that
higher-order estimators, i.e., t2 and t3 are negative. The
correlation matrix in Table 6-2 quantifies our visual
impression. The correlation between land-productivity
variable and the L-K term for industry is -.064 and for
1/ When K = L, (ln(K/L)2 = (in(L/K)2 = 0.
219
Table 6-2
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND FACTOR INTENSITY VARIABLES
(Correlation/One-tailed significance)
LHS ln(L/Z) ln(K/Z) (ln(L/Z)) 2  (ln(K/Z)) 2  (ln(K/L))2
INDUSTRY:
LHS 1.000 .806 .833 -.803 -.708 -.064
.999 .000 .000 .000 .000 .118
ln(L/Z) .806 1.000 .783 -.979 -.612 -.431
.000 .999 .000 .000 .000 .000
ln(K/Z) .833 .783 1.000 -.775 -.861 .193
.000 .000 .999 .000 .000 .000
(ln(L/Z))2  -.803 -.979 -.775 1.000 .662 .419
.000 .000 .000 .999 .000 .000
(ln(K/Z))2  -.708 -.612 -.861 .662 1.000 -.217
.000 .000 .000 .000 .999 .000
(ln(K/L))2  -.064 -.431 .193 .419 -.217 1.000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
COMMERCE:
LHS 1.000 .596 .540 -.556 -.427 -.078
.999 .000 .000 .000 .000 .070
ln(L/Z) .596 1.000 .512 -.956 -.362 -.229
.000 .999 .000 .000 .000 .000
ln(K/Z) .540 .512 1.000 -.472 -.816 .353
.000 .000 .999 .000 .000 .000
(ln(L/Z)) 2  -.556 -.956 -.472 1.000 .356 .318
.000 .000 .000 .999 .000 .000
(ln(K/Z))2  -.427 -.362 -.816 .356 1.000 -.055
.000 .000 .000 .000 .999 .152
(ln(K/L))2  -.078 -.229 .353 .318 -.055 1.000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .152 .999
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
LHS = left-hand side variable (land productivity).
L - labor.
K = capital.
Z = land.
commerce is -.078, and both are not significant at a .05%
level, while the correlations between the land-productivity
and the rest factor-intensity variables are between .427
and .833 in absolute terms and are all highly significant.
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These observations technically mean that even if we include
the L-K term in the estimation, it will contribute very
little to the explanatory power of the regression model.
Besides this "free-rider" problem, the L-K term is highly
correlated to other factor-intensity variables, which will
cause multicollinearity in estimation. Having taken into
account all these factors, we decided to omit the L-K term
from the final model.
We therefore set ti to 0, and by reinvoking
Equations [11] and [13], it yields:
[14] ln(V/Z) = ln(t ))+a 1 ln(L/ ) + b ln(K/Z)
+ a2 (1 2)(ln L/Z)) + b2 1/2)(ln(K/Z))
2
Equation [14] has only four independent variables. Its
coefficients correspond to the ones in Equation [6] and the
relationships between them are given in Equation [11].
This is the final model that will be used for estimating
factor shares and the marginal product of factors of the
production function.
It should be noted that prices are not included in
this model. The implied assumption is that individual
firms have little or no influence on prices, either because
competition prevails, or alternatively as under the Chinese
situation, price is exogenously determined by the
government. If there is evidence that individual firms do
have a control over price, then V in the model should be
rewritten as V = p(Q)Q, with p(Q) denoting price and Q the
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physical output. This change will not affect the
estimation of Equation [14], but many associated functions
associated with Equation [14] will be altered. Some of
those associated functions will be derived below.
There is no obvious restriction on the range of the
estimators a,, bl, a2 , and b2 , because signs for the log-
scale ratio variables included in Equation [14] are not
predetermined. However, if the "over-crowdedness" of
factor utilization is dominant in the economy and if this
effect is successfully captured, a1 and b, should be
positive, and a2 and b2 should be negative. The estimator
to relates to "technical progress" effects. We do not
expect the explanatory power of this estimator to be strong
because our estimation is based on the average values of
short-span time-series data (three years).
Some useful functions can be derived from the final
model of the production function [14]:
(i) Factor-share Function
The functions of labor, capital, and land shares can
be derived by taking the first-order condition of Equation
[14] with respect to labor, capital, and land,
respectively. With some manipulations, we have:
[15] Ls = L(dV/dL)/V = al + a2 ln(L/Z),
[16] Ks = K(dV/dK)/V = b1 + b 2 ln(K/Z), and
[17] Zs = Z(dV/dZ)/V = 1 - a, - b, - a2ln(L/Z)
- b 2ln(K/Z)
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= 1 - (a1 + a 2 ln(L/Z)) - (b1 + b 2 ln(K/Z))
1 - LS 
- Ks
Where Ls, Ks, and Zs are labor, capital, and land shares,
respectively, of the value-added. The coefficients are
defined by Equation [6]. It should be noted that the sum
of factor shares, Ls + Ks + Z = 1 =100%. It should also
be noted that although the elasticity of scale of the
function is independent of input and output, the individual
shares will vary according to input levels. In passing, we
see the "over-crowded" effect is captured precisely as we
expected: if a2 and b2 are negative, which means the
factors of labor and capital are saturated in the economy,
an increase of factor intensity after a certain level,
namely, when ln(L/Z)>0 and ln(K/Z)>0, share of payment to
that factor will decline rather than increase.
(ii) Marginal Product Function
With some simple manipulations of Equations
[15]-[17], we obtain the marginal product functions of
labor, capital, and land as follows:
[18] MPL = dV/dL = (V/L)(a1 + a2 ln(L/Z)) = (V/L)Ls'
[19] MPK = dV/dK = (V/K)(b1 + b 2 ln(K/Z)) = (V/K)Ks, and
[20] MPZ = dV/dZ = (V/Z)(1 - a, - b, - a 2 ln(L/Z)
- b ln(K/Z))
= (V/Z)(1 - Ls - Ks) = (V/Z)zs.
Where MPL, MPK, and MPZ are the marginal products of labor,
capital, and land, respectively. See Equation [6] for
variable and coefficient definitions.
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Equations [18]-[20] are especially interesting and
useful because they link the three most important
components of production function together, i.e., the
productivity, marginal product, and factor share. These
equations state that the marginal product of the factor
equals the factor productivity times the factor share. The
factor that has a high marginal product is also the one
that has a high factor productivity and factor share.
(iii) Variable Factor Elasticity Function
By manipulating the terms on the left-hand-side
Equations [15]-[17], we obtain a model of the variable
labor, capital, and land elasticities of output:
[21] Evl a1 + a2 ln(L/Z),
[21] Ev,k = b + b2 ln(K/Z), and
[22] Ev,z 1 - a1 - bi - a 2 ln(L/Z) - b 2 ln(K/Z).
Where Ev,1, Ev,k, and Ev'z are the labor, capital, and land
elasticities of output, respectively. These variable
elasticity models are especially valuable because they
allow for the output elasticity of factors to change with
factors. We often see constant elasticity models that are
used to evaluate, for instance, the housing elasticity of
income, but because spending propensities of consumers vary
with income levels, the conceptual basis of the constant-
elasticity model is unrealistic. To overcome this problem,
some researchers, such as Dowall (1989), try to use dummy
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variables to capture the effect of varied income
elasticities of housing. Although this approach is
certainly an advancement over the constant elasticity
model, the variable elasticity model may further improve
the dummy variable approach because it makes full use of
the information. This model can help us assess, for
instance, whether the income elasticity of housing is a
monotonic decreasing function, i.e., the increase of income
will cause the spending propensity for housing to decrease.
There are other associated functions that can be
derived, such as the dual short- and long-run cost
functions, the factor-demand function, etc. To derive
these functions, however, requires us to invoke the
assumption of perfect competition, which we consider
unrealistic for this study. Thus, these functions will not
be presented here.
Model Testing
This section consists of four parts. First, we test
the model against pooled Yantai and Jinan data, to see in
general what is the average land contribution to the
economy in these two cities. Second, we test the model by
controlling sector, to see whether there are differences in
land-use pattern of various sectors. Third we study the
elasticity of substitution of implied by the model.
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Finally, we test whether rent gradients are implied by the
model, as a result of the factor substitution.
General Test Result
The production function defined in Equation [14] is
estimated using the ordinary least-squares (OLS) method on
the pooled Jinan and Yantai data. The reason we use pooled
data is because we are interested in general trends in the
economy that determine the relationship between factors and
output, rather than how the relationship is determined due
to the differences between cities and between sectors.
With the es.timated production function, we then calculate
for factor shares and the marginal products of factors for
each observation (enterprise) with Equations [15]-[20].
Then, we calculate the means and other statistics for the
factors shares and the marginal products of factors. These
results are summarized in Table 6-3.
First, we see that the production function model
explains about 60% of the variation of the data. The
estimators for the lower-order variables (i.e., ln(L/Z) and
ln(K/Z)) are positive and highly significant. The ones for
the higher-order variables (i.e., ln(L/Z)2 and ln(K/Z) 2)
are also positive, indicating that the "over-crowdedness"
in labor and capital employment may not prevail.
Unfortunately, the t-values for the higher-order
estimators are not significant. One possible explanation
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Table 6-3
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTION, FACTOR SHARES, AND
THE MARGINAL PRODUCTS: ALL SECTORS AND CITIES
Production Function:a
ln(L/Z) ln(K/Z) (ln(L/Z))2/2 (ln(K/Z))2/2 const.
Coef. .72059 .24965 .00053 .00105 .85934
Std.Err .12750 .05664 .02000 .01438 .18282
Sig T .0000 .0000 .9789 .9420 .0000
R-square: .57991 Sig F: .0000 Cases eliminated:
Std. Err: .85406 d.f.: 692 6
Factor Share:b Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land .030 .00 .028 .038 697
Capital .250 .00 .243 .252 697
Labor .720 .00 .717 .721 703
Marginal Products:c Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land (y/sq.m) 16.84 39.27 .10 499.23 697
Ca pita %) 57 192 1 2972 697
Labor (y/person) 6469 27511 87 404564 703
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
NOTE: a: The functional form is given in Equation [14].
b: Formulas are given in Equations [15] -[17].
c: Formulas are given in Equations [18J-[20].
L = labor.
K = capital.
Z = land.
const. = constant.
coeff. = coefficient.
Std Err - standard error.
Sig T = significance of t-value.
Sig F = significance of F-value.
d.f. = degree of freedom.
Std Dev = standard deviation.
y/sq.m - yuan per square meter.
y/person = yuan per person.
is multicollinearity. If we refer back to the correlation
matrix in Table 6-2, we see that correlations between the
lower- and higher- order variables are between .816 and
.979 in absolute terms, all with high levels of
significance. One solution to this problem could be to
omit the two higher-order estimators from the model,
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thereby reducing our model to the Cobb-Douglas function
with constant returns to scale. This change means that the
estimated factors shares would not vary with input
levels--an assumption we do not accept as realistic. By
keeping the two higher-order terms in the model, on the
other hand, we can observe and analyze the range of the
variation of factor share with input levels. This should
yield valuable information on the production processes we
are trying to describe. In addition, these higher-order
estimators do have compatible levels of correlation with
the left-hand side (see Table 6-2), implying their
contribution to the explanatory power of the model is
similar to the levels of the lower-order estimators.
Because of these reasons, we keep the two higher-order
estimators in the model despite their insignificant
t-values.
The factor-payment share for individual enterprises
is also calculated from the estimated production function.
For the two cities and two sectors as a whole, the capital
share, on average, is 25% (ranging from 22% to 27%) and
labor, 72% (range: 70.7% to 72.8%). A quick comparison of
our results with other studies indicates our estimators are
not unrealistic. Douglas (1934), for instance, applied the
Cobb-Douglas production function to time-series data of
U.S. manufacturing for 1899-1922 and observed that the
labor and capital income shares are 75% and 25%,
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respectively. Mizon (1977) used the same model but with no
imposition of constant returns to scale on the cross-
sectional data for 24 manufacturing industries in the UK.
By structuring the error term as eu rather than the
conventional way of +u, he concluded that the labor and
capital shares are 76.6% and 24.4%.2/ Finally, using the
Swedish data, Heathfield and Wibe (1987) show that labor
and capital income shares between 1950 and 1960 are 64% and
36%; between 1961-1970 are 65% and 35%; and between
1971-1980 are 67% and 33%. Unfortunately, all the studies
cited above do not consider land as an independent
production factor, therefore, the land share is not
reported.
The average land share estimated from our model is
3%, with a range from 0.8% to 6.2%. This estimation seems
to be on the low side, but is expected and is
understandable because of the noncompetitive land
allocation that has caused waste and inefficiency in land
use of many enterprises, especially industrial enterprises.
One data set that is generated from a developing economy
that include the land share is found in Michael Murray's
work (1988, p.46). He reports that in the Korean economy
the "typically" recorded land shares from various
industries range from .10 to .20. (Labor shares range from
2/ Because he did not impose the restriction on constant returns
to scale, the theoretical factor shares do not sum up to 100%.
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.45 to .70 and capital shares from .20 to .40.) Our .03
land-share estimate, compared with his reports, seems to be
excessively low, but, in the same work, Murray admits that
his estimates for land and capital are at the upper limit
and those for labor are on the lower boundary.
By using Equations [18]-[20], we calculated the
marginal products of land, capital, and labor for each
enterprise. The estimated marginal product of land ranges
from .10 yuan per meter to 499.23 yuan/square meter, with
the unweighted mean value of 16.84 yuan/square mater.3/
Because the estimated marginal product of land can be
sufficiently understood as an annual land "rent," if we
assume that an economy under normal circumstances would
have an average annual discount rate of 15%, this yields an
average land value for the two study cities of 112.27
yuan/square meter, or, in today's international price
terms, US$ 2.84 per square foot (3.7 yuan=1 US dollar). If
the discount rate is set at 10%, then the average land
"value" is 168.4 yuan/square meter, or US$ 4.26/square
foot. These "prices" are probably excessively low, judging
by international standards, but if we take into account
that an average urban worker's annual income in the two
cities is about US$ 350 (approximately 1,300 yuan, see
Table 4-3a) and the income distribution of urban households
3/ Two cases with negative value-added were eliminated from
calculating the marginal products of factors.
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has not been very skewed, we find this price rather hefty
for urban households if they were allowed to own a piece of
land.4/
A formal cross-country comparison is presented in
Table 6-4a. The upper part of the table contains data on
land value as a percent of tangible assets in various
developed and developing countries originally compiled by
Goldsmith (quoted by Eaton, 1988). We constructed the same
index from our samples, by, first converting the estimated
marginal products of land into "values" (using a discount
rate of 15%), then using the value proxies to multiple the
land areas to obtain the total land "values;" and then
calculating the "land value" as percent of the total
tangible assets and taking means by city and industry. The
results are summarized in the lower part of the table.
The upper part of the table shows that of those
twenty-some developed and developing countries, all land
(including agricultural land) as percent of tangible assets
4/ A numeric example: For a typical urban couple having a joint
income of $700/year and living in a house of 800 square feet,
if we assume the floor-area ratio is .5, then the household
needs 1600 square feet of land. The total cost of land then
is:
US$ 2.84 x 1600 = US$ 4,550 (at a discount rate of 15%),
or:
US$ 4.26 x 1600 = USS 6,816 (at a discount rate of 10%).
This means the land cost alone is equivalent to 6.5 years (15%
discount rate), or 9.7 years (10% discount rate),
respectively, of their joint-income.
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Table 6-4a
LAND AS PERCENT OF TANGIBLE ASSETS:
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
(Percent)
Country
Japan
Hungary
India
United States
F.R.Germany
Canada
France
Russia/USSR
Mexico
Yugoslavia
South Africa
Israel
Belgium
Switzerland
Italy
Norway
Sweden
Great Britain
Denmark
Australia
MEDIAN
EXHIBIT -
Jinan-Yantai
Approximate Year
1850 1913 1978
All Agricultural All Agricultural All Agricultural
Land Land Land Land Land Land
35.3 -
41.3 35.8
45.8 43.2
56.5 49.9
54.5
47.2
29.9
Combined:
41.8
19.9
42.2 29.7
53.7 -
35.3 19.2
26.9 20.2
33.2 25.4
61.5 -
28.0 21.0
18.7
36.0
39.2
31.3
22.2
26.3
21.7
33.3
22.4
9.9
13.3
50.7
27.1
25.1
24.9
24.9
24.3
23.4
22.8
19.3
18.5
18.5
18.5
18.1
17.2
16.8
15.8
15.3
14.9
14.2
12.5
11.0
16.5
5.4
12.6
3.4
7.9
5.8
15.4
8.5
3.3
2.5
5.1
5.3
2.8
2.5
2.9
18.9
Mean Std Dev Cases
18.6 19.1 699
Jinan City
Industry Alone
Commerce Alone
Yantai City
Industry Alone
Commerce Alone
17.1
8.1
23.8
21.7
10.7
39.9
15.4
4.5
17.1
24.8
5.1
32.5
471
272
199
228
142
86
SOURCE: International data: Joanathan Eaton, 1988.
Exhibit data: estimated from the survey data.
F.R.Germany = Federal Republic of Germany.
Std Dev = Standard Deviation.
ranges from 12.5% to 27.1%, with a median of 18.95%. Japan
is the only exception, where land alone accounted for over
50% of the total tangible assets. The estimation from our
model for Jinan and Yantai combined is strikingly close to
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the median of this set of international data (18.6%). This
indicates that our estimates are not out of line, although
our comparison is not strictly valid because our data do
not include rural land.
The international data also reveal that there is no
necessary correlation of percent of land as the total
tangible assets with development stage, or with type of
economy (market or planned). On the high-end, excluding
Japan, we have Hungary (27.1), India (25.1), the United
States (24.9), and Federal Republic Germany (24.9); on the
low-end, we have Australia (12.5), Denmark (14.2), Great
Britain (14.9), and Sweden (15.3). This indicates that on
the macro-level the factors that determine land value and
importance in the price system are hardly universal. Land
value is greatly affected by a country's demand and supply
conditions which are always unique for each individual
country.
In passing, we notice that land is much more
important for commerce than for industry. Land accounts
for 23.8% and 39.9% of the total tangible assets of
commerce in Jinan and Yantai respectively; but it accounts
for only 8.1% and 10.7% of the total tangible assets of
industries of the two cities. This difference is largely
due to two combined forces: (1) Commerce in general uses
land more efficiently and therefore their estimated "shadow
land value" is higher than industry; (2) Commercial firms
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possess much less fixed capital than industrial firms. On
average, capital endowment per worker of commerce is only
one-third to one-half of that of industry (see Table 4-2).
Finally, we present a general comparison of our
factor-share estimates with the national accounts of the
United States between 1929-1969. The U.S. data, which are
adopted from Denison (1974, pp.51-60), are presented in
Table 6-4b. Two observations warrants mentioning: (1)
Denison's data only include the nonresidential business,
thus in this account the two sets of data are completely
compatible; and (2) on the other hand, Denison's data
include rural economic activities, while our data do not;
but because the agricultural share of the U.S. gross
national product had been very small--3% in 1965, for
instance (the World Bank, 1987, pp.204-5), this
incompatibility is minimal.
Comparing our factor-share estimates with Table
6-4b, we find that the labor share we estimated is a lot
lower than that of the U.S. account (72% versus 80%), while
the capital share is much higher (25% versus 16%). These
discrepancies seem to be reasonable. It can be seen as a
result of China's cheap labor in relation to the expensive
capital, characteristics of a developing economy. We have
no means, of course, to check whether the scales of the
discrepancies are reasonable. Our estimate of the land
share is consistently lower than that of the United States
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Table 6-4b
U.S. Nonresidential Business Factor-Share Estimates 1929-1969:
Denison Data (%)
Average
Input 1929-69 Highest Lowest 1929 1965
Labor 79.54 81.88 77.95 79.38 78.33
Capital 16.12 n.a. n.a. 15.26 17.27
Structures & Equipment 11.54 12.22 11.08 10.80 12.94
Inventories 4.58 5.54 3.75 4.46 4.33
Land 4.35 4.95 3.27 5.36 4.40
TOTAL 100.00 n.a. n.a. 100.00 100.00
EXHIBIT -
a) 1965 U.S. Agricultural share of GNP: 3%
b) Estimated factor shares of two Chinese cities 1984-87 average:
Labor = 72% ; Capital 25%; Land = 3%.
SOURCE: The U.S. data: Denison, 1974, Tables 5-1 and J-2.
U.S. agricultural share of GNP: The World Bank, Table 2.
Shares of two Chinese cities: Table 6-3.
n.a. = not applicable.
GNP = Gross National Product.
(3% versus 4.35%, a 1929-69 average of the U.S.). We think
this to a great extent is attributed to an inefficient land
use in China. If we further take into account land supply
situations, that is, land is much more scarce in China than
in the United States, we are more convinced that scarce
land resource in China has not been efficiently used.
Tests for the Subsets of Data
We repeat the same exercise, i.e., estimating the
production function, and then calculating factor shares and
the marginal products of factors, for subsets of data.
These subsets are: Industry I (heavy industry), Industry
II (light industry), Commerce I (retail and wholesale
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shops), and Commerce II (services and restaurants). We did
not partition the data by city for two reasons. First, the
production process and input requirements for an industry
in China normally do not vary greatly from city to city.
Second, we need sufficient degrees of freedom if some real
and stable trends are to be identified.
When applying the models to the subsets of data, we
observe an unusual phenomenon, that is, about 5-15% of the
observations in each data set show a negative land share.
To illustrate why this happens, we refer to Equation [20],
which states that an enterprise can only a negative land
share when the marginal product of land is negative
(presumably the output of the enterprise is positive). In
a competitive market where factors are paid in accordance
to the full value of the marginal product, a firm cannot
survive when land earns a negative marginal product because
it will have no funds to pay for the land rent. In the
Chinese economy, however, where equilibrium in the price
system has not been reached because of the economic
transition, it is plausible for an enterprise to run a
"cross-subsidy" between factors, that is, to use, for
instance, the profits earned from the under-paid labor to
compensate for the loss from land, such that the total
profits of the enterprise are greater than zero as
production continues. This "cross-subsidy," of course, is
not nominal, because land has no financial value. It is
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shown in a particular form, e.g., land has been used very
inefficiently while workers are working very hard and get
much less pay than their worth.
The negative-share, therefore, tells us that the
factor-rewarding behavior of that enterprise is abnormal,
if not irrational. This line of reasoning prompts us to
raise a new proposition: if we define "normal" enterprises
as the ones whose factors all earn at least positive
marginal products (although the shadow "cross-subsidy" may
still exist), can we use our model to distinguish these
"abnormal" from "normal" enterprises? If we can succeed,
we would, first, demonstrate the discerning power of our
model, and second, be able to examine the production
characteristics that pertain to a "normal" enterprise.
In a process to identify the "normal" enterprises,
we developed a procedure as follows:
(i) Run the OLS regression to estimate the
production function.5/ Use the estimated parameters
of the production function to calculate the factor
shares for each individual observation; then, sort
the data from low to high according to the land
share.
(ii) Use the residual analysis method to identify
the influential cases and remove them. Meanwhile,
5/ Theil (1978,p.76 ) suggests that if the non-zero intercept is
in fact absent, the slope coefficient may be estimated with
far greater precision than with the intercept term left in.
Following his suggestion, we use the regression-through-origin
method when the constant term is highly insignificant. We
observe that for our data set, the results from regression
with or without the constant term are only marginally
different.
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exclude the cases that contain a negative land
share.
(iii) Re-estimate the production function, and
repeat the previous two steps until there is no case
that has a negative land share.
Normally, after we repeated steps (i) and (ii) two or three
times, we eliminate all the cases that contain negative
land shares. In the process, between 3% and 13% of cases
are removed from each of the data sets. The final results
of the estimated production functions, factor shares, and
marginal products of the factors are summarized in Tables
6-5a through 5d. The term "Cases Eliminated" indicates the
total number of enterprises that are excluded from the
estimation either because the enterprise has a negative
land share or because it is an influential case.
Now, we can examine the production and factor-
rewarding patterns of the remaining "normal" enterprises.
First, compared with Table 6-3, we notice that the land
shares of the "normal" enterprises estimated from the sub-
data sets are much higher than the estimate from the
general pooled data. The mean land shares estimated from
the subsets of data range from 7% to 17%, while the mean
land share for the pooled data set is only 3%. This seems
to support the theory that the cases eliminated from the
subsets of data are indeed the ones that use land
inefficiently so that land earns little marginal product.
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Table 6-5a
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTION, FACTOR SHARES AND
THE MARGINAL PRODUCTS: HEAVY INDUSTRY 6
Production Function:b
ln(L/Z) ln(K/Z) (ln(L/Z))2/2 (ln(K/Z))2/2 const.c
Coef. .47651 .30141 -.00349 -.05535
Std.Err .07856 .15693 .01828 .04597
Sig T .0000 .0568 .8487 .2305
R-square: .96205 Sig F: .0000 Cases eliminated:
Std. Err: .52103 d.f.: 144 4
Factor Share:d Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land .130 .05 .015 .263 148
Capital .380 .05 .254 .489 148
Labor .490 .00 .479 .497 148
Marginal Products:e Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land (y/sq.m) 22.52 34.34 .12 209.50 148
Capital (%) 17 12 1 63 148
Labor (y/person) 2256 2214 301 23483 148
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
NOTE: a: Definition is given in Table 3-9.
b: The functional form is given in Equation [14].
c: Regression through the origin, no constant.
d: Formulas are given in Equations [15]-[17].
e: Formulas are given in Equations [18J-[20J.
L = labor.
K = capital.
Z - land.
const. = constant.
coeff. = coefficient.
Std Err = standard error.
Sig T = significance of t-value.
Sig F = significance of F-value.
d.f. = degree of freedom.
Std Dev = standard deviation.
y/sq.m = yuan per square meter.
y/person = yuan per person.
It is likely that when they are included in the pooled data
the land share is scaled down.
Second, the capital shares for commercial sectors
are in general lower than those for industrial sectors,
while labor shares are in general higher than those for
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Table 6-5b
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTION, FACTOR SHARES AND
THE MARGINAL PRODUCTS: LIGHT INDUSTRY I
Th- P d.ction F ti b
ln(L/Z) ln(K/Z) (ln(L/Z))2/2 (ln(K/Z))2/2 const.c
Coef. .43771 .51634 .00707 -.01590
Std.Err .04597 .07386 .01452 .03494
Sig T .0000 .0000 .6267 .6497
R-square: .95468
Std. Err: .42027
Factor Share:d
Sig F: .0000
d.f. : 173
Cases eliminated:
10
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land .050 .01 .031 .082 177
Capital .530 .01 .493 .560 177
Labor .420 .01 .399 .433 177
Marginal Products:e Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land (y/sq.m) 14.72 16.56 .91 111.50 177
Capital (%) 26 14 7 83 177
Labor (y/person) 1747 1169 365 9484 177
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
NOTE: a:
b:
c:
d:
e:
L
K
z
const.
coeff.
Std Err
Sig T
Sig F
d.f.
Std Dev
y/sq.m
y/person
Definition is given in Table 3-9.
The functional form is given in Equation [14].
Regression through the origin, no constant.
Formulas are given in Equations [15] -[17].
Formulas are given in Equations 118]-120].
= labor.
= capital.
= land.
- constant.
= coefficient.
= standard error.
= significance of t-value.
= significance of F-value.
= degree of freedom.
= standard deviation.
= yuan per square meter.
= yuan per person.
industrial sectors. These results are expected,
consider in rough ternis that the commercial sector requires
mostly workers to deliver goods and services, while
industry requires both workers and expensive equipment to
do the job. Therefore, it is entirely logical for the
242
if we
Table 6-5c
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTION, FACTOR SHARES, AND
THE MARGINAL PRODUCTS: RETAILS AND WHOLESALES a
Production Function:b
ln(L/Z) ln(K/Z) (ln(L/Z))2/2 (ln(K/Z)) 2/2 const.
Coef. .53646 .25434 -.01273 -.00652 .84648
Std.Err .26918 .07741 .11113 .04171 .31985
Sig T .0473 .0012 .9089 .8759 .0086
R-square: .36463 Si F: .0000 Cases Eliminated:
Std. Err: 1.00947 d.f.: 257 9
Factor Share:c Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land .190 .01 .164 .213 262
Capital .260 .00 .245 .273 262
Labor .550 .01 .532 .566 268
Marginal Products:d Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land (y/sq.m) 210.83 365.77 1.26 2866.0 262
Capita] (%) 117 304 1 3149 262
Labor (y/person) 8125 30381 104 315907 268
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
NOTE: a: Definition is given in Table 3-9.
b: The functional form is given in Equation [14].
c: Formulas are given in Equations [15]-[17].
d: Formulas are given in Equations [18]-[20].
L = labor.
K = capital.
Z = land.
const. = constant.
coeff. = coefficient.
Std Err = standard error.
Sig T = significance of t-value.
Sig F = significance of F-value.
d.f. = degree of freedom.
Std Dev - standard deviation.
y/sq.m = yuan per square meter.
y/person = yuan per person.
commercial sector to have a higher labor, but lower
capital, share than industry.
Last, but not least, we find land shares of
commercial sectors make up much higher proportions of the
total value-added than the industrial sectors. On average,
a "normal" commercial enterprise would channel 16-17% of
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Table 6-5d
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTION, FACTOR SHARES, AND
THE MARGINAL PRODUCTS: SERVICES AND RESTAURANTS a
Production Function:b
ln(L/Z) ln(K/Z) (ln(L/Z))2/2 (ln(K/Z)) 2/2 const.
Coef. .83299 .03247 .01728 -.01283 .67532
Std.Err .27748 .16743 .09872 .09979 .33467
Sig T .0037 .8468 .8616 .8981 .0473
R-square: .74904 Si F: .0000 Cases Eliminated:
Std. Err: .67532 d.f.: 72 12
Factor Share:c Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land .150 .01 .133 .164 77
Capital .040 .01 .028 .055 77
Labor .810 .01 .789 .827 77
Marginal Products:d Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Cases
Land (y/sq.m) 51.07 42.75 2.56 215.7 77
Capital (%) 9 9 0 42 77
Labor (y/person) 2709 1557 675 9411 77
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
NOTE: a: Definition is given in Table 3-9.
b: The functional form is given in Equation [14].
c: Formulas are given in Equations [15]-[17].
d: Formulas are given in Equations [18]-[20].
L = labor.
K = capital.
Z = land.
const. = constant.
coeff. = coefficient.
Std Err - standard error.
Sig T = significance of t-value.
Sig F = significance of F-value.
d.f. = degree of freedom.
Std Dev - standard deviation.
y/sq.m = yuan per square meter.
y/person = yuan per person.
its income to reward land, while a "normal" industrial
enterprise can only set aside 7-10% of its income for the
land rent. This empirical observation supports the claim
that land is a much more critical factor to commercial than
to industrial production.
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Because the commercial sector achieves a higher land
productivity, and because it can devote a higher proportion
of income as land payment, the marginal product of land of
the commercial sector is much higher than that of the
industrial sector. This is why commercial shops, on
average, can justify paying a price of 194 yuan per square
meter to obtain a piece of land, and restaurants and
services, on average, can afford 53 yuan per square meter,
while heavy and light industries can only offer, on
average, a price of 17 and 19 yuan per square meter. This
indicates that commercial enterprises, because they can
justify paying high prices for land, will have much more
power than industrial enterprises in bargaining for a piece
of land; therefore, the commercial sector is likely to
dominate land-use patterns and the land market if free
land-trade is allowed. Because a city can only support a
limited number of commercial establishments, what is left
by commerce is then available to industry.
Elasticity of Substitution
One of the most important aspects to study before
estimating a production function is the elasticity of
substitution implied by the function. In this research,
however, evaluation of the elasticity of substitution is
not possible because there is no price for land. The
evaluation of the elasticity of substitution between land
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and nonland factors, therefore, can only be carried out
once the marginal product of land is calculated.
Evaluation of the elasticity of substitution provides us
with another formal device to assess whether the marginal
product of land estimated from our model is realistic and
reasonable.
In their pioneering works on housing production and
urban spatial structure, Mills (1967, 1972) and Muth (1969)
have basically relied on the Cobb-Douglas production
function. A number of empirical studies followed their
works. These relaxed the restriction on the values of the
substitution elasticities by adopting constant elasticity
substitution (CES) or variable elasticity substitution
(VES) functions. Fare and Yoon (1981) estimate a weak
disposability of inputs (WDI) production function in order
to remove the restriction imposed by the VES that the
elasticity of substitution can only be less than or equal
to 1. They report that their estimated elasticities exhibit
more variability than the VES estimates with some
elasticities greater than one. They conclude that the WDI
functional form is a more accurate specification of urban
housing production than the VES functions.
Excellent literature surveys were conducted by
McDonald (1981) and Reedy (1985). Of the 21 studies we
find in the works of Reedy, McDonald, as well as ones that
are not included in these two reviews, 16 used U.S. and
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three used Canadian data. Only three studies have tested
models on developing economies (Ghana, Colombia, and Korea,
see the references in Table 6-6). All data are cross-
sectional, with the exception of Muth's who tested time-
series data and Kau and Sirmans who used pooled data.
Fifteen out 21 studies adopt (or implicitly adopt) the CES
production functions. In two cases, translog cost
functions were used to relax further the restriction on
elasticity of scale. McDonald reports that estimated
elasticities for a single metropolis are greater than those
estimated for a cross-section of metropolitan areas.
A summary of these studies is presented in Table
6-6. Of all the studies listed, the mean value of
elasticity of substitution between land and capital is
0.54, and the median is 0.46. This means that a 1% change
in the price ratio of land versus capital will lead to
approximately a half percent of change in the input mix in
the opposite direction. (In other words, if the land price
increases faster than the capital price, then consumption
on land will increase slower than on capital).
It should be pointed out that in estimating the o,
there are two different methodologies and concepts
represented. Lee (1981), Murray (1988), and others made a
strict estimation of paired inputs, capital and land, or in
some cases, labor and land. The general functional form
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Table 6-6
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION
BETWEEN LAND AND NONLAND FACTORS
Data a of
-------------------- Functional Land and
Author Industry Country Type Year Form Non-land
McDonald Housing U.S. C-S 1969-71 CES 1.13
Clapp Housing U.S. C-S 1970-72 CES .97
Clapp Off. Bui. U.S. C-S 1973 CES .95
McDonald Housing U.S. C-S 1970-72 CES .86
Sirmans, et al. Off. Bui. U.S. C-S 1960 VES .83
O'Neill Housing U.S. C-S CES .75
Fallis Manuf. Canada C-S 1971 CES .75
Fare & Yoon Housing U.S. C-S 1960 WDI .75
Koenker Housing U.S. C-S 1964-66 CES .71
Fallis Manuf. Canada C-S 1958 CES .69
Asabere, et al. Housing Ghana Pooled 1974-78 CES,VES .54,.55
Rydell Housing U.S. C-S 1974 CES .50
Muth Housing U.S. C-S 1966 CES .50
Jackson, et al. Housing U.S. C-S 1970 CES .50
Sirmans & Redman Off. Bui. U.S. C-S 67,71,75 VES .45
Polinsky, et al Housing U.S. C-S 1969 CES .45
Rosen Housing U.S. C-S 1969 T.C. .43
Fountain Housing U.S. C-S 1972-74 CES .38
Arnott & Lewis Housing Canada C-S 1975-76 CES .36
Lee Manuf. Columbia C-S 1978 CES .31
Muth Housing U.S. T-S 1946-60 CES .08
Kau & Sirmans Housing U.S. Pooled 1966-78 VES .23-.89
Murray Manuf. Korea C-S 1978 T.C. .12-.65
SOURCE: McDonald (1982), Reedy (1985), O'Neill (1967), Asabere, et al.
(1982), Jacksonet al. (1984), Murray (1988).
T-S = time-series data.
C-S = cross-section data.
CES = constant elasticity of substitution.
VES = variable elasticity of substitution.
T.C.= trans-log cost function.
WDI = weak disposability of inputs.
a = Elasticity of substitution.
Off. Bui.= office building.
Manuf.= manufacturing.
used to estimate the elasticity of land and other factors
is, by definition:
[24] ln(F/Z) = a + oln(s/r),
where F = factor input,
Z = land input,
s = land price,
r = factor price,
a = elasticity of substitution between land and
the factor, and
a = constant from the estimation.
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Koenker (1972) and O'Neill (1967), on the other hand,
estimate the elasticities of substitution between land and
"nonland" factors. They use the following functional form:
[25] ln(N/Z) = a + aln(s/n),
where N is denoted as nonland input and n is the price of
the non-land factor. Adding ln(n) to both sides of [25]
yields:
[26] ln(nN/Z) = a + aln(s) + (1-a)ln(n).
By invoking the implied relation V = sZ + nN, the left-hand
side can be rewritten as ln((V-sZ)/Z), where V is the total
value-added. Omitting the right-hand side term (1-o)ln(n)
because n is not really observable, it yields:
[27] ln((V-sZ)/Z) = a + aln(s).
This is the model used by Koenker (1972) and O'Neill
(1967).
In the following, we apply the model specified in
Equation [24] to the estimation of elasticities of
substitution between land and capital and between land and
labor. Likewise, we also apply Equation [27] to the a
between land and the "nonland" factors. As for the data,
we use the marginal product of land (jointly estimated) in
lieu of land price. Because we have already obtained the
marginal product estimates for labor and capital, we
utilize them instead of the observed prices for labor and
capital. Finally, the a is estimated for industrial and
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commercial sectors separately. We do not further divide
the data by city for the reasons just stated in the above
section. In passing, the a between labor and capital is
also estimated using the marginal product estimates. These
results are summarized in Table 6-7.
Two unusual results emerged from using our model.
First, all the estimated elasticities of substitution are
slightly over unitary, ranging from 1.0099 to 1.3890. With
the exception of the capital-labor substitution, which is
found to be typical compared with literature,6/ it seems
that our estimation leans towards the high-end compared to
most studies we included in Table 6-6. The second
characteristic is that all the estimates have a very high
R-square, ranging from .9454 to .9997. This is rarely seen
in any empirical regression model that contains hundreds of
cases.
In search of an explanation for these two unusual
results, we take the total differential of both sides of
Equation [24]. For illustration purposes, we here look
only at land-labor substitution. The total differential
yields:
[28] d(L/Z)/(L/Z) = ad(MPZ/MPL)/(MPZ/MPL),
where: L = labor,
Z = land,
MPZ = the marginal product of land,
MPL = the marginal product of labor, and
6/ See, for instance, Reedy (1985), Nerlove (1967), especially
Tables 5, 6, and 7.
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a = the elasticity of substitution.
Substitute Equations
[29] d(L/Z)/(L/Z) =
[18] and [20] into [28], it yields:
od{(ZsV/Z)/(LsV/L)}/{(Zs
ad{(Zs/Ls)(L/Z)}/{(Zs/Ls
/V/Z)/(LsV/L)}
)(L/Z)}
If the term Zs/Ls is a constant, then it can be moved in
front of the differential term. There it will be cancelled
out because the same term appears in the expression of the
denominator. Then, the left-hand side and the right-hand
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Table 6-7
DIRECT ESTIMATION OF ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION:
YANTAI AND JINAN(Coefficient/Standard error/Significance of t-test)
Land- Land- Land- Labor-
Capital Labor Non-land Capital
Industry: o 1.0524 1.0416 1.0387 1.0018
.000 .001 .001 .000)
.000 .000 .000 .000
a 11.9833 -3.3563 3.3312 -1.0813
.002 (.007 .002 (.003)
.000 .000 .000 .000
R-square .9999 .9998 .9995 .9999
Standard error .0113 .0197 .0242 .0033
Sig F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
d.f. 339 339 339 339
Commerce: a 1.0444 1.0384 1.0262 1.0034
.001 (.002 .001 .000)
.000 .000 .000 .000
a 11.9367 -3.3131 3.3310 -1.0951
.002 (.012 .001 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000
R-square .9999 .9985 .9994 1.0000
Standard error .0153 .0400 .0461 .0003
Sig F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
d.f. 354 354 354 354
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
a = Elasticity of Substitution.
a = Constant.
Sig.F- Significance of F-statistics.
d.f. = degree of freedom.
side of the equation are identical. This means that the o
can only take a value of 1.0, and, because the regression
will be on a 45-degree straight line, the R-square will be
1.0 with no standard error. This is the case for the
Cobb-Douglas production function because, as we
demonstrated earlier, the factor shares of the function are
all fixed and do not vary with input and output levels.
This is one way to illustrate why the elasticity of the
Cobb-Douglas production function has to be 1.0. Also, we
note that when the underlying production function is a
Cobb-Douglas, any estimates of the elasticity of
substitution should have a very high R-square. This is
because the log-scale factor ratio and the log-scale
reciprocal price ratio are supposedly on a straight
line--if the assumed competition prevails such that firms
in the economy all pay the marginal products for the
factors. Furthermore, for the estimation of the a that
utilizes marginal products obtained from the function
rather than observed prices, the R-square should be exactly
1.0, or in other words, there should be no standard error
of estimation--provided the production function is properly
estimated and the marginal products are correctly
calculated.
However, in the production-function model we
adopted, as is suggested by Equations [15] and [17], the
term Zs/Ls is not a constant because we have purposely
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constructed the Zs and Ls to be functions of input levels.
Thus, we cannot move the term out of the differential term,
and it will have to remain in the equation for estimation.
Nevertheless, since the ranges and standard deviations of
the Zs and Ls estimated from our model are very small,7/ it
is entirely possible for the a to be very close to 1 and
the R-square to be very high.
If we accept our estimation of the elasticity of
substitution, it means quantitatively that for every 1%
change in the ratio of the marginal products of two inputs,
slightly over 1% of change in input mix occurs in the
opposite direction. It indicates that the changes in the
input mix in response to price changes will be more or less
proportional and industrial and commercial enterprises will
react similarly to factor-price changes.
Centrality and Land Value
In Chapter Five, we demonstrated that there is a
weak factor-substitution with respect to location (except
the Jinan industrial sector), and location is relevant in
determining the profit level of an enterprise. In this
section, we further investigate the relationship between
the implicit land "rent," which is the marginal product of
land estimated from our model, and centrality of the
7/ The range for Z is [.008,.062] and the standard deviation is
.01; and the range for L is (.707,.728] and the standard
deviation is .00, see Table 6-3.
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enterprises. If our model is consistent with our previous
analysis, a downward slope should be observed if we sort
the estimated marginal product of land by distance to the
CBD.
To see whether a land-rent gradient exists in our
estimated marginal product of land, we first calculate the
marginal product of land based on pooled data estimates.
Then, we separate the data by city to make the estimated
gradients city-specific. The dependent variable is the
log-scale marginal product of land, as is used in most
literature. The independent variables include the CBD
distance variable, an industry dummy variable, and various
continuous and dummy variables, representing the set of
location characteristics of the enterprise which we
introduced in Chapter Three. We also constructed an
interaction variable between industry and distance to the
CBD to test whether the rent gradients for industry and
commerce are different from each other.
We use the stepwise regression method to select the
relevant distance variables. In both the Jinan and Yantai
models, the first variable entering the equation is the
industry dummy, which has the highest partial correlation
with the left-hand side and is highly significant. In the
Yantai data set, we have a dummy variable indicating
whether the enterprise is on a bus line (defined as a bus-
stop being within 10 to 15 minutes walking distance of the
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enterprise). This is the second variable selected for the
Yantai model. Then the next variable picked for both
Yantai and Jinan models is the distance to the CBD, a
continuous variable. None of the rest of the location
variables meet the entry criterion, i.e., the probability
of the F-statistic of the partial correlation must be below
.05. The final result is given in Table 6-8.
All the coefficients in the both Yantai and Jinan
models have correct signs and are highly significant. The
key variable in this model is the distance to the CBD,
which is negative and significant. In numeric terms, it
means that for every kilometer distance from the CBD, the
land rent will fall by 16.2% in Yantai and 13.7% in Jinan,
respectively. When converting the unit of kilometer into
mile (to make our estimates compatible with typical
empirical studies), the appropriate figures are 26.1% in
Yantai and 22.1% in Jinan. These figures do not look
abnormal. An empirical study conducted by MaCauley (1985)
reports that the land-density gradients for more than a
dozen U.S. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs)
are between -.11 and -.47, with the median value of -.22.
In a recent empirical study, Dowall (1989, p.167) also
found the land-value gradients for the city of Karachi,
Pakistan between 1980 and 1988 are in the neighborhood of
-11% to -13% (having converted into miles).
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Table 6-8
Gradients of the Marginal Product of Land:
Final Results from the Stepwise Regression a
(Coefficient/Standard error/Significance of t-test)
Variable
Name Interpretation Yantai Jinan
IND Industry dummy: -1.0775 -0.7033
1=Industry .190 102
O=Commerce .000 .0
BUS Bus stop dummy: .2883
1=A bus stop within one block .080
0=Otherwise .000
CBD Distance to CBD (km) -0.2209 -0.1768
.058 
.027J
(Constant) 2.6785 2.8159
.200 .082)
.000) (.000)
R-square 0.3312 0.2638
(Standard Error) (1.238) .933)
(Sig F (.000) (.000)
D.F. 215 402
NOTE: a) The dependent variable:
log(Estimated Marginal Product of Land, yuan/square meter)
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
Sig F = Significance levels of F-test.
D.F.= Degree of freedom.
We should also point out that the estimated rent
gradient for Jinan is flatter than that for Yantai. This
is because Jinan city is much larger than Yantai;
therefore, it is logical for the gradient of a larger city
to fall slower than that of a smaller city.
Industrial dummies for both Yantai and Jinan are
negative, indicating that for every location industrial
land rent is lower than commercial land rent. On average,
industrial enterprises can only afford one-third to
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one-half of the rent the commercial enterprises are willing
to offer. However, we were not able to observe a cross-
over point between industrial and commercial rents, as we
did in Chapter Five (see Tables 5-6).
Finally, it is interesting to note that the bus stop
dummy for Yantai is positive and significant. Numerically,
it means for an enterprise that is located on a bus line,
the average land rent it can offer is 33% higher than the
enterprise at the same distance to the CBD but not located
on a bus line. The magnitude of this figure is very
striking. Unfortunately, we do not have the same data for
Jinan; therefore, we cannot test whether the location of
bus routes for Jinan is as important as for Yantai in
determining the land rent. This test also reveals a
weakness in our survey design. If we had collected a set
of qualitative variables, such as whether the enterprise is
facing a main street (or a back alley), whether it is at a
main intersection, and whether it is located on the ground
floor, we could test whether these variables are
significant in determining the land rent. We then could
use the ones that test out as significant to "fine-tune"
the estimates of the land rent when we are requested to
propose a land-tax tariff structure.
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Policy Implications
Although our research is academically oriented,
findings of the study may be of use for some practical
political decisions. In the following we will focus on
three policy-related questions: (1) Should proposed rent
be a long-term or short-term measure? Should it be local
or central? (2) What criteria could be used as a base to
determine the government rent schedule? And (3) How much
society will gain from an improved land use?
The Weighted Average Enterprise Affordable Price
Urban land in China is allocated noncompetitively,
as a result of the sole-state ownership and state-bar of
land trading. Mechanisms governing the resource allocation
are mainly dominated by the "bureaucratic mentality" of
bureaucrats, whose motive to make best use of resources is
questionable. For a government that wants to improve the
resource-allocation efficiency, one option is to create a
land-leasing market, in which the first-tier of tenants,
after lawfully paying the state a proper rent to obtain a
lease directly from the state, can trade their use rights
with the second tier of tenants, who do not have a direct
lease with the land owner--the state. In this view,
establishing a value-based government-land rent system
seems to make great sense.
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Earlier in this chapter, we estimated the "shadow"
marginal product of land by using the production function
analysis. In essence, the marginal product of land
estimated for each enterprise is the maximum land rent the
government could take away from each enterprise at a given
location, without distorting its payment to other factors
(assuming enterprises wish to pay factors strictly
according to their marginal products). The estimated
marginal product also reflects how each enterprise
evaluates the "importance" or "usefulness" of land to its
production, as a result of the noncompetitive resource
allocation.
To facilitate our further analysis that will lead to
a proposal of government-land rent system, we use a
regression model to generate a weighted average level of
the estimated marginal product of land. The procedure we
used is similar to what we used in testing the centrality
of the data, except this time the only regressor we include
is distance because our sole interest now is to find a
general average indiscriminant of sector and ownership.
The result from the regression is shown in Table 6-9. In
both cases, the sign for the distance variable is correct
(negative) and significant. We label the trajectory of the
model defined in Table 6-9 as the weighted average
enterprise affordable price curve (WAEAP curve, hereafter).
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Table 6-9
Weighted Average Enterprise Affordable Price
(WAEAP) Modela
(Coefficient/Standard error/Significance of t-test)
Variable
Name Interpretation Yantai Jinan
CBD Distance to CBD (km) -0.4409 -0.2161
.056 
.027
(Constant) 2.7976 2.5919
.126 .090)
(.000) .000)
R-square 0.2209 0.1321
(Standard Error) (1.293) (1.069)(Sig F) (.000) (.000)
D.F. 217 425
NOTE: a) The dependent variable:
log(Estimated Marginal Product of Land,
yuan/square meter).
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
Sig F = Significance levels of F-test.
D.F.- Degree of freedom.
The WAEAP curve is a weighted average line that
originates from the CBD and goes between the high and low
"shadow" land values at every given location on a two-
dimensional plane. It is formed by evaluating the way
enterprises convert inputs into economic product in their
production processes. It is a curve that reflects how an
average enterprise values the importance of land as a
result of a noncompetitive land allocation. About half of
the enterprises are to be found underneath that curve when
plotting this line against the distance to the CBD.
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Nature of the Land Rent
The nature of this rent, by which we mean whether it
should be long-term or short-term, and whether it should be
local or central, can be established by comparing the
differences between the WAEAP curve and the bid-price curve
in Alonso's sense, or the prevailing market price curve in
the "almost perfect world." There are several fundamental
differences between them, as we examined in a great detail
in Chapter One. Only two relevant ones are highlighted
here. First, the bid-price curve and prevailing market
price curve generalize a land price pattern in a
competitive market. The WAEAP curve, on the other hand, is
a curve that describes, on average, how enterprises value
land as a consequence of noncompetitive land allocation.
Therefore, pricing land according to WAEAP schedule
does not guarantee a potential "highest and best" use of
land. Furthermore, we demonstrated that a WAEAP type of
pricing underestimates the true land value if the resource
were competitively allocated. The difference could be
measured by the area in Figure 2-5 enclosed by ABDEF. All
these signify that using a WAEAP schedule to charge land
rent should be treated as an expedient measure. The
government should encourage other measures in forming a
true urban land market, such as exploring more flexible
tenure arrangements. Eventually the WAEAP type of pricing
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should be switched to a pricing according to the record of
arm's-length deeds.
Second, a difference between the WAEAP schedule
pricing and competitive market pricing is that an improved
average land productivity will directly lead to a raised
level of the WAEAP curve that justifies the landlord
(government) to collect a higher rent from all users, while
in a competitive market each land user would presumably
benefit directly from the improvement. Hence the WAEAP
schedule pricing will encourage a collusion among the
tenants not to improve their land use so that they all end
up paying a low rent.
The disincentives introduced by the WAEAP charging,
however, can be offset through an effective local land
administration. This is because the WAEAP charge is set at
an average level, which divides land users in the city in
half: half are in the city in a rent deficit zone and the
other half in rent surplus zone (please refer back to
Figure 2-7). A "prisoner's dilemma" therefore is created:
although every land user may know its endeavor to improve
land use contribute to a higher general land rent, yet the
ones below the WAEAP line want to move up to get rid of the
deficit, while the ones currently above the WAEAP line have
to continue to improve land use in order to maintain their
surplus situation. As a result, the disincentive of the
WAEAP pricing is cancelled.
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If the state or Province wants to collect this rent,
it must set it in accordance with the average shadow value
of land of the nation or the province, in order to generate
the "prisoner's dilemma" at an intercity level to
counteract the disincentive of WAEAP pricing. However, it
would be impossible to structure such a land rent that can
also takes into full account the situation or site value in
each individual city. Interactions of city size, land use,
and economic structure, among others, produce a unique
pattern of situation or differential rent schedule for each
individual city, as demonstrated by Jinan and Yantai in
Table 6-9. Thus, to argue for a uniform intercity rent
schedule will compromise the efficiency and equity goals we
examined in Chapter One, even if we can categorize cities
(by size and economic type, for instance) before assigning
the rates.
A worst possible land rent is a uniform one set by
the central government, since this takes no consideration
of situational or locational rent, and is collected by the
central government. In this case, the rent will fail the
three goals it is set out to achieve: (1) the efficiency
goal will fail because it cannot stimulate an improved land
use, and is little help in forming a second tier of land-
leasing market; (2) the equity goal will fail because
unintended subsidies still go to land users who occupies a
good location; and (3) the revenue goal will fail because
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only a token income can be generated from this rent. The
cost of administration of this charge, including property
identification, assessment, bookkeeping, and collection
(Bahl, 1979) will undoubtedly outweigh the revenue gain.
Scenarios of Government Land-Rent Structures
We need to make two assumptions before going
further. We assume that the government collects a revenue
in the name of land rent that is solely from the marginal
product of land, and collects other taxes and revenues,
whatever names they may come under, from marginal products
of labor and capital. We also assume that the government
has decided to treat all the land users the same, that is,
the land levy is just charged against land size and
location, regardless of who occupies it.
Under these assumptions, we can suggest several
options for government land-rent structure. One option is
that the rent should be structured to follow exactly the
WAEAP schedule in all locations, plus some minor
adjustments.8/ This is the highest possible land rent the
government could justifiably charge. This option enables
the government to recover the full status quo economic
8/ For example, a small percentage could be added to the
enterprise that is located within walking distance to bus
stops, or facing a major street. The estimates can be
obtained by conducting a small scale survey to collect
detailed location data, and using the methodology that
calculates the results summarized in Table 6-8.
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product due to the public land resource. Because it
theoretically puts 50% of the firms under the WAEAP curve,
many firms, especially the large and most inefficient land
users, will be hit. Although this is exactly the signal a
land-charge system should deliver, yet the government may
not be able to calm down the outcry from the financially
"stressed" renters.
As a temporary measurement, the government may wish
to consider a strategy that starts charging at a lower
level, and then gradually raises it until it covers fully
the public land rental value. A lower government rent
structure will put fewer enterprises in a theoretical "rent
deficit, "9/ but society as a whole will collect less
"potential" revenue, and provide more unintended land
subsidies to encourage inefficient land use. Some tough
trade-off has to be made by society as a whole. Table 6-10
presents a number of scenarios evaluating a "shadow
percentage" rental-revenue loss and the proportion of
enterprises that could theoretically incur a rent deficit.
A rent structure that sets 2.5% of enterprises in rent
deficit and 97.5% in surplus clearly is not a good option,
because too large of a percentage of the potential
9/ The actual impact of the newly imposed rent on enterprises
will not be the same as we calculated because enterprises are
not paying factors exactly according to their marginal
product. The enterprises whose labor and capital are
underpaid may have a softer cushion in absorbing the land rent
impact, if it is not directly passed to consumers.
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Table 6-10
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN
RENT-DEFICIT FIRM AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE LOSS
% Potential Revenue Lossa
SE below % of Rent- ------------------------
WAEAP Curve Deficit Firms Yantai Jinan
1.960 2.5 94.4 60.9
1.645 5.0 62.8 43.5
1.282 10.0 39.3 29.5
0.674 25.0 17.9 15.4
0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
NOTE: a) The full potential revenue is defined as
the area under the WAEAP curve.
SOURCE: Estimated based on figures provided in
Table 6-9.
SE = Standard error of dependent variable.
WAEAP - Weighted average enterprise affordable
price.
government-rental revenue will be- lost (Yantai: 94%;
Jinan: 61%) due to the low rates.
As rent-deficit firms increase to 5%, 10%, and 25%,
the loss of the social-rental value will reduce to 62%, 39%
and 18% in Yantai, and 44%, 30%, and 15% in Jinan. When
rent-deficit firms increase to 50%, there will be no loss
of the social-rental value, and no unintended government
land subsidy to those inefficient land users. There are,
however, a reward to the firms that use land efficiently so
that they are positioned above the WAEAP curve. It looks
as if this is the optimal land rent the government should
charge in order to collect the highest amount of revenue
and to create the maximum incentives for an efficient land
use. We will not elaborate any further what is the optimal
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level of the land rent the government should set at the
moment. As academic researchers and policy analysts, our
task is to draw an obvious range of the proposed rent, to
formulate scenarios and provide detailed analysis of
consequences of each scenario. It is the elected public
officers and citizens who should make a hard trade-off
between the conflicting goals embodied in the new charge
system. The decision on what should be the most proper
rent structure to be instituted is clearly more political
than economic or econometric. What we hope here is that
when that decision is made, the decisionmakers are fully
aware of the economic consequences of the option they
chose.
Measuring Resource Gain from Improved Land Use
In China, the waste of natural resources as a result
of bureaucratic land allocation in the past is
indisputable. In the earlier analysis we show a
theoretical approach to quantify the resource waste (see
the discussions about Figure 2-5). The idea,
unfortunately, cannot be implemented because we do not have
a sense of what the true sectoral bid-price curves would
look like in China if the resource had been competitively
allocated. In the following, then, we will outline a more
practical research approach that will (a) identify the most
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inefficient land users; and (b) evaluate the social gain
from improved land use.
The studies in section "Tests from Subset Data"
suggest a procedure to distinguish the "normal" firms
(whose shadow marginal product of land is positive) from
the "abnormal" firms (whose shadow marginal product of land
is negative). Of the four industries we formed, 3% to 13%
of the firms were dismissed from each industry. Those
dismissed firms, in our view, are the suspects that abuse
land resources, and therefore the government should be
especially harsh to them if they complain about their
having difficulty in making the land rent payment.
Another set of inefficient land users can be
identified by the WAEAP curve. We understand that the
WAEAP curve to a great extent reflects the average status
quo land "usefulness" to enterprises. The inefficient land
users, who see land is trivial to their production, are to
be found far below the WAEAP level at any given location.
It is these inefficient land users that bring down the
general level of the WAEAP curve. Thus, removing some
extremely low observations 10/ will result in a raised
level of the WAEAP curve. The additional area covered by
the raised WAEAP curve then represents the increased
10/ Statistically speaking, 2.5% of the firms are below 1.96
standard error of the WAEAP curve, and 5% below 1.65 standard
error, and so forth (please also refer to Table 6-10 for the
schedule).
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social-rental value from an improve land use (please also
refer to Figure 2-6). Removing the low points can be
thought of as an improvement of their land use to a
compatible level at their current locations, or to relocate
them to more appropriate locations because they are
mislocated in the first place.
Based on this reasoning, we designed two scenarios,
in one case 5% of the most inefficient land users will be
"removed" and the other 10%, and calculate the percentage
increase of the societal rent value covered by the new
WAEAP curve. The results are summarized in Table 6-11. In
Yantai's case, removing 5% of the most inefficient land
users will increase the social-rental value by a 9.1%, and
removing 10% will increase 13.3%. In Jinan's case, 5% of
the most inefficient land users accounts for 4.1% social-
rental value loss, and 10% for 7.2%. The estimates seem to
indicate that a government strategy to focus on a smaller
percent of most inefficient land users, say 5%, is to be
more effective in raising the social-rental value, than a
strategy that has a wider focus, say, 10% of the lowest
land productivity enterprises.
Finally, to help identify the bad and good land
users, we constructed a land use and economic efficiency
profile for "bad," "average," and "good" land users. We
first created two additional sub-databases. One contains
all the "abnormal" enterprises, that is, the cases
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Table 6-11
SOCIAL GAIN FROM IMPROVED LAND USE
% Increase in Social-Rental Value
% of Firms ---------------------------------
"Removed" Yantai Jinan
5.0 9.1 4.1
10.0 13.3 7.2
NOTE:
a) The base WAEAP function is adopted from Table 6-9.
b) New WAEAP functions (standard error in parentheses):
ln(Rent)Jinan, 5% - 2.7391 - .2286 (Distance to CBD)
(.080) (.024)
R-square: .1860 (.933); F-significance: .0000.
ln(Rent)Jinan,10% = 2.8564 - .2349 (Distance to CBD)
(.075) (.022)
R-square: .2274 (.085); F-significance: .0000.
ln(Rent)Yantai, 59- 2.9519 - .4812 (Distance to CBD)
(.143) (.055)
R-square: .2694(1.239); F-significance: .0000.
ln(Rent)Yantai,10%= 3.1349 - .5256 (Distance to CBD)
(.143) (.053)
R-square: .3245(1.191); F-significance: .0000.
c) Integrated distance: Jinan = 5 km; Yantai = 3 km.
SOURCE: Estimated from the survey data.
eliminated from the subsets of data testing (see section
"Tests from the Sebsets of Data") because they have
negative land-earning shares. There are 55 of such type of
enterprises, making up about 1/10 of all the valid cases.
This database serves as the "bad" land users. The other
sub-database, serves as the "good" land users, containing
the cases whose marginal product of land are placed at the
top 10 percentile of each of the four subsets of data
tested through Tables 5a to 5d. There are 63 cases in this
database. Having controlled for sector and city, we
270
calculated a set of land-use and economic-efficiency
indices of these two databases, and also calculated the
same set of indices for the whole group, serving as the
"average" land user's profile. The results are summarized
in Table 6-12.
Table 6-12 shows that "bad," "average," and "good"
land users all have distinctive profiles. First, on
average, "bad" land users allocated much more land per
worker than the "average" land users do, and the latter, in
turn, allocate more land per worker than the "good" land
users (for Jinan commerce: 36, 19, and 3.5 square meter per
worker for "bad," "average," and "good" land users
respectively; Jinan industry: 99, 71, 13; Yantai commerce:
260, 64, 16; and Yantai industry: 98, 68, 15). "Bad" land
users also do not use land intensively, judging by the
average floor-area ratio, i.e., building floor space over
land area, of each controlled group (for Jinan commerce:
.8, 1.16, and 1.89 for "bad," "average," and "good" land
users, respectively; Jinan industry: .29, .71, 1.27; Yantai
commerce: .37, .98, .91; and Yantai industry: .45, .69,
1.7). "Bad" land users, on average, are having a very low
land productivity compared with "average" and "good" land
users (for Jinan commerce: .34, .52, and 2.01 thousand yuan
per square meter of land for "bad," "average," and "good"
land users, respectively; Jinan commerce: .04, .34, .37;
Yantai commerce: .05, 1.61, 6.62; and Yantai industry: .15,
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Table 6-12
PROFILE OF "BAD," "AVERAGE," AND "GOOD" LAND USERS a
"Bad" Users "Average" Users "Good" Users
Mean (S.D., N) Mean (S.D., N) Mean (S.D., N)
Jinan Commerce:
Land per worker 36.63 78.6,11 19.29 31.5,280 3.50 2.5,17
Floor-area Ratio .80 .7,11 1.16 .7,262 1.89 1.5,17
Output/Land .34 .8,11 .52 .7,280 2.01 1.8,17
Labor Produc. 3104 (4316,11) 4479 (4140,392) 9254 (10136,17)
Jinan Industry:
Land per worker 98.70 88.6,12 70.71 (70.1,201 13.19 15.6,22
Floor-area Ratio .29 .3,12 .71 .6,200 1.27 1.0,22
Output/Land .04 .1,12 .34 2.9,201 .37 .2,22
Labor Produc. 1855 ( 870,12) 5372 (13721,212) 8177 (15539,22)
Yantai Commerce:
Land per worker 259.61 115.3, 9 64.39 (122.5, 88 16.20 16.0,15
Floor-area Ratio .37 .3, 9 .98 .7, 86 .91 .1,15
Output/Land .05 .0, 9 1.61 3.0, 88 6.62 3.9,15
Labor Produc. 16123 (15134, 9) 31266 86347,142) 132438 (179631,15)
Yantai Industry:
Land per worker 98.28 98.0,23 68.35 84.0,142 15.01 11.8, 7
Floor-area Ratio .45 .4,23 .69 .6,138 1.70 1.6, 7
Output/Land .15 .4,23 .16 .2,142 .42 .1, 7
Labor Produc. 2901 (1781,23) 4376 (3109,151) 9201 (6916, 7)
UNITS: Land per worker - square meter/worker.
Floor-area Ratio = square meter/square meter.
Fixed Capital/Land = yuan/square meter.
Output/Land = yuan/square meter.
Labor Productivity = yuan/year.
NOTE: a) Definitions of "bad," "average," and "good" land users are given
in the text.
SOURCE: Calculated from the survey data.
S.D. = standard deviation.
N = Number of cases.
Labor Produc. = Labor Productivity.
.16, .42). Last, "bad" land users also turned out to be
the least productive enterprises, measured by labor
productivity (for Jinan commerce: 3104, 4479, and 9254 yuan
per year for "bad," "average," and "good" land users,
respectively; Jinan industry: 1855, 5372, 8177; Yantai
commerce: 16123, 31266, 132438, and Yantai industry: 2901,
272
4376, 9201). This last index is especially interesting,
because it indicates that the unproductive enterprises are
also the ones that employ the land factor most
inefficiently, and there is a great potential to raised
land productivity at city level by targeting the most
inefficient enterprises.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed several functional
forms of production functions and their relevant
properties. Based on the three-input, one-output
transcendental logarithmic production function, we
developed a set of models to describe the production
process and to estimate the shadow factor shares and the
marginal product of factors. These models are tested,
using both the pooled data from the two case-study cities
and subsets of that data. We find that land in these two
cities contributes to 3% of the total product on a three-
year average, while the labor and capital make up 72% and
25% of the total product, respectively. With the exception
of the land share that seems to be at the lower boundary,
which is understandable because land was not competitively
allocated, our estimates are not unreasonable when compared
to the empirical studies in the literature.
One reason the land share constitutes only 3% of the
economic product is because about 10% of the enterprises in
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the two cities actually "cross-subsidize" land with other
factors, that is to say, they use the profits earned from
other underpaid factors to cover the shadow "loss" from
lard. After we identified and eliminated this type of
"variant" enterprise and re-estimated the production
functions, the mean land shares increased significantly.
For different subsets of data, the means of the land share
range between 7% and 17%. This indicates that the land
resource is not being efficiently utilized by the economy
as a whole. A small number of enterprises seems to create
a large land waste.
Two more micro-economic concepts are used to aid in
an assessment of whether our predicted marginal product of
land is realistic and reasonable. First, we estimated the
elasticity of substitution between land and other factors.
Various models are used to test capital-land, labor-land,
and land-"nonland" elasticities of substitution. We find
that the u's implied by our models are all unitary or
slightly over one. The reason for this is that the
variation in factor shares predicted by our model is not
large. In this regard, our model resembles more of the
characteristics of the Cobb-Douglas than the CES production
function.
Second we studied the rent gradients that pertain to
the estimated marginal land product data. We find that
negative rent gradients exist in our estimates with a
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reasonable slope (-14% and -16% per kilometer) and reliable
coefficients. We also conclude that, on average, at
virtually every location the commercial sector can offer a
higher rent than industry. This implies that once the
free-trade of land is allowed, the commercial sector will
undoubtedly dominate the land market.
Finally, we analyze the policy implications of the
findings of this study. Based on the estimated marginal
product of land of every individual enterprise, we
generalize a weighted average enterprise affordable price
curve (WAEAP curve) that indicates the average social-
rental value at any given location. There are two major
differences between the WAEAP curve and the land-price
structure in a competitive economy, (1) the WAEAP curve is
a result of a bureaucratic resource allocation; and (2)
the level of WAEAP curve is directly affected by improving
land use. The first difference signifies that collecting
land rent according to WAEAP pricing should be temporary
because it does not signal land users what is the "best and
highest" use of land. As the situation permits, a new rent
structure should be instituted based on the records that
reflects the bona-fide deeds and arm's length negotiations.
The second difference calls for setting a local rather than
central or provincial land charge, in order to create a
"prisoner's dilemma" situation to counterbalance the
disincentives that might be induced by the proposed rent
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charge. Two scenario analyses further examine the
consequences of setting the rent at different levels and
the gain of social-rental value from different strategies
that target the most inefficient land users.
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Chapter VII
CONCLUSION: TOLD AND UNTOLD STORIES
This thesis demonstrates that land has a tangible
economic value to the economy even though the society has
deliberately chosen to suppress its price, and exempting
land from the price system achieves nothing but encouraging
resource waste and fostering government bureaucracy. This
conclusion is drawn from empirical analyses of data that
were obtained from field surveys, in which over 1,000
enterprises in two Chinese cities, namely, Yantai and Jinan
in Shandong Province, were surveyed.
We started by analyzing the behavior of the basic
production unit of the economy--the enterprise. We
concluded that in these two Chinese cities a partial
rationality in enterprise economic behavior had been
induced since its economic reform of the early 1980s.
Decentralization of decision-making had made enterprises
much more flexible than before in response to market needs
and price changes. We find, in particular, that use of
temporary workers has become a common practice among the
enterprises. Apparently there were mechanisms in the
system that link productivity of an enterprise to workers'
compensation. We could even postulate that some Chinese
enterprises had tried to pay workers in accordance to the
marginal product of labor. All these seemed to suggest
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that the reform had given incentives to enterprise to
improve its use of resources, which made land, a major
economic input, a non-trivial good to enterprises. There
was, nevertheless, a wide spectrum of behavior patterns in
the enterprises that were observed, ranging from rational
and normal to totally irrational and variant. Our
quantitative methodology, unfortunately, could not estimate
how much resource had been wasted by enterprises due to
price distortions in the economy, government interventions,
and inefficient tenure arrangements.
Resource scarcity and a growing of "bureaucratic
mentality" made officers in charge of land allocation
extremely cautious about location decisions they made. By
dropping the temporal dimension from our evaluation, we
detected partial and limited rational behavior of
bureaucrats. We, for instance, observed a strong tendency
for commercial enterprises to be located in central
locations. We discovered the existence of differential
land productivity with respect to the CBD. We looked into
whether there was evidence that enterprises tried to
squeeze the untaxed "economic rent" by substituting nonland
factors for land at the already-assigned locations, and
found a very weak and rather inconclusive tendency. We
concluded that there was a wide range of results due to the
bureaucratic land allocation. There was indication that a
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large wastage of land existed, especially in the industrial
sector in both study cities.
We developed a set of models to evaluate the factor
shares, the marginal product of factors, and the elasticity
of substitution based upon the transcendental logarithmic
production function. Our model indicated that averaging
two cities and all industries, land contributes to 3% of
the total economic product of enterprises. We subsequently
found that the land share is raised significantly (between
7% and 17%) when we divided the data into subsets and
excluded the cases that had a negative marginal product of
land. Our model suggested that once land trading is
allowed, the commercial sector will be the one that
controls land-use patterns, because it can justify paying a
much higher price for land than industry.
There was an indication that a small number of
enterprises (about 10% of the sample) were operating an
internal shadow "cross-subsidy," that is, they covered
their land-use inefficiency by, say, paying them less than
they deserve. Two conclusions could be made from this
observation. First, the economies in the two cities were
far from being competitive in allowing enterprises who
totally disregard the marginal pricing rule to survive.
Second, there was significant waste of land resources
perhaps caused by only a small number of enterprises.
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The data supporting this research were from a
centrally planned economy (CPE) where by definition it is
"legitimate" for government to participate in a wide range
of enterprise and individual decisions. In the analysis,
however, we seemed to be given an impression that sometimes
enterprises and even bureaucrats did not behave totally
randomly. Many decisions that were made both at the micro-
and macro-levels seemed to have some partial rationality.
What we learned from this exercise is, therefore, that any
form of economy, even for a centrally planned, is most
likely not a simple phenomenon. It has its own mechanisms
that solicit "reasonable" options for resource allocation,
and we need to achieve a certain level of sophistication to
discuss its problems. In a CPE the pressures from the
resource scarcity and the prevailing "bureaucratic
mentality," (that is, fear of punishment make bureaucrats
avoid making decisions), might actually curb some totally
irrational decisions at a heavy cost of time. Therefore,
what seems to be suggested by this research is that the
problems with the CPE is perhaps not so much how many bad
decisions the planners make in allocating a resource, but
rather in how few good decisions they make and how long it
takes to make them. Still, a more severe problem with the
CPE is that there is no mechanism in the system that
corrects the mistakes once made, because to undo then redo
something needs more procedures and, thus, much too long a
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time to complete. Therefore, what we often observe is that
once a big mistake is made, a CPE will be contented merely
to have the ones responsible punished, or to have nobody
blamed.
The issue of establishing a land market in China is
complex. It is further complicated by the monolithic
state-ownership of land and the restrictions imposed on
land transfer, which are all stipulated by the
constitution. The constitution can always be revised, as
China just did in regard to land, but it is unrealistic to
expect in the near future that China will grant great
flexibility to economic agents to seek efficient land-
tenure arrangements. With this in mind, one option to
facilitate land transfer and to minimize the social
inequality is to create a first-tier leasing agreement and
a secondary leasing market. The first-tier tenants, who
currently occupy the state land, would obtain a lease from
the state by paying a proper rent. Then they could openly
trade their land-use rights with any perspective second-
tier tenants in a secondary leasing market.
In this spirit, we proposed a land-rent scheme,
based on a weighted average of estimated shadow land value
of all the enterprises at all the locations. We suggested
that the weighted average pricing should only be an
expedient measure because it does not represent the "best
and highest" land-use pricing. We also demonstrated that a
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land-rent system based on our proposal has to be a local
one. We further analyzed the trade-off scenarios between
the lost social rental value and the proportion of
enterprises that might have difficulty to pay. We also
proposed an approach to evaluate the gain from improved
land use.
Whatever option the state might select, words of
caution are warranted. It is not reasonable to expect that
making land prices explicit will remedy price distortions
in the economy; the change will only help, but it will be a
major step towards slimming them down. Moreover, it is
unrealistic for the state to expect that the proposed land
tax will raise a large revenue. Our analysis indicates
that the labor reward is already excessively low judging
from the total marginal labor product (i.e., when the
marginal product of labor is estimated using total output
measured by value-added, including all the central and
local taxes). To continue to squeeze the enterprise for
revenue will further diminish labor's incentives to work.
The state may have to consider reducing other enterprise
taxes so as to help them pay the land tax.
The analysis we presented in this thesis shows that
rational behavior by enterprises can be induced when the
enterprise is given autonomy to make decisions according to
its own specific economic considerations. The rational
behavior of enterprises, in turn, will greatly improve the
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efficiency of resource use and allocation. China's
economic reform in many aspects seems to have moved on a
right track. We encourage the urban land reform in China,
and hope the market will rationalize enterprise and
individual behavior, will provide more opportunities and
choices to enterprises and individuals, will create a
dynamic and energetic economic structure, and will reduce
resource waste by the bureaucratic allocation process.
While praising the "invisible hand," however, we
want to stress that we should also be aware that the market
is not the "Be all and end all," and certainly not the only
possible solution for all the problems in China. The
market alone cannot produce the social justice and
progress. The balance between individual opportunities and
the communal interest, its values and morale needs has to
be maintained. Last, but not least, a government is always
needed to safeguard competition, to protect consumers'
interest, to supply public goods and services, and to
provide for social welfare. What we must remember is what
the worldwide experience tells us vividly that any
government that is totally ineffective, corrupt, and
discredited by its people will not bring economic
prosperity to its people, regardless of how sound its
economic policies.
283
EPILOGUE
I had completed most research of this thesis before
April 1989, with great enthusiasm that China, the largest
nation in the world that was isolated for many years, was
on her way to become a full member of the international
community. Later on, like millions of TV viewers
everywhere, I watched the unfolding of the Tiananmen Event.
Thousands and thousands people went on the streets with
banners, then the gunshots and roaring of tanks filled the
air of Beijing City . . . all these manifested that a great
change had taken place in China. What difference the
Tiananmen Event made in the course of China's development
remains to be seen. Only history will tell.
Undoubtedly the Tiananmen Event has its historical
significance: it affects the lives of millions and the
future of the nation. In a small way, I also felt the
impact of the Event--because of my research related to this
thesis. To begin with this research was not meant to have
this ending, yet it now has become nothing but a mere
academic exercise, a mental excursion to satisfy my own
intellectual curiosity (which, I reckon, is perhaps what a
thesis is all about, anyway).
In spite of the unforeseen change, I do not intend
to modify the structure, the presentation, and the
conclusions of the thesis. Let it be the way it was. It
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represents a small attempt, as objectively and honestly as
I have tried, to record an episode that occurred in the
exciting moment of China's economic reform.
We all hope that China's future is more predictable.
When the former U.S. President Carter was invited to China
some years ago as a state guest, he visited an old American
lady who had spent most of her adult life in Shanghai and
had finally settled there. When the President humbly asked
her to shed light on what China's future would look like,
she pointed to the thick clouds in the sky, said, "Sir, do
you know whether it's going to rain or not?"
We must learn to cope with unpredictable events.
Tao, a prominent Chinese ancient philosopher, had some
insights on this regard. One of his moral tales goes that
once upon a time, there was a family with an old farmer,
his wife, his young son, and several small daughters. The
family had a young male horse, who was indispensable in
farming and house work. One day they found the horse
missing. The old farmer tried to comfort the grieving
family. He said that sometimes a misfortune could become a
fortune. It just so happened that a few days later, the
missing horse came back, accompanied by a female wild
horse. Naturally the family was jubilant: now they had
not just one but two horses, and possibly more baby horses.
Trying to calm down the over-jubilant family, the old
farmer again advised them that sometimes a fortune could
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become a misfortune. It just so happened that a few weeks
later, the son fell off the horse after a heavy drinking
and celebration with his friends. The village doctor
confirmed that the son could never walk again. The
farmer's family was in grief, and the old farmer, again,
tried his misfortune/fortune consolation. A few months
later, it just so happened, a war broke out. All the young
men were drafted to fight the war, and few returned. The
son did not go because he was handicapped.
I found this story enlightening and inspiring, as
far as China's situation is concerned. Presently the news
from China is not most encouraging; I, however, would like
to stay calm and remain cool, just like the old farmer.
Maybe one day I will find myself working on the China land-
reform project again, and my research is in demand. Who
knows. We will see.
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Annex: Survey instruments
JINAN URBAN ENTERPRISE LOCATION AND LAND USE SURVEY
QUESTIONNAIRE (Commerce)
Unit: Money--1,000 yuan; Area--Square Meter
(All the data should be year-end numbers)
No.
General Information
Name of the enterprise:
Address:
Date of establishment:
Scale (Circle one): Large and Medium, Small, Unknown
Ownership (Circle one):
SOE: Central, Provincial, Municipal, Other
Collective: Provincial, Municipal, Sub-City, Other
Private, Joint-Venture, Other (such as coops)
Type of Business (Circle one):
1.Commerce; 2.Restaurants; 3.Services.
A. Information on Firm Size 1984 1985 1986
a. Number of workers (1)
b. O/w: contract and temporary workers (2)
c. Fixed assets, original value (3)
d. Fixed assets, net value (4)
e. Total circulation funds (5)
f. O/w: Self-owned circulation (6)
B. Sales Revenue (7)
C. Ordering Cost (8)
D. Gross Sales Profit (9)=(7)-(8)
E. Circulating Cost (10)
F. Sales Taxes and Fees (11)=(12)+(13)+(14)+(15)+(16)
a. Operating tax (12)
b. UMCT (13)
c. Property tax (14)
d. Vehicle license tax (15)
e. Other taxes and fees (16)
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G. Operating Profits (17)-(9)-(l0)-(ll)
H. Other Expense and Revenue Incurred Outside Operation (18)
I. Net Extra-Operation Income (19)
J. Net Profit (20)-(17)+(18)+(19)
K. Loan Repayment (21)
L. Profits Subject to Tax (22)-(20)-(21)
M. Profits Tax (23)
N. Adjustment Tax (24)
0. Retained Earnings (25)-(22)-(23)-(24)
P. Allocation of Retained Earning (26)-(27)+. .. +(31)
a. Production development (27)
b. Employees' welfare (28)
c. Wage bonus (29)
d. Central E&T fund (30)
e. Other (31)
Q. Land Use Information
a. Total land area (32)
b. Ground floor area of Buildings (33)
c. Total building area (34)
O/w: Productive (35)
Non-productive (36)
d. Number of locations (37)
e. Is your shop on the first floor (38)
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JINAN URBAN ENTERPRISE LDCATION AND LAND USE SURVEY
QUESTIONNAIRE (Industry)
Unit: Money--1,000 yuan; Area--Square Meter
(All the data should be year-end numbers)
No.
General Information
Name of the enterprise:
Address:
Date of establishment:
Scale (Circle one): Large, Medium, Small, Unknown
Ownership (Circle one):
SOE: Central, Provincial, Municipal, Other
Collective: Provincial, Municipal, Sub-City, Other
Private, Joint-Venture, Other (such as coops)
Type of Business (Circle one):
1.Metallurgical; 2.Construction materials; 3.Textile; 4.Light ind
5.Machine building; 6.Electronics; 7.Chemical; 8.Pharmacy;
9.Construction; 10.Electricity; ll.Transportation; 12.Coal
13. Petroleum; 14.Other.
A. Firm Size information 1984 1985 1986
a. Number of workers (1)
b. O/w: contract and temporary employees (2)
c. Gross output (3)
d. Fixed assets, original value (4)
e. Fixed assets, net value (5)
f. Total circulation funds (6)
g. O/w: Self-owned circulation (7)
B. Gross Revenue (8)-(9)+(10)
a. Total sales revenue (9)
b. Other revenues (10)
C. Total Cost (l1)=(12)+...+(17)
a. Wages (12)
b. Raw materials and fuel (13)
c. Depreciation (14)
d. Property tax, licence tax, etc. (15)
e. Interest (16)
f. Other expenses counted as cost (17)
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D. Sales Taxes and Fees (18)-(19)+(20)+(21)
a. "Three taxes" (19)
b. UMCT (20)
c. Other taxes and fees (21)
E. Other Expenses (22)
F. Total profits (23)-(8)-(ll)-(15)-(22)
G. Loan Repayment and Two Retained Earnings (24)
H. Profits Subject to Tax (25)-(23)-(24)
I. Profits Tax (26)
J. Adjustment Tax (27)
K. Retained Earnings (28)-(25)-(26)-(27)
L. Balance from Last Year's Retained Earnings (29)
M. Grant Transfer from Governments (30)
N. Net Retained Earning (31)-(28)+(29)+(30)
0. Allocation of the Net Retained Earnings (32)
a. Production development (33)
b. Employees' welfare (34)
c. Wage bonus (35)
d. Reserved funds (36)
e. New products development (37)
f. Central E&T fund (38)
g. Other (39)
P. Balance of This Year (40)-(31)-(32)
Q. Land Use Information
a. Total land area (41)
b. Building ground floor area (42)
c. Total building area (43)
O/w: Productive (44)
Non-productive (45)
d. Number of location (46)
290
YANTAI URBAN ENTERPRISE LOCATION AND LAND USE SURVEY
QUESTIONNAIRE
Unit: Money--10,000 yuan; Area--Square meter
Name of the enterprise:
Address:
Industry/Sector:
1.General Information
A. Number of Employees
B. Number of Temporary EmployE
C. Fixed Assets
Original Value
Net Value
D. Circulation Funds
E. One Location or More
F. Scale (Large, medium, or sr
2.Revenue, Cost, and Taxes
A. Gross Output
B. Total Sales
C. Sales Taxes (Incl. UMCT,
D. Cost
Of which:
Date of Establishment:
Ownership:
Zone the enterprise located:
1984 1985 1986
1984 1985 1986
Education surcharge, etc.)
Wages
Deductible Wage Bonus
Raw Materials
Depreciation
Energy and PU Fee
Interest
Effluent Charge
Other Tax
Total Profit
Profits Tax
Adjustment Tax
Central Energy & Transportation Funds
Retained Profits
Production Development
Reserved Funds
New Products Development
Employees' welfare
Wage Bonus
Wage Bonus Tax
3.Land Use Information
A. Total Land Area
B. Total Building Area
Productive
Non-Productive
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